United States of America v. Marcus Johnson, a/k/a Jay Johnson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4506
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARCUS JOHNSON, a/k/a Jay Johnson,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,
Chief District Judge. (3:06-cr-00220-1)
Submitted: April 8, 2014 Decided: April 17, 2014
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Abraham Julian Saad, SAAD LAW OFFICE, Huntington, West Virginia,
for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney,
Joseph F. Adams, Assistant United States Attorney, Huntington,
West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Marcus Johnson appeals the sentence imposed by the
district court after his supervised release was revoked because
he violated several conditions of supervision. Johnson contends
that the sentence was plainly unreasonable because it was longer
than necessary to serve the purposes of supervised release and
it was imposed solely because the court wanted to punish him.
We have reviewed the record and the court’s reasons for imposing
the sentence at issue and find no error. Accordingly, we
affirm.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a
revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first consider
whether the sentence imposed is procedurally or substantively
unreasonable. Id. at 438. Only if we find the sentence
procedurally or substantively unreasonable must we then decide
whether it is “plainly” so. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d
652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007).
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if
the district court has considered both the applicable 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) factors and the policy statements contained in
Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court

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must also provide an explanation of its chosen sentence,
although this explanation “need not be as detailed or specific”
as is required for an original sentence. United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). Here, the district
court correctly calculated the advisory policy statement range
as four to ten months, the statutory maximum sentence of sixty
months, considered the advisory sentence, and gave the parties
an opportunity to present argument.
A sentence is substantively reasonable if the district
court states a proper basis for concluding that the defendant
should receive the sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
We conclude that the district court stated a proper
basis for ordering the sentence it did when it took note that
Johnson was unable to abide by the conditions of supervision.
See Moulden, 478 F.3d at 655 (noting that revocation sentence is
intended “to sanction the violator for failing to abide by the
conditions of the court-ordered supervision and to punish the
inherent breach of trust indicated by the defendant’s behavior”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). We note that the court
acted within its authority when it cited deterrence as a reason
for the sentence. See United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 642
(4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that district court appropriately
considered whether “sentence would adequately deter violations
of supervised release”).

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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s revocation
of supervised release and judgment order.* We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
* We will not accept Johnson’s invitation to reconsider the
standard of review stated in Crudup. See, e.g., Scotts Co. v.
United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 271 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[A]
panel of this court cannot overrule, explicitly or implicitly,
the precedent set by a prior panel of this court. Only the
Supreme Court or this court sitting en banc can do that.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

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