Bonds v. Woodall

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
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No. 25-60462
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Stacey Alicia Bonds,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Sonya Woodall, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Chief of the
Magnolia Police Department; Mike Milholen, Individually and in His
Official Capacity as a Magnolia, Mississippi Police Officer; The City of
Magnolia, Mississippi,

Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 5:24-CV-33
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Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
Stacey Bonds is a kindergarten teacher. During a heated customer-
service call regarding her car, Bonds told an agent that she was aggravated
and might “kill some little kindergarteners.” The customer-service agent
called police, and police arrested Bonds. Bonds then brought a variety of state
and federal law claims against the officers and the relevant city. The district
court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and qualified
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 18, 2026

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
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No. 25-60462
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immunity. We reverse as to the denial of qualified immunity and decline
to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims.
I
One morning, Stacey Bonds wanted to use a remote entry service to
unlock her car. But for some reason, the service was unable to help. So Bonds
was forced to unlock her car manually. She then drove to the school where
she taught kindergarten. As she drove, Bonds repeatedly called the remote
entry service, struggling to get through to a real person. Eventually, after
Bonds arrived at her school, she succeeded in getting through to a telephone
agent.
That call escalated. Bonds began by repeatedly telling the staffer that
“my aggression level is very high.” She also said, “[s]o, is there any way that
you help me this morning so that I can teach my class and not kill some little
[k]indergarteners.” When the support staff fixed the issue, Bonds said,
“[y]ou have alleviated my anxious morning and you have saved 20 children
from being killed.”
Concerned, the tech support worker reported Bonds’s statements to
the authorities in Magnolia, Mississippi. That report prompted two Magnolia
police officers—defendants Mike Milholen and Sonya Woodall—to meet
with Bonds, school administrators, and other police staff. Bonds admitted to
making the remarks but said that her comments were “taken out of context.”
The group then asked Bonds to go to the Sheriff’s Office.
At the Sheriff’s Office, Bonds first gave a recorded statement and a
written statement in which she admitted to making the comments at issue.
At the same time, Officer Milholen called an Assistant District Attorney
(“ADA”) responsible for prosecuting cases in Magnolia. The ADA said
Bonds would be charged with making terroristic threats under Mississippi
Code Section 97-7-75. So, Bonds was charged with “making threats to kill
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No. 25-60462
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twenty (20) kindergarten students if they did not fix her APP on her phone
that operates the locks on her Kia Vehicle.” Bonds was processed and placed
in jail. Subsequently, her case was presented to a grand jury, which returned
a “no bill.”
Bonds sued the City of Magnolia, Chief Woodall, and Officer
Milholen. She brought claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution under federal and state law. She also brought a
Fourteenth Amendment claim.
After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the officers were protected by qualified immunity and that
Bonds’s claims failed as a matter of law. The district court denied the
defendants’ motion. The defendants appealed.
II
A
This case implicates two jurisdictional questions. First, do we have
jurisdiction over the denial of qualified immunity? And second, do we have
jurisdiction over anything else? We address each issue in turn.
First, jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity. Normally, this court does “not have jurisdiction to review a denial
of a summary judgment motion because such a decision is not final within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 250 (5th Cir.
2018) (citation omitted). But courts treat the “denial of qualified immunity
on a motion for summary judgment” as “immediately appealable if it is based
on a conclusion of law.” Id.; see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–30
(1985). The existence vel non of probable cause is a legal question, and
therefore the district court’s denial of qualified immunity is immediately
appealable. Gonzales v. Dallas Cnty., 249 F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 2001).
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Second, what about the rest of the appeal? Recall that Bonds brought
both federal and state law claims, and that some of those claims ran only
against the officers while others run against Magnolia, Mississippi.
The claims against both the officers and the City implicate this court’s
pendent appellate jurisdiction. Morin v. Claire, 77 F.3d 116, 119 (5th Cir.
1996); Carter v. Dupuy, 173 F.4th 561, 566 (5th Cir. 2026). But see Frias v.
Hernandez, 142 F.4th 803, 811 (5th Cir. 2025) (Oldham, J., concurring)
(questioning our jurisdiction over state immunities), cert. denied sub nom.,
McKinnon v. Hernandez, 146 S. Ct. 1480 (2026) (mem.).
1
Pendent appellate
jurisdiction allows us to reach issues intertwined with claims over which we
have jurisdiction “in the interest of judicial economy.” McKay v. LaCroix,
117 F.4th 741, 745 (5th Cir. 2024).
Pendent appellate jurisdiction “is only proper in rare and unique
circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
Mi Familia Vota v. Ogg, 105 F.4th 313, 333 (5th Cir. 2024) (same). Indeed,
“[o]nly where essential to the resolution of properly appealed collateral
orders should courts extend their [collateral order] jurisdiction to rulings that
would not otherwise qualify for expedited consideration.” Swint v. Chambers
Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995) (quoting Riyaz A. Kanji, The Proper
Scope of Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction in the Collateral Order Context, 100
Yale L.J. 511, 530 (1990)). It “is always discretionary.” McKay, 117 F.4th
at 745–46.
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1
There is some ambiguity in our precedents concerning whether our jurisdiction
over state law immunities is regular appellate jurisdiction or pendent appellate jurisdiction.
Compare Carter, 173 F.4th at 566, with Frias, 142 F.4th at 811. In our view, the correct
answer is pendent appellate jurisdiction: After all, we have jurisdiction over the federal
immunity claims, see Perniciaro, 901 F.3d at 250, and our ability to consider anything else
sits downstream of that jurisdiction and is justified only on the basis of judicial economy,
see Morin, 77 F.3d at 119. That approach also matches the way the parties frame this dispute.
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We decline to exercise that discretionary jurisdiction here. Reaching
the state law and municipal liability claims would require venturing too far
afield from the federal immunity at issue in this appeal, since we would have
to parse both state law immunity doctrines and municipal liability standards
and then apply them to a contested fact pattern. This is not the “rare and
unique” case that justifies the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction. Id.
at 745 (quotation omitted).
B
Next, the merits. The qualified immunity standard “shield[s]” public
officials like police officers from money damages liability if their “conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982). So police officers enjoy qualified immunity if (A) they did not
violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights or (B) the contours of those rights
were not “clearly established” at the time of the violation. Id.; see also Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
Bonds’s false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution
claims fail on both prongs.
Start with the constitutional guarantee. The Fifth Circuit accepts that
the Constitution prohibits false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution. Thomas v. Kippermann, 846 F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam) (recognizing false arrest and false imprisonment claims); Brown v.
Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing malicious
prosecution). Each such claim has as an element that the action be taken
without probable cause. See Thomas, 846 F.2d at 1011 (“Claims of false
arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution involve the guarantees
of the [F]ourth and [F]ourteenth [A]mendments when the individual
complains of an arrest, detention, and prosecution without probable
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cause.”); accord Roper v. Blanton, No. 25-50384, 2025 WL 3252321, at *1 (5th
Cir. Nov. 21, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished). Thus, the existence of
probable cause generally defeats a plaintiff’s claim.
Officer Milholen and Chief Woodhall had probable cause to arrest
Bonds. When Bonds had been arrested, the facts clearly supported a
reasonable person’s belief that an offense was committed: the officers had a
report from a disinterested witness who heard the statements and was
concerned enough to call the police. And Bonds herself admitted that she said
she would “kill 20 kindergartners today.” Officers also knew that Bonds
made such statements at the time that she was in the presence of
kindergartners. That gives rise to probable cause. Thus, Bonds cannot show
that the officers’ conduct violated the Constitution.
2

