Hayatdavoudi v. Univ LA Sys Bd Trst, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
m 00-30389
Summary Calendar
_______________
ASODOLLAH HAYATAVOUDI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA SYSTEM BOARD OF TRUSTEES
AND
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHWESTERN LOUISIANA,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(97-CV-1846)
_________________________
November 27, 2000
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and
DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
Asodollah Hayatavoudi appeals a summary
judgment in favor of the University of Loui-
siana System Board of Trustees and the Uni-
versity of Southwestern Louisiana2 (collec
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the
limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
*(...continued)
R. 47.5.4.
2 We take judicial notice that the University of
Southwestern Louisiana has since changed its name
(continued...)

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2
tively, the “University”) on his title VII claim
of employment discrimination. Because we
agree with the district court that Hayatavoudi
adduced insufficient evidence of discrimination
to allow a reasonable jury to find the Uni-
versity liable, we affirm.
I.
Hayatavoudi, an Iranian-American of the
Shiite Moslem faith, is a tenured professor in
the petroleum engineering department, headed
by Herman Reike, who joined the University in
1994.3 Hayatavoudi has taught at the Uni-
versity since 1980, except for periods of time
he spent on sabbatical at Stanford University
and on leave because of an injury. With one
exception, however, the events relevant to this
appeal occurred after 1992.
Hayatavoudi alleges several adverse em-
ployment actions.4 First, he complains that in
1994, his supervising dean, Anthony Ponter,
wrongfully denied him a promotion to de-
partment head in favor of a “white male who
was U.S. born.” Second, Hayatavoudi com-
plains about unfavorable performance ratings
from supervisors, resulting in lost raises.
Third, he objects to the 1994 expiration of his
endowed professorship, the revocation of a
research stipend, and the alleged failure to pay
for consulting work. Fourth, he claims he was
subjected to “harsher working conditions” to
“discourage him from continuing in his posi-
tion.” Fifth, he alleges that Ponter and Reike
“continuously [made] defamatory remarks”
about him to students and faculty.
In addition to adverse actions, Hayatavoudi
alleges instances of racial harassment. The
first is a comment made by a colleagueSSwho
has since transferred from the petroleum en-
gineering department to the chemical engin-
eering departmentSSduring the Iran hostage
crisis of the early 1980’s, in which the col-
league called Hayatavoudi “Ayatolla Asodol-
lah.” Hayatavoudi also alleges that the same
colleague lunged at him during a 1982 meet-
ing, calling him names and referring to him as
“dead meat.”
Further, Hayatavoudi contends that
“toward the middle of the [spring] semester of
1995,” Reike sang a “Jewish song” in his
presence. Hayatavoudi also alleges that,
sometime “during the fall or spring of 1996,”
Reike told him that, while Reike had been in
Saudi Arabia, he had seen Saudis “getting rid
of their amadies.”5
The primary basis for Hayatavoudi’s com-
plaint, however, appears to be a March 5,
1996, altercation between him and Reike stem-
ming from a departmental meeting in which
Reike notified the faculty that it would not be
2(...continued)
to the University of Louisiana at Lafayette.
3 We assumeSSwithout decidingSSthat Rieke’s
position as department head places him in a su-
pervisory position over Hayatavoudi for purposes
of title VII analysis.
4 Because this appeal arises from a summary
judgment, we recount the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-movant, Hayatavoudi. See
Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 44 F.3d 308,
312 (5th Cir. 1995). This does not mean, however,
that we must give credence to unsupported
allegations: “[C]onclusory allegations unsupported
by concrete and particular facts will not prevent an
award of summary judgment.” Id. (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247 (1986).
5 An “amady” appears to be a piece of religious
clothing in the Shiite religion.

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3
allowed to utilize the services of the
depart ment secretary as much as in the past.
Upset, the faculty members walked out of the
meeting.
Apparently feeling that Hayatavoudi had led
the uprising, Reike co nfronted him in the
hallway after the meeting. Reike, who is
white, told Hayatavoudi that he was like “the
dogs in the desert, howling as the caravan goes
by,” which, according to Reike, is a reference
to an Arabic proverb. Reike also proclaimed
that Hayatavoudi had wasted departmental
assets and equated the waste with thievery.
The altercation escalated and ended with a
physical confrontation during which, according
to Hayatavoudi, Reike bumped him and called
him an idiot. Hayatavoudi then touched
Reike, at which point Reike told Hayatavoudi
that he had made a “fatal mistake.”6
II.
