Eddie Levord Taylor v. Dennis Daniels

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-6361
EDDIE LEVORD TAYLOR,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
DENNIS DANIELS,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:14-cv-00079-FDW)
Submitted: May 19, 2015 Decided: May 22, 2015
Before NIEMEYER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Eddie Levord Taylor, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge,
III, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Eddie Levord Taylor seeks to appeal the district court’s
order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. We dismiss
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal
was not timely filed.
Parties in a civil action in which the United States is not
a party are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district
court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal
period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal
period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a
notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional
requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
The district court’s order was entered on the docket on
August 15, 2014. The notice of appeal was filed, at the
earliest, on March 9, 2015.1 Because Taylor failed to file a
timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening
of the appeal period,2 we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis
1 For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date
appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could
have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to
the court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266,
276 (1988).
2 Even if Taylor’s untimely notice of appeal were construed
as a motion to reopen the appeal period under Rule 4(a)(6), we
conclude that such a motion could not be granted because Taylor
(Continued)

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and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
DISMISSED
filed his notice of appeal 19 days after receiving notice of the
court’s judgment, which was beyond the 14-day period provided in
Rule 4(a)(6)(B). See Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 610
(2010) (stating that “expiration of a jurisdictional deadline
prevents the court from . . . extend[ing] that deadline”);
Hensley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 651 F.2d 226, 228 (4th
Cir. 1981) (noting expiration of time limits in Rule 4 deprives
court of jurisdiction).

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