Rodney E. Hays v. TOWN OF GAULEY BRIDGE, WEST VIRGINIA, a West Virginia Municipal Corporation

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1377
RODNEY E. HAYS,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF GAULEY BRIDGE, WEST VIRGINIA, a West Virginia
Municipal Corporation; WILLIAM KINCAID, individually and in
his official capacity as Judge of the Gauley Bridge
Municipal Court; SEAN WHIPKEY, individually and in his
official capacity as a Town of Gauley Bridge Officer; HEATH
WHIPKEY, individually and in his official capacity as a
Town of Gauley Bridge Police Officer; CHARLES BURKHAMER,
individually and in his official capacity as a Town of
Gauley Bridge Police Officer,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver,
Jr., District Judge. (2:09-cv-01272)
Submitted: July 30, 2012 Decided: August 14, 2012
Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Rodney E. Hays, Appellant Pro Se. Vaughn Sizemore, BAILEY &
WYANT, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Apellees.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Rodney E. Hays appeals the district court’s order
adopting in part the recommendation of the magistrate judge and
dismissing his claims, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1985(3) (2006), alleging the denial of due process of law and
conspiracy, and his state law claims for negligence and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. We have reviewed
the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm
the disposition of these claims for the reasons stated by the
district court. Hays v. Town of Gauley Bridge, No.
2:09-cv-01272 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 29, 2011).
Hays’s remaining claims were tried before a jury. On
appeal, he asserts that the jury’s verdict on his Fourth
Amendment claim was unsupported by the evidence. As he did not
object to the sufficiency of the evidence below, our scope of
review is “exceedingly confined,” and we will uphold the jury’s
verdict if it is supported by any evidence. Bristol Steel &
Iron Works v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.
1994). Because evidence was presented below to support the
jury’s finding of probable cause, we reject Hays’s challenge to
the jury’s verdict.
Hays also contests as inadequate the amount of the
jury award in his favor on his Sixth Amendment claim. This
challenge seems to be based on the district court’s failure to

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more fully direct Hays, who proceeded without counsel, as to how
to pursue his rights during the litigative process, including at
trial. However, “although pro se pleadings are construed
liberally, the district court cannot serve as de facto counsel
for pro se litigants, informing them of the appropriate
procedural steps to take during litigation.” GJR Inv., Inc. v.
Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998),
overruled on other grounds as recognized in Randall v. Scott,
610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). Hays’s argument to the contrary
is without merit.
Finally, Hays alleges that the district court erred in
denying Hays’s motion for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
11, in which he asserted that opposing counsel made many
frivolous and harassing legal arguments. We review the grant or
denial of Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion. American
Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 321 (4th Cir.
2003). Our review of the record discloses that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose the
requested sanctions.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment below. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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