In October 1996, Hayatavoudi filed a
“charge questionnaire” with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
complaining of discrimination on the basis of
race, religion, nationality, age, and disability.
That charge questionnaire led to an EEOC
complaint in May 1997. The EEOC dismissed
the complaint in a right-to-sue letter a month
later.
Shortly thereafter, Hayatavoudi filed the
instant complaint alleging title VII claims on
theories of adverse employment action and
hostile work environment. After discovery,
the University moved for summary judgment,
which the district court granted after a hearing,
ruling that Hayatavoudi had produced no
evidence indicating that Reike’s evaluations
were mo t ivated by impermissible
discrimination, that Hayatavoudi had not
produced sufficient evidence that the
admittedly hostile environment was the result
of discriminatory animus, and that all the other
complained-of events occurred more than 300
days before the filing of the EEOC charges and
thus were prescribed under title VII.
Hayatavoudi appeals the portion of the
summary judgment rationale that concludes
that he had produced insufficient evidence of
a hostile work environment. He concedes,
however, that his “individual claims of adverse
6 The evidence conflicts regarding the substance
of the physical confrontation. Hayatavoudi
testified in his deposition that Reike “started com-
ing at [Hayatavoudi] with his stomach in front and
started to touch [him],” at which point Hayatavou-
di merely asked Reike to calm down. Then, ac-
cording to Hayatavoudi, Reike proclaimed, “You
touched me, you made your fatal mistake.” Hay-
atavoudi maintained a calm demeanor throughout
the altercation.
In contrast, Reike contends that he and Hay-
atavoudi began screaming at one another, with
Reike pointing his finger at Hayatavoudi's face. In
response, Hayatavoudi shoved Reike, at which
point Reike said, “You assaulted me” and told
Hayatavoudi he had made a fatal mistake, implying
that Hayatavoudi would be punished by the
University for the assault. Reike also contends that
he did not bump Hayatavoudi, but instead that
Hayatavoudi bumped into him. Reike merely
placed his own hands behind his back and “was
going to take the hit.”
(continued...)
6(...continued)
Viewing the facts most favorably to Hayatavou-
di, Reike bumped into Hayatavoudi, causing the
physical confrontation. We find it troubling that,
while both parties agree that several observers
witnessed the confrontation, neither has produced
supporting testimony from any of these witnesses,
who could presumably confirm either
Hayatavoudi’s or Reike’s version of the facts.

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4
employment actions are barred by prescription
or are independently insufficient to constitute
a claim for discrimination. . . . [He] does,
however, reference [those] claims . . . as
supporting evidence that he was subjected to
a hostile environment.”
III.
We review a summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard as did that court.
See Waymire v. Harris County, 86 F.3d 424,
427 (5th Cir. 1996). To survive a motion for
summary judgment, the non-moving party
must present sufficient evidence to support the
elements of its prima facie case. See Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-23
(1986). “Conclusory allegations unsupported
by specific facts, however, will not prevent an
award of summary judgment; ‘the plaintiff
[can]not rest on his allegations . . . to get to a
jury without any significant probative evidence
tending to support the complaint.’” National
Ass’n of Gov. Employees v. City Pub. Serv.
Bd., 40 F.3d 698, 713 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249 (1986)) (modifications in original).
IV.
To survive summary judgment on a hostile
work environment claim, a plaintiff must es-
tablish an issue of fact with respect to each of
the elements: “(1) racially discriminatory intim-
idation, ridicule and insults that are; (2) suf-
ficiently severe or pervasive that they; (3) alter
the conditions of employment; and (4) create
an abusive working environment.” Walker v.
Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 625 (5th Cir. 2000)
(citing DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police
Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 594 (5th Cir.
1995)). To determine whether a work en-
vironment is impermissibly abusive, a court
must consider all aspects of the discriminatory
conduct, including “[its] frequency . . .; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee’s work performance.” Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88
(1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).7
To violate title VII, discriminatory conduct
must be “so severe or pervasive as to alter the
conditions of [the victim’s] employment.” Id.
at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted, mod-
ification in original). Moreover, “an em-
ployee’s subjective belief of discrimination,
however genuine, cannot be the basis of
judicial relief.” Vance v. Union Planters
Corp., 209 F.3d 438, 444 (5th Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
A.
