Catherine W. Weber v. Life Insurance Company of North America, a subsidiary of CIGNA Corporation

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1135
CATHERINE W. WEBER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, a subsidiary of
CIGNA Corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Lynchburg. Norman K. Moon, Senior
District Judge. (6:11-cv-00032-NKM-BWC)
Submitted: July 30, 2012 Decided: August 20, 2012
Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
G. Edgar Dawson, III, Chad A. Mooney, PETTY, LIVINGSTON, DAWSON
& RICHARDS, PC, Lynchburg, Virginia, for Appellant. Zoe
Sanders, William C. Wood, Jr., NELSON MULLINS RILEY &
SCARBOROUGH, LLP, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

-- 1 of 4 --

2
PER CURIAM:
Catherine W. Weber sought a declaratory judgment
holding that she is entitled to benefits under her deceased
husband’s life insurance policies. The district court granted
Appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Weber
appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, applying
the same standard we apply to motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Independence News,
Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 568 F.3d 148, 154 (4th Cir. 2009).
We accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Weber. Burbach
Broad. Co. of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405-06
(4th Cir. 2002). In order to survive a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, the complaint must contain facts sufficient “to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007).
Weber’s husband, Carl (“Carl”), was killed in the
crash of a personal aircraft on which he was a passenger. Prior
to his death, Carl participated through his employment in an
insurance plan that included accidental death and dismemberment
benefits issued by Life Insurance Company of North America, a

-- 2 of 4 --

3
subsidiary of CIGNA Corporation (“Appellee”). The policies
contain eleven “Common Exclusions” that bar the award of
benefits for loss resulting from a number of events, including
among others, suicide, skydiving, or driving under the
influence. At issue in this case is Common Exclusion 6(a),
which bars benefits for loss occurring during “(6) flight in,
boarding or alighting from an Aircraft or any craft designed to
fly above the Earth’s surface (a) except as a passenger on a
regularly scheduled commercial airline.” The remainder of
Common Exclusion 6, subsections (b) through (g), bars coverage
for loss occurring during a variety of flight-related
activities.
On appeal, Weber challenges the district court’s
conclusion that Common Exclusion 6 is unambiguous and therefore
enforceable. Weber claims that had Common Exclusion 6 ended at
subsection 6(a), “any reasonable person would understand and
expect that only commercial airline passengers [would] be
covered in the event of an accidental death,” but that
subsections 6(b) through 6(g) are superfluous when read in
conjunction with subsection 6(a), and therefore blur the issue
of what flight activity is actually excluded from coverage.
The district court rejected this argument, relying
upon Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 166
F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1948), in reaching its conclusion that each

-- 3 of 4 --

4
provision in the policies must be independently read. As the
district court noted, the structure of Common Exclusion 6 is
similar to the challenged exclusions upheld in Provident Life.
We conclude that the district court correctly ruled
that each of the subsections contained in Common Exclusion 6
details a separate type of risk that is excluded from coverage.
Read on its own, Subsection 6(a) bars coverage for accidents
caused by or resulting from “flight in, boarding or alighting
from an Aircraft or any craft designed to fly above the Earth’s
surface except as a passenger on a regularly scheduled
commercial airline.” In addition to this general exclusion, we
agree with the district court that Common Exclusions 6(b)
through 6(g) articulate additional grounds of exclusion barring
coverage for certain activities otherwise arguably not covered
by Common Exclusion 6(a). Thus, the subsections of Common
Exclusion 6(a) are neither conflicting nor ambiguous. We
accordingly conclude that Subsection 6(a) clearly bars coverage
for Carl’s death.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

-- 4 of 4 --