Harrison v. General Motors Corp

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 01-10469
Summary Calendar
_______________________
LANA HARRISON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
Civil Docket No.: 3:00-CV-1272-X
_________________________________________________________________
October 17, 2001
Before JONES, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The court has carefully considered this appeal in light
of the briefs and pertinent portions of the record. Appellant
Harrison concedes that her suit is barred by the Texas statute of
limitations unless she has met her burden to show an excuse for her
failure to serve process on Appellee GMC within the time set by the
statute. Specifically, Harrison’s burden was to show that she was
diligent in seeking to serve process. Harrison does not dispute

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that her attorney’s lack of diligence as to service of process is
imputed to her, but she argues that because the attorney committed
fraud on her by filing the suit pro se without her consent and by
forging her signature on a pleading, this case is different.
We disagree. The district court correctly relied on
Weaver v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 942 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Ct. App.
1997). Harrison “cannot rely upon any failure on the part of [her]
chosen attorney as diligence or an excuse for lack of diligence,
because the acts of one’s attorney [are] imputed to the client.”
Id. at 170 (emphasis added). In the Weaver case, the plaintiff’s
attorneys falsely assured her they would serve process. That case
was nearly as amenable to a charge of fraud as the instant one, yet
the court affirmed dismissal. See also Rodriguez v. Tinsman &
Houser, Inc., 13 S.W.3d 47, 51 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). For the
reasons stated by the district court in its memorandum opinion and
order, the judgment of the court is AFFIRMED.

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