United States of America v. Christy Santiago

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-4233

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHRISTY SANTIAGO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Big
Stone Gap. James P. Jones, District Judge. (2:18-cr-00008-JPJ-PMS-1)

Submitted: April 30, 2020 Decided: May 19, 2020

Before KEENAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles M. Henter, HENTERLAW, PLC, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas
T. Cullen, United States Attorney, Laura Day Rottenborn, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2

PER CURIAM:
A federal jury convicted Christy Santiago of conspiracy to distribute suboxone to a
federal inmate, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2018), and conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute suboxone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(E), 846
(2018). The jury acquitted her of distributing suboxone to a federal inmate, making a false
statement regarding the alleged suboxone distribution, and possession with intent to
distribute and distribution of suboxone. She now appeals her 18-month sentence, an
upward variance from the Sentencing Guidelines range established by the district court,
arguing that the court violated her Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by improperly
sentencing her based on acquitted conduct. She also argues that her sentence is
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
We review a sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). In so doing, we examine the sentence for
“significant procedural error,” including “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating)
the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2018)] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,
or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. at 51. “A sentencing court’s
explanation is sufficient if it, although somewhat briefly, outlines the defendant’s particular
history and characteristics not merely in passing or after the fact, but as part of its analysis
of the statutory factors.” United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 518-19 (4th Cir. 2017)
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

3

If we find no procedural error, we also consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence in view of the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. When a
district court departs from or imposes a sentence outside of the Guidelines range, we “must
consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently
compelling to support the degree of the variance.” United States v. Zuk, 874 F.3d 398, 409
(4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[E]ven though we might reasonably
conclude that a different sentence is appropriate, that conclusion, standing alone, is an
insufficient basis to vacate the district court’s chosen sentence.” Id. (internal quotation
marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted).
Santiago first argues that the district court violated her Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury by sentencing her based on acquitted conduct. The record does not support
Santiago’s contention. Rather, the record shows that the district court varied upward based
on its consideration of various § 3553(a) factors related to Santiago’s crimes of conviction,
such as her extended relationships with numerous federal and state inmates and the fact
that she was involved with introducing drugs into a maximum-security facility, where the
risk of harm is greater than a lower-security facility. None of these considerations by the
district court leads us to conclude that the district court sentenced her based on acquitted
conduct or violated her Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
1

1
Moreover, a district court may consider conduct of which a defendant has been
acquitted if the conduct has nonetheless been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997).

4

Next, Santiago’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district
court opined that the Guidelines range did not adequately reflect the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
sentencing factors in light of the seriousness of providing drugs to federal inmates, the
extensive ties between Santiago and federal inmates at a maximum-security facility over a
period of time, and the need for just punishment and deterrence. In so doing, the district
court provided an individualized assessment of the facts before it and determined that an
upward variance was appropriate based on those facts.
2
We conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in imposing the variant sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

2
To the extent the district court articulated that Santiago was convicted of
distributing drugs to a federal inmate, rather than conspiracy to do so, the inartful phrasing
of a single sentence does not negate the entirety of the district court’s explanation.