Cbx Technologies, Inc. v. GCC TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, f/k/a Government Contract Consultants, LP

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1022
CBX TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
GCC TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, f/k/a Government Contract
Consultants, LP,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. James K. Bredar, District Judge.
(1:10-cv-02112-JKB)
Submitted: June 21, 2013 Decided: July 16, 2013
Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John Christopher Belcher, Oxon Hill, Maryland, for Appellant.
Keith Leon Baker, BARTON, BAKER, THOMAS & TOLLE, LLP, McLean,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

-- 1 of 6 --

2
PER CURIAM:
CBX Technologies, Incorporated (“CBX”) appeals the
district court’s orders granting GCC Technologies, LLC (“GCC”),
summary judgment on CBX’s breach of contract claim against it,
denying CBX’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment, and
denying CBX’s motion to amend its complaint, as well as its
motion to reconsider that ruling. This matter returns to us
after we vacated the district court’s previous order granting
GCC’s motion to dismiss CBX’s complaint, and remanded the matter
to the district court so it could determine two factual issues
the court found determinative of GCC’s dismissal motion. On
remand, the parties engaged in discovery, GCC again moved to
dismiss CBX’s complaint or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment, and the district court granted GCC summary judgment.
In this appeal, CBX asserts that the district court
erred when it granted GCC’s summary judgment motion and denied
its motion for partial summary judgment because CBX argues that
this court’s “dispositive factual issues” language in its
previous opinion was mere dictum. According to CBX, it was
unfair for this court to suggest that these were the only issues
necessary to determine CBX’s case because that “suggestion”
assumed that the Teaming Agreement between the parties was a
valid contract, that the parties’ Subcontract was a “full and
complete document[,]” and that if the Subcontract was valid,

-- 2 of 6 --

3
that the rights and obligations under the Subcontract “were
properly assigned to or novated by GCC[.]”
CBX also asserts that the district court erred when it
denied its motion to amend its complaint and CBX’s motion for
reconsideration of that ruling because CBX asserts that the
district court should have considered CBX’s request under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) before determining whether good cause for
altering the scheduling order existed under Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(4). CBX also asserts that the district court erroneously
determined that CBX had not established good cause to modify the
scheduling order. Considering CBX’s arguments in reverse order,
we affirm the district court’s orders.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to
amend for abuse of discretion. See Nourison Rug Corp. v.
Parvizian, 535 F.3d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 2008). Although district
courts should freely give leave to amend pleadings “when justice
so requires[,]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), “after the deadlines
provided by a scheduling order have passed, the good cause
standard [of Rule 16] must be satisfied to justify leave to
amend the pleadings[.]” Nourison Rug, 535 F.3d at 298. We have
reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it denied CBX’s motion to amend its
complaint, and denied CBX’s motion for reconsideration of that
decision. Moreover, because one panel of this court may not

-- 3 of 6 --

4
overrule the decision of another panel, we decline CBX’s request
to “revise or clarify [our] ruling” in Nourison Rug. See Scotts
Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 271-72 n.2 (4th Cir.
2002).
We also discern no error in the district court’s
decision to grant GCC summary judgment on CBX’s breach of
contract claim, and deny CBX’s cross-motion for partial summary
judgment. We review de novo the district court’s decision on a
summary judgment motion. EEOC v. Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658,
668 (4th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate only where
the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact” and that it is “entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient” to
defeat the defendant’s summary judgment motion. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Instead, “there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff.” Id. At the summary judgment stage, the nonmoving
party must come forward with more than “mere speculation or the
building of one inference upon another” to avoid dismissal of
the action. Othentec Ltd. v. Phelan, 526 F.3d 135, 140 (4th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
also Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 308

-- 4 of 6 --

5
(4th Cir. 2006) (“Mere unsupported speculation is not sufficient
to defeat a summary judgment motion if the undisputed evidence
indicates that the other party should win as a matter of law.”).
In our opinion remanding the matter to the district
court, we explicitly held that “both the jurisdictional and
merits inquiries turn on whether the Teaming Agreement was in
effect at the time of the alleged breach.” CBX Tech., Inc. v.
GCC Tech., LLC, 457 F. App’x 299, 301 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-
1380) (unpublished). Thus, after agreeing with the district
court that the Teaming Agreement was expired as of November 9,
2009, we instructed the district court to determine on remand
whether CBX’s work began before that date and, if so, whether a
breach occurred before that date. Id. at 302.
The district court did just that. In its order
granting GCC’s summary judgment motion, the district court
determined that based on the “solid factual evidence” submitted
by GCC, and the nearly non-existent evidence submitted by CBX,
although CBX employees began work before November 9, 2009, GCC
and CBX “enjoyed a good relationship through December 2009 —
well after the November 9, 2009, end of the teaming agreement.”
Having determined that no breach occurred before the Teaming
Agreement expired, we conclude that the district court properly
determined that CBX could not state a viable breach of contract
action under the Teaming Agreement.

-- 5 of 6 --

6
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s
orders granting GCC summary judgment, denying CBX partial
summary judgment, denying CBX’s motion to amend its complaint,
and denying CBX’s motion for reconsideration of the district
court’s order denying its motion to amend. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this Court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

-- 6 of 6 --