Next consider the clearly established law requirement. Even if the
officers somehow violated the Constitution, at a minimum, Bonds’s right not
to be arrested after making such threats was not clearly established.
“Overcoming qualified immunity requires showing clearly established law
supporting the plaintiff’s claim, and that demands ‘that the legal principle
clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before
him.’” Templeton v. Jarmillo, 28 F.4th 618, 621 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018)). Bonds cannot clear that
hurdle. There is no similar Supreme Court precedent explaining that Bonds
could not be arrested, imprisoned or prosecuted for her statements. See White
v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017). So her claims fail to overcome the officers’
qualified immunity.
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2
Even worse for Bonds, in the qualified immunity context, courts consider whether
there was “arguably . . . probable cause for the search and arrest.” Brown, 243 F.3d at 190
(emphasis added).
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Finally, consider Bonds’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. Bonds
alleged that she was deprived of “[f]reedom from a deprivation of liberty
without due process of law in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.”
It is difficult to make much of this claim. On the one hand, it appears
to challenge Bonds’s supposed detention without probable cause under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. That reading flows from her false
arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims, since all are
premised on an arrest without probable cause
If that reading is right, Bonds has failed to plead a constitutional
violation. This Court has explained that there is “no Fourteenth Amendment
‘liberty interest’ or substantive due process right to be free from criminal
prosecution unsupported by probable cause.” Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch.
Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 814 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 270–72 (1994). So Officer Milholen and Chief Woodall would enjoy
qualified immunity from this claim, too.
Perhaps to avoid that result, Bonds now argues her Fourteenth
Amendment claim captures that she was (supposedly) denied a judicial
determination of probable cause within forty-eight hours of her arrest in
violation of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
But that pivot does not change the result. For one, Gerstein says
individuals must receive a judicial determination of probable cause shortly
after their arrest. Id. at 125. So it would be odd to say that individual police
officers violated Bonds’s right to a judicial hearing.
3

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3
Bonds also argues that Chief Woodall could have, and should have, ordered a pre-
arrest probable cause hearing. But state law is irrelevant to the federal constitutional
standard, which the Supreme Court says usually requires a probable cause hearing within
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Even assuming the Gerstein violation does run against the officers, the
facts do not give rise to a clearly established violation of Bonds’s rights. The
record demonstrates a municipal court judge reviewed the case and directed
that Bonds be held in jail without bond. While the details of that judge’s
actions are murky, what is clear is that the officers would not have known
such conduct was insufficient and clearly violated Bonds’s constitutional
rights. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 152 (2017) (“[I]f a reasonable officer
might not have known for certain that the conduct was unlawful—then the
officer is immune from liability”).
*
The district court erred in denying qualified immunity to Officer
Milholen and Chief Woodall. On remand, the district court should consider
how the presence of probable cause affects Bonds’s remaining claims.
REVERSED.
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forty-eight hours after detention. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125; County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (“[W]e believe that a jurisdiction that provides judicial
determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply
with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.”).
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