Hayatavoudi acknowledges the infirmity of
any claims related to employment actions
taken more than 300 days before the filing of
his EEOC questionnaire.8 Nor does he
7 Although Faragher dealt specifically with
sexual harassment, the Court drew heavily from
precedent involving racial harassment, noting that,
“[a]lthough racial and sexual harassment will often
take different forms, and standards my [sic] not be
entirely interchangeable, we think there is good
sense in seeking generally to harmonize the
standards of what amounts to actionable
harassment.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786-87 &
n.1.
8 Title VII imposes time limits on plaintiffs
seeking to recover for discriminatory actions. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). When a state or local-
ity provides for an administrative mechanism to
address complaints, as is the case here, a title VII
plaintiff may not recover for discrimination or
harassment occurring more than 300 days before
the filing of an EEOC complaint. See id.; Hucka-
(continued...)

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5
contend that the “continuing violation” theory
serves to insulate those claims from the statute
of limitations.9 Instead, he argues that his em-
ployment history with the University serves as
evidence of the hostile nature of his
relationship with that employer.
Although he cites no authority for his posi-
tion, Hayatavoudi argues that, despite the ab-
sence of any allegation of a continuing
violation, he may use past events as evidence
of a hostile work environment when actual
recovery for those events would be barred by
limitations. Because we conclude that
Hayatavoudi has produced no evidence that
the past employment actions were motivated
by discriminatory animus and, thus, that they
are of no probative value in evaluating his
hostile work environment claim, we need not
decide whether they might properly be used as
evidence supporting a claim of current hostile
environment.
In analyzing each of the alleged adverse
actions, we apply the framework established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973),10 under which a plaintiff seeking
to survive summary judgment must establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. See Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S.
Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000). The defendant may
rebut the prima facie case by producing a
legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for
the employment action; upon such a showing,
the McDonnell Douglas framework
disappears, and the remaining issue is
“discrimination vel non.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
To survive summary judgment, however,
the plaintiff may still show that the defendant’s
proffered justification is mere pretext. See id.
A showing of pretext may, on its own, allow a
trier of fact to infer discriminatory motive. See
id. at 2108.
The first employment action Hayatavoudi
describes is Ponter’s failure to consider him for
appointment to department head. Hayatavoudi
cites Ponter’s deposition testimony that in
choosing a department head, Ponter preferred
8(...continued)
bay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1998).
Because neither party addresses the issue of
whether the filing of a “charge questionnaire” with
the EEOC tolls the statute of limitations under title
VII, we assume, arguendo, that it does. Title VII’s
time limits are not jurisdictional and therefore may
be waived by a party for whom they would
otherwise serve as a defense. See Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).
Thus, to the extent that the University may have
been able to assert a defense based on the fact that
Hayatavoudi’s EEOC complaint was not filed until
June 1997, it has waived that defense by failing to
assert it on appeal.
9 See, e.g., Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery
Assocs., P.A., 139 F.3d 532, 537 (5th Cir. 1998)
(“Application of [the continuing violation” theory
relieves a Title VII plaintiff from the burdens of
proving that the entire violation occurred within the
actionable period provided the plaintiff can show a
series of related acts, one or more of which falls
within the limitations period.”).
10 Normally, the McDonnell Douglas
framework is used in analyzing claims of
discrimination based on adverse employment
action. As discussed supra, Hayatavoudi admits
that he has no viable claims for discriminatory
employment actions. Because, however, he
contends that past employment actions are evidence
of a hostile work environment, we must evaluate
those actions for discriminatory animus. The
McDonnell Douglas framework is an appropriate
device by which to do so.

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“American born” citizens to those of foreign
nationality. Standing alone, such a statement
might be indicative of discriminatory animus;
in the deposition, however, Ponter also
indicated his basis for the statement, that under
his view of United States immigration law, “if
you have a U.S. citizen and a foreigner with
exactly the same qualification, you take the
U.S. citizen.” Viewed in context, Ponter’s
assertion represents merely an imprecise
formulation of his (accurate) view of the
University’s rights under federal immigration
law.11
More importantly, the University has ar-
ticulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory justi-
fication for its failure to consider Hayatavoudi
for the position. Gary Marota, the
University’s vice president for academic
affairs, indicated that he had instructed Ponter
to look for a department head from outside the
department, given the fact that every member
of the department, including Hayatavoudi, had
in the past served as department head, each
“with great disaster.” Given this legitimate
justification for hiring Reike, an outsider,
instead of Hayatavoudi, and the inability of
Hayatavoudi to show that the justification is
pretext, we cannot conclude that the
University's choice of department head results
from any racial, ethnic, or religious animus.
