United States of America v. Furman Jones, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4854
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
FURMAN JONES, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (8:12-cr-00024-HMH-3)
Submitted: April 26, 2013 Decided: May 2, 2013
Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part, affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Jessica Salvini, SALVINI & BENNETT, LLC, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Andrew Burke Moorman, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

-- 1 of 4 --

2
PER CURIAM:
Furman Jones, Jr., pled guilty in accordance with a
written plea agreement to conspiracy to distribute and to
possess with intent to distribute 1000 kilograms or more of
marijuana and five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006). Jones was sentenced to thirty months
in prison. He now appeals. His attorney has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
questioning whether the sentence is reasonable but stating that
there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Jones has filed a
pro se supplemental brief suggesting that his guilty plea was
invalid and that counsel was ineffective.
The United States has moved to dismiss the appeal
based on Jones’ waiver in his plea agreement of his right to
appeal. Upon review of the plea agreement and the transcript of
the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 proceeding, we conclude that Jones
knowingly and voluntarily1 waived his right to appeal his
1 In his informal brief, Jones contends that his guilty plea
and plea agreement are invalid because counsel misinformed him
about the sentence he would receive. At his Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
hearing, Jones swore that: he understood the penalties he faced;
he was satisfied with his attorney; his plea was not the result
of threats or coercion; and he understood his plea agreement,
which identified the penalties for his offense. There is no
compelling evidence to contradict these statements.
Accordingly, Jones’ unsupported claim that he was misinformed
about the sentence he faced provides no reason to invalidate the
guilty plea and plea agreement. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431
(Continued)

-- 2 of 4 --

3
conviction and sentence, with the exception of claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.
Jones’ claim that his sentence is unreasonable falls squarely
within the scope of the waiver.2 Accordingly, we grant the
motion to dismiss insofar as Jones seeks to challenge the
reasonableness of his sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for non-waivable meritorious issues and have found none.
We therefore affirm with respect to all issues not encompassed
by the waiver of appellate rights.
This court requires that counsel inform Jones, in
writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Jones requests that such a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that the petition would
be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
U.S. 63, 74 (1977); United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216,
221-22 (4th Cir. 2005).
2 To the extent that Jones claims in his informal brief that
counsel was ineffective for misinforming him about the sentence
he would receive, the claim is not cognizable because
ineffectiveness does not conclusively appear on the face of the
record. See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 434, 435 (4th
Cir. 2008).

-- 3 of 4 --

4
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy of the motion was served on Jones.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART

-- 4 of 4 --