Bridges v. Dept of Social Svcs

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
m 00-30804
Summary Calendar
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SANDRA J. BRIDGES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
(98-CV-931)
_________________________
April 27, 2001
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES,
and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
Sandra Bridges requested a designated han-
dicapped parking space from her employer, the
Department of Social Services (“DSS”).
When she did not get one, she sued under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
claiming that she did not receive a reasonable
accommodation. The district court granted
summary judgment for DSS, and we affirm.
I.
Bridges experiences pain in walking.
Although her condition does not prevent her
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the
limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.

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either from working in the office or from
household chores, she requested a parking
space close to the building to minimize her
walking distance. The DSS accommodated
her request by assigning her to a space in the
parking garage near the building as soon as it
became available, whereas she previously had
to park in an open lot across the street.
Bridges contends that she should have
received a designated “handicapped” parking
space. She complains that when the
handicapped space became available, it was
assigned to another employee who had
requested an accommodation.
Bridges avers that she must park in a
“stacked” space, which requires her to make
extra trips to the garage to accommodate the
person in the other space. DSS explains that
the handicapped slot is the only parking space
closer to the building than is the one Bridges
uses; the two spaces are separated only by the
width of a driveway.
II.
We review a summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standards as did the district
court. Vielma v. Eureka Co., 218 F.3d 458,
462 (5th Cir. 2000). We draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-movant.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is
proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
III.
The ADA requires that covered entities
make “reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability
who is an applicant or employee unless such
covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business of
such covered entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)-
(5)(A). Bridges can state a claim for
discrimination based on her employer’s failure
to accommodate a disability by showing that
(1) the employer is covered by the statute; (2)
she is an individual with a disability; (3) she
can perform the essential functions of the job
with or without reasonable accommodations;
and (4) the employer had notice of the
disability and failed to provide
accommodation. Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68
F.3d 1512, 1515 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that a
failure to provide a parking space for a
disabled employee may present a cognizable
claim under the ADA).
DSS does not contest that it is a covered
entity and that Bridges can perform the
essential functions of the job.1 Although
1 A failure-to-accommodate claim under the
ADA is distinct from a claim of disparate treatment
and is analyzed separately under the law. E.g.,
Green v. Nat’l Steel Corp., 197 F.3d 894, 897-98
(7th Cir. 1999). Such failure to accommodate,
however, may provide evidence of disparate
treatment. See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d
305, 314 (5th Cir. 1997) (“A wrongful termination
claim under the ADA is not properly analyzed
under a reasonable accommodation theory unless
an employer is shown to have terminated a
qualified individual with a disability in order to
avoid accommodating that employee’s impairments
at the workplace.”). Because Bridges alleges no
adverse employment action, we need not apply
disparate treatment analysis here. To the extent
that the district court relied on disparate treatment
analysis to grant summary judgment for DSS, it
erred. We may affirm, however, on any basis
(continued...)

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Bridges has suffered no adverse employment
action, she may still raise a claim of
discrimination based on the alleged failure
reasonably to accommodate her disability. See
Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel, Inc., 178 F.3d 731,
734 (5th Cir. 1999). To raise this claim
independently of a disparate treatment claim,
however, she “must demonstrate that a
substantially limiting impairment somehow
affected [her] ability to perform [her] job.
Without such a showing, there would be
nothing for an employer to accommodate.”
Burch, 119 F.3d at 315 n.4.
A.
We must consider whether Bridges is dis-
abled within the meaning of the ADA, which
defines “disability” as “(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more o f the major life functions of such
individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such impair-
ment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). “[T]he
impairment must be substantially limiting at the
time of the requested accommodation.” Burch
v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 315 (5th Cir.
1997).
To examine “major life functions” and sub-
stantial limitations, we look to the regulations
promulgated by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. Dutcher v. Ingalls
Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir.
1995). These regulations classify walking as a
major life function. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(i)). The definition of “substantially
limits” includes “significantly restricted as to
the condition, manner, or duration under
which an individual can perform a particular
major life activity as compared to the
condition, manner, or duration under which
the average person under which the average
person in the general population can perform
the same major life activity.” Id. (citing 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)).
Bridges can walk around the office and can
do household chores, shopping, and yard
work. She has identified no activity in which
she cannot engage. She asserts, however, that
she attempts to minimize walking because it
causes her pain. This condition does not qual-
ify as a “significant” restriction on her ability
to walk within the meaning of the ADA.2
B.
Even if we were to conclude that Bridges is
“significantly restricted as to the . . . duration”
of her walking, she could not recover, because
she has not demonstrated that DSS knew of
her disability and failed to make reasonable
accommodation. Bridges had several informal
conversations with her supervisors about her
parking assignment in an open lot some
distance from the office building, and she made
a formal request for accommodation in July
1996. In September 1996, the DSS assigned
her a parking space in the office building
garage. This spot is precisely sixty feet, six
inches from the entrance to the building.
Bridges’s main complaint with the
1(...continued)
supported by the record. Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d
504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999).
2 See Dutcher, 53 F.3d at 726 n.11 (concluding
that difficulty in picking little things up from the
floor, operating a car ignition, or holding things
high up or really tightly for long periods of time did
not present sufficient evidence for a jury to
determine that impairment significantly limited a
major life activity). The district court found that
Bridges had not demonstrated a substantial limit to
the major life activity of working. Bridges does not
contest this finding.

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accommodation is that she occasionally has to
make an extra trip to the garage because she
parks in a stacked space.
“The ADA is a federal discrimination
statute designed to remove barriers which
prevent qualified individuals with disabilities
from enjoying the same employment
opportunities that are available to persons
without disabilities.” Taylor v. Principal Fin.
Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 1996).
Bridges has alleged no barrier to her
employment opportunities. Moreover, “the
ADA requires employers to reasonably
accommodate limitations, not disabilities.” Id.
at 164.
“This is a critical distinction, because the
existence vel non of a disability or impairment
is material to a reasonable accommodation
claim only insofar as it limits an employee’s
ability to perform his or her job.” Burch v.
Coca-Cola, Co., 119 F.3d 305, 314 (5th Cir.
1997). Bridges has not alleged any limitation
on her ability to perform her job under the
current arrangement. Therefore, the district
court correctly concluded that DSS had no
duty to provide her with the specific parking
space that she requested.
AFFIRMED.

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