Hayatavoudi complains about his
unfavorable performance evaluations. He
contends that the unfavorable scores and
comments included in his evaluations are the
result of discriminatory animus and are not
indicative of his actual performance. The
record reflects that, while Hayatavoudi’s
overall scores are generally unfavorableSShe
has received a rating of four every year since
Reike began the evaluation process, except for
1997, when he received a “three-star”12SSthey
are not substantially worse than those of any
other member of the department, with the
exception of Ali Ghalambour, an Iranian
professor who consistently receives ratings of
one and two. Notably, Hayatavoudi has failed
to show that he was treated differently, with
respect to his overall scores, from any non-
minority member of the department.13
More than the overall scores, Hayatavoudi
complains about his ratings in the area of re-
search, where he has received consistently low
scores.14 The record reflects, however, that
the unfavorable evaluations were always ac-
companied by detailed explanations, providing
legitimate justification for the ratings.
Hayatavoudi often failed to sign the
evaluations, because he felt they were unfair,
11 Ponter’s exposition of the law on this point is
correct: “[I]t is not an unfair immigration-related
employment practice for a person or other entity to
prefer to hire, recruit or refer an individual who is
a citizen or national of the United States over
another individual who is an alien if the two
individuals are equally qualified.” 8 U.S.C. §
1324b(a)(4).
12 The faculty rating system allows an
evaluatorSSin this case, ReikeSSto assign ratings
from one to four. One is the highest rating a
professor can attain under the system, while four
indicates unsatisfactory performance. Three
indicates satisfactory performance, while “three-
star” indicates performance at a level slightly high-
er than three.
13 Although the petroleum engineering
department had only one non-minority member,
that professor consistently received ratings of four.
14 It is undisputed that Hayatavoudi received
consistently high ratings from Reike in his teaching
evaluations.

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and he made numerous complaints to
University administrat ion about the
evaluations; there is, however, no evidence in
the record that those complaints alleged any
racial, ethnic, or religious motivation for the
evaluations. Moreover, the record reflects that
Hayatavoudi failed to take advantage of
invitations to discuss his evaluations with the
University administration.
Regarding the substance of the
evaluationsSSthat he failed to meet standards
for scholarly productionSSHayatavoudi argues
that he has produced fifteen publications, one
patent, and four pending patents. In his
deposition, however, he could point to only
one publication, four abstracts, and no
proposals during the first eight months of 1998
and two or three abstracts, resulting in two
publications, during 1997. One of the 1997
publications discussed his sole patent, which
appears to cover an invention made during the
course of an independent contract with an
outside company, not within the scope of his
employment at the University.
Although Hayatavoudi remembers
publishing something in 1996, he cannot
remember the substance of that article. Reike
stated, in his deposition, that he instructed
Hayatavoudi to produce at least one research
proposal per semester and that Hayatavoudi
had failed to comply with that instruction;
Hayatavoudi does not dispute this contention.
To summarize, other than a vague statement
regarding the number of publications he has
produced throughout his career, Hayatavoudi
can point to no evidence showing that his
production deserves a rating higher than four.
On this record, there is nothing to show that
the University’s justification for Hayatavoudi's
low evaluationsSSthat he failed to produce
enough publications or proposalsSSis mere
pretext.
Hayatavoudi next takes issue with what he
terms the “revocation” of his endowed
professorship. Hayatavoudi contends that the
revocation is the result of discrimination. The
University admits that Hayatavoudi lost the
professorship but contends that the
professorship is awarded on renewable three-
year terms. Because Hayatavoudi failed to re-
apply for the professorship, it expired.
Hayatavoudi does not dispute that he failed
to reapply for the professorship but seems to
contend that he did not need to reapply. Not-
ably, he has not produced any evidence that
the expiration of his professorship was related
to racial, ethnic, or religious animus or that his
failure to reapply is merely pretext for
discrimination.
Hayatavoudi also complains about a
research stipend that was revoked when his
research was not approved. Although he
alleges that the research was pre-approved and
that the disapproval was therefore improper,
he provides no evidence supporting the
allegation. Such a bare allegation is not
probative with respect to the issue of whether
the stipend revocation was motivated by
discrimination. Neither the expiration of
Hayatavoudi’s professorship nor the
revocation of his research stipend evidences
any racial, ethnic, or religious animus.
