United States of America v. Joaquin Delangel-Velasco, a/k/a Roberto G. Flores, a/k/a Quaquoin Delangel-Velasco

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4256
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOAQUIN DELANGEL-VELASCO, a/k/a Roberto G. Flores, a/k/a
Quaquoin Delangel-Velasco,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:10-cr-00222-TDS-1)
Submitted: January 18, 2012 Decided: March 14, 2012
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, FLOYD, Circuit Judge, and J.
Michelle CHILDS, United States District Judge for the District
of South Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Childs wrote the
opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Floyd joined.
Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North
Carolina, Mireille P. Clough, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Michael F. Joseph, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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CHILDS, District Judge:
Joaquin DeLangel-Velasco challenges the twenty-four month
sentence imposed by the district court following his guilty plea
to the charge of illegally reentering the United States in
violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(1). We affirm.
DeLangel-Velasco is a citizen of Mexico. In 2003, he was
convicted in North Carolina on two counts of felony breaking and
entering motor vehicles. In 2005, DeLangel-Velasco was
convicted in North Carolina for felony abduction of children.
He was deported to Mexico on December 10, 2008. On February 4,
2010, DeLangel-Velasco was arrested in Thomasville, North
Carolina and law enforcement authorities determined that he had
re-entered the United States without obtaining appropriate
consent.
DeLangel-Velasco pled guilty in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of North Carolina to an indictment
under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(1) for unlawfully returning to
the United States after being deported. The district court
sentenced DeLangel-Velasco to twenty-four months’ imprisonment,
a three-year term of supervised release, and a special
assessment of one hundred dollars.
At sentencing, the district court found that DeLangel-
Velasco’s prior conviction for abduction of children qualified
as an aggravated felony which justified an eight-level

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enhancement to his base offense level. Under this analysis, the
Guidelines range was twenty-four to thirty months. The district
court further found that, even if the eight-level enhancement
did not apply, DeLangel-Velasco was subject to a four-level
enhancement because he was convicted of a prior felony. Under
this alternative analysis, the Guidelines range was fifteen to
twenty-one months. In determining that the twenty-four month
sentence was appropriate, the district court noted the
seriousness of the offense, the need to promote respect for the
law, and the need for adequate deterrence.
On appeal DeLangel-Velasco argues that the district court
erred in imposing an eight-level enhancement to his base offense
level based on the determination that his prior conviction for
abduction of children qualified as an aggravated felony under
the United States Sentencing Guidelines. DeLangel-Velasco
further argues that the district court’s alternative basis for
imposing the twenty-four month sentence was unreasonably high
because the sentence represented an upward variance which was
greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a).
We review a sentence imposed by a district court for
reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007). Initially, the
court determines whether there is any “significant procedural

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error” in the sentence, including “failing to calculate (or
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a)
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,
or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence-including
an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.”
Id.; see also United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th
Cir. 2009). The court must then “consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed,” considering “the
totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any
variance from the Guidelines range.” Id. If the sentence
imposed by the district court varies beyond the Guidelines
range, the court must provide justification to support the
variance. See United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 977 (2008).
In this case, DeLangel-Velasco does not dispute the
district court’s application of the four-level enhancement, but
argues that the district court imposed a three-month variance
which was unreasonable