Chiles v. Allmand, et al

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-10426
Summary Calendar
GEORGE VERNON CHILES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LINDA FAITH ALLMAND; FORT WORTH PUBLIC LIBRARY FOUNDATION;
THE CITY OF FORT WORTH,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(4:98-CV-804-Y)
November 13, 2000
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, George Vernon Chiles, pro se,
sued the Fort Worth Public Library Foundation, the City of Fort
Worth, Texas, and Linda Allmand, the librarian for the City and a
member of the Foundation’s board, claiming violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. In participating in the Foundation’s
fundraising campaign, Chiles made a contribution and submitted a
message to be etched on a brick in the sidewalk surrounding the
library. The Foundation voted to reject his message, which

-- 1 of 3 --

reflected dissatisfaction with the library’s circulation
department, and it refunded his contribution.
Chiles appeals Appellees’ motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment being granted. Chiles asserts, among other things:
summary dismissal is inappropriate in a case requiring First
Amendment forum analysis; the Foundation’s rejection of his message
violated his First Amendment rights; the brick campaign was a
public forum; and the Foundation was a state actor.
We review de novo the grant of motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment. E.g., Barrientos v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
Co., 911 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1072
(1991).
To state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must (1) allege a
violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law”. Leffall v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994). The
threshold inquiry for a § 1983 action is whether there was
intentional involvement of a state actor. See Yeager v. City of
McGregor, 980 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 821
(1993).
Based upon our review of the record and the briefs, the
Foundation was not a state actor. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 838 (1982); Yeager, 980 F.2d at 342; Frazier v. Board of
Trustees of Northwest Miss. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 765 F.2d 1278, 1288
(5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986). Accordingly,

-- 2 of 3 --

3
the district court did not err in granting the Foundation’s motion
to dismiss.
Chiles fails to demonstrate that the Foundation’s policy for
rejecting messages on bricks was attributable to the City. Because
the record does not indicate that the City exercised policy-making
authority over the Foundation, the summary judgment in favor of the
City is also proper. See Yeager, 980 F.2d at 343-44.
Because the Foundation was not a state actor, its board
members were not state actors either. Accordingly, and the
allegations against Allmand must also fail. See Yeager, 980 F.2d
at 344.
AFFIRMED

-- 3 of 3 --