Hayatavoudi alleges that in an attempt to
force him to resign, the University subjected
him to “harsher working conditions” than
those faced by other faculty members. The
only support we can find in the record for this
allegation is the assertion in his affidavit that
“[h]e was never provided a safe environment
to teach [sic] after his injury and did have to

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teach in his dormitory for a period of time.”15
The record reflects that Hayatavoudi was
told repeatedly that he was not allowed to
teach from his dormitory room because it was
against University policy, yet he continued the
practice. Other than his testimony that his
back injury and urinary tract surgery rendered
him unable to teach in a classroom, Haya-
tavoudi fails to support, with facts in the rec-
ord, his allegation of unsafe environment.
More importantly, he fails to establish any con-
nection between his allegations and any racial,
ethnic, or religious animus. As we have said,
unsupported allegations are not probative
evidence of hostile work environment.
Finally, Hayatavoudi complains that he was
“subjected to continuous defamatory remarks
to his peers and students by Dean Ponter and
Dr. Herman Reike, such as stating ‘you are no
research professor’ and ‘your work is no
good.’” Hayatavoudi has failed, however, to
produce the testimony of any peers or students
supporting these allegations.
Once again, unsupported allegations
provide no evidence of any racial, ethnic, or
religious animus on the part of Reike or Pon-
ter. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Hayatavoudi, we cannot conclude
that any of the actions of which Hayatavoudi
complains provide evidence that he was
subjected to discrimination or a hostile work
environment.
B.
Having disposed of all of Hayatavoudi’s
“supporting” allegations, we now turn to the
allegations that directly undergird his hostile
work environment claim. The first of those al-
legations is the “Jewish song.” We need not
decide the perverse issue of whether the mere
singing of a Jewish song around a Moslem
constitutes religious harassment, because Hay-
atavoudi’s unsupported allegation cannot form
the basis for relief.
Nowhere in the record do we find support
for the allegation; in fact, during his
deposition, Hayatavoudi could not even state
with any degree of specificity when the event
occurred or who may have witnessed it.
Likewise, accepting as true Hayatavoudi’s
allegation that Reike told him that the Saudis
were “getting rid of their amadies,” we fail to
see how the recounting of an observed
phenomenon, without more, can possibly be
considered harassing conduct. We therefore
cannot conclude that either of these events is
probative of the ultimate fact of racial, ethnic,
or religious harassment.
The events that occurred on and after
March 5, 1996, form the primary basis for
Hayatavoudi’s hostile work environment
claim.16 In evaluating whether these events
constitute “discriminatory conduct [that] was
severe or pervasive enough to create an
15 Because neither the pleadings nor Hayatavou-
di’s brief describes the harsh conditions, we are left
to speculate as to what he may have been referring.
16 Hayatavoudi also asks us to consider, in
evaluating his hostile work environment claim, the
“Ayatollah Assodollah” comment and the con-
frontation between himself and Farshad. Those
events occurred in 1982, and Hayatavoudi cannot
show that any discriminatory conduct has occurred
in the intervening period. Moreover, Farshad, the
antagonist in each of those events, no longer works
in the petroleum engineering department. On these
facts, we cannot conclude that either event is
probative of pervasive racial, ethnic, or religious
hostility within title VII’s limitation period.

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objectively hostile or abusive work
environment,” Walker, 214 F.3d at 625 (citing
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
22 (1993)), we must be mindful that “Title
VII is not a general civility code for the
American workplace . . . .” Indest v. Freeman
Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 263 (5th Cir.
1999) (single-judge opinion) (citing Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
81 (1998)). Indeed, “conduct must be extreme
to amount to a change in the terms and
conditions of employment . . . .” Faragher,
524 U.S. at 788. The proper title VII analysis
“will filter out complaints attacking the
ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as
the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-
related jokes, and occasional teasing.” Id. (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (discussing, in
the context of a sexual harassment suit, the
“demanding” standard a court must use to
properly judge hostility).
Having decided that neither the University’s
employment decisions nor the two prior
interactions between Reike and Hayatavoudi
provide probative evidence with respect to the
ultimate issue in this caseSSwhether racial,
ethnic, or religious animus contributed to the
admittedly hostile atmosphere in the petroleum
engineering departmentSSwe now evaluate the
March 1996 altercation. Viewed most
favorably to Hayatavoudi, that incident
consists of the following: (1) Reike’s “dog in
the desert” comment to Hayatavoudi; (2) the
chest “butting” between Reike and Hayatavou-
di; (3) Reike’s “idiot” insult; and (4) Reike’s
allegation that Hayatavoudi’s wastefulness
amounts to thievery. Because all the events
occurred during one altercation, the allegedly
discriminatory conduct plainly was not
pervasive. The sole remaining issue, therefore,
is whether any of the eventsSSor their
confluenceSSwas severe enough to form a
basis for a Title VII claim.
Assuming, arguendo, that Reike’s “dog in
the desert” comment was motivated by racial
animus,17 that comment alone does not rise to
a level sufficiently severe to support a title VII
claim. We have stated that “mere utterance of
an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders
offensive feelings in an employee” does not
constitute actionable harassment under title
VII. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.
1971), quoted in Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787.
Coupled with the physical “bump,”
however, Reike’s comment becomes a closer
call.18 Nonetheless, in looking at “all the
circumstances,” as required by Faragher, id.,
the altercation did not constitute harassment
severe enough to alter the conditions of em-
ployment. There appear to have been no neg-
ative ramifications resulting from the incident;
indeed, Hayatavoudi concedes that the
atmosphere in the department has been
relatively placid since then.19 In summary, a
17 This is not to say that such an assumption is
dictated by the facts of this case. Indeed, it seems
far more plausible to conclude that Reike, upset
over the faculty’s interruption of the department
meeting, simply confronted Hayatavoudi, whom
Reike (correctly or incorrectly) assumed to be the
leader of the mutiny, with an allegory he had
learned during his extensive travels to Moslem
countries.
18 As we note supra, one of the factors to
consider in evaluating discriminatory conduct is
“whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,
or a mere offensive utterance . . . .” Faragher, 524
U.S. at 787-88.
19 In fact, Marota and Ponter testified that Reike
was informally reprimanded after the incident, and
(continued...)

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primarily verbal altercation, during which
nothing more physically threatening than chest
“butting” occurred, is not sufficiently severe to
justify relief under title VII.
The fact that Reike called Hayatavoudi an
idiot during the altercation does nothing to
alter our analysis. During a heated exchange,
it is not unusual for combatants to exchange
such unpleasantries; that comment utterly fails
to provide any probative evidence of racial
animus. Likewise, Reike’s assertion that Hay-
atavoudi’s wastefulness is tantamount to thiev-
ery is nothing more than an angry statement
made during an altercation; it displays no racial
animus.20
V.
Without a doubt, the environment in the
petroleum engineering department was far
from harmonious. To the extent that the strife
in that department exceeded the infighting typ-
ical of academic settings, however, we cannot
conclude that racial animus caused the
aberration. With respect to each of the
employment actions Hayatavoudi mentions,
the University has produced legitimate, non-
discriminatory justifications to counter every
colorable allegation. Even after extensive
discovery, Hayatavoudi cannot show that any
of the asserted justifications is pretext.
With respect to the strained relationship
between Reike and Hayatavoudi, the only al-
legation even remotely indicative of racial
animus is the altercation in March 1996. That
event cannot be described as severe enough to
alter Hayatavoudi’s conditions of employment,
however, and therefore cannot on its own
support a title VII claim.
The district court aptly summed up this
case when, in its oral ruling granting summary
judgment, it stated that “[t]hese two guys just
didn’t get along” but that “I don’t think . . . a
jury could find that it had anything to do with
race, religion, or national origin.” Hayatavou-
di has failed to establish a material issue of fact
with respect to each of the elements of his
prima facie claim. In particular, he cannot es-
tablish a fact issue with respect to whether the
University’s conduct was severe or pervasive
enough to alter the conditions of his
employment. Viewing all the supportable
allegations in the light most favorable to
Hayatavoudi, we conclude that the district
court properly granted summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
19(...continued)
Hayatavoudi concedes that there have been no
other incidents since the March 1996 incident and
speculates that “somebody may have talked to
[Reike].”
20 Moreover, Reike contendsSSand Hayatavoudi
does not disputeSSthat Reike’s statement resulted
from a conversation with other faculty members in
which they described Hayatavoudi's purported
wastefulness.

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