United States of America v. Darrell Todd Mays

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-7882

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DARRELL TODD MAYS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken.
Margaret B. Seymour, Senior District Judge. (1:03-cr-00726-MBS-2)

Submitted: May 21, 2020 Decided: May 26, 2020

Before AGEE and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Darrell Todd Mays, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Darrell Todd Mays appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to reduce
his sentence under the First Step Act of 2018, (“FSA”), 115 Pub. L. No. 115-391, 134 Stat.
5194. In 2005, Mays pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5
kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846 (2018), and the district court imposed a life sentence.
Section 404(a) of the FSA defines a “covered offense” as “a violation of a Federal
criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . , that was committed before August 3, 2010.” The Fair
Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties for possession with intent to distribute 50
grams or more of crack cocaine but not the penalties for possession with intent to distribute
powder cocaine. See United States v. Gravatt, 953 F.3d 258, 262 (4th Cir. 2020). Without
the benefit of our recent decision in Gravatt, the district court concluded that Mays’
conviction was not a covered offense because the statutory penalties for the cocaine
conspiracy were unchanged by the Fair Sentencing Act.
In Gravatt, we held, as a matter of first impression that a defendant—like Mays—
who “was charged conjunctively with conspiring to distribute both powder cocaine and
crack cocaine” was convicted of a covered offense under § 404(a). 953 F.3d at 264.
Because Mays’ sentence involved a covered offense under § 404(a), and the additional
limitations in § 404(c) of the FSA do not apply, we vacate the district court’s order and
remand to allow the district court to address Mays’ motion on the merits. See Gravatt, 953
F.3d at 264.

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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED