Ronald I. Paul v. South Carolina Department of Transportation

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2431
RONALD I. PAUL,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; PAUL D. DE
HOLCZER, individually and as a partner of the law firm of
Moses, Koon & Brackett, PC; G. L. BUCKLES, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Keith J. Buckles and G. L.
Buckles individually personal representative Keith J.
Buckles; MICHAEL H. QUINN, Individually and as senior
lawyer of Quinn Law Firm, LLC; J. CHARLES ORMOND, JR.,
individually and as partner of the Law Firm of Holler,
Dennis, Corbett, Ormond, Plante & Garner; OSCAR K. RUCKER,
in his individual capacity as Director, Rights of Way South
Carolina Department of Transportation; MACIE M. GRESHAM, in
her individual capacity as Eastern Region Right of Way
Program Manager South Carolina Department of
Transportation; NATALIE J. MOORE, in her individual
capacity as Assistant Chief Counsel, South Carolina
Department of Transportation,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior
District Judge. (3:13-cv-01852-CMC)
Submitted: April 30, 2014 Decided: May 14, 2014
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

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Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ronald I. Paul, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Ronald I. Paul seeks to appeal the district court’s
order adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint without
prejudice and the order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)
motion. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final
orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and
collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
545-46 (1949). Because Paul may proceed with this action in the
district court by amending his complaint to provide specific
facts showing his entitlement to the relief he seeks, see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a), the orders he seeks to appeal are neither final
orders nor appealable interlocutory or collateral orders. See
Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d
1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993).
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. We grant Paul’s motions to file supplemental
briefs and deny his motion for summary reversal, as amended. We
also dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED

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