United States of America v. Jarvis Demond Hemphill

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4138
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JARVIS DEMOND HEMPHILL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:11-cr-00398-FDW-1)
Submitted: November 17, 2015 Decided: November 19, 2015
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Sandra J. Barrett, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Jill Westmoreland Rose, Acting United States Attorney, Amy E.
Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Jarvis Demond Hemphill appeals his convictions and 141-
month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to Hobbs Act
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012); brandishing a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012); and possessing a firearm
as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2012). On appeal, Hemphill raises several issues related to
his competency to enter a guilty plea. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
Hemphill first asserts that the Government committed
prosecutorial misconduct in failing to request a competency
hearing prior to his guilty plea, and the trial court erred in
failing to hold such a hearing sua sponte. Because Hemphill did
not request a competency hearing in the district court or
otherwise challenge the court’s failure to hold one, we review
this issue for plain error. See United States v. Dreyer, 705
F.3d 951, 960 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A] district court’s failure to
conduct a competency hearing on its own motion will always be
subject to plain error review.”); see also Henderson v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126-27 (2013) (describing plain error
standard of review).

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During the pendency of a defendant’s prosecution, the
district court may grant a motion by the Government or defense
counsel for a competency hearing, or may sua sponte order such a
hearing, “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he
is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2012). To determine whether reasonable
cause for a competency hearing exists, the court should consider
such factors as “(1) any history of irrational behavior; (2) the
defendant’s demeanor at and prior to [court proceedings]; and
(2) prior medical opinions on competency.” United States v.
General, 278 F.3d 389, 397 (4th Cir. 2002). To show error in
the trial court’s failure to order a competency hearing, “the
defendant must establish that the trial court ignored facts
raising a bona fide doubt regarding his competency to [plead].”
United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 291 (4th Cir. 2010)
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
Hemphill’s demeanor during the plea hearing generally
demonstrated his comprehension of the proceedings and his
ability to communicate effectively with his counsel. While
Hemphill’s history of mental health challenges was addressed at

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sentencing, nothing in the record suggests that these
difficulties affected his ability to understand the court
proceedings or to assist in his defense. Thus, we find no plain
error in the district court’s or Government’s refusal to further
inquire into Hemphill’s competency.*
Hemphill also asserts that he suffered constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s
failure to move for a competency hearing. Unless an attorney’s
ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the face of the record,
ineffective assistance claims generally are not addressed on
direct appeal. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th
Cir. 2008). Instead, such claims should be raised in a motion
brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), in order to permit
sufficient development of the record. United States v.
Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). Because the
record does not conclusively establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, we conclude that this claim should be raised, if at
all, in a § 2255 motion.
* The Government briefly notes in its response brief that
Hemphill entered an appeal waiver that may bar his appeal in
part. Because the Government does not address the
enforceability of this waiver and has not moved to dismiss the
relevant portion of the appeal, we decline to enforce the waiver
sua sponte. See United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th
Cir. 2005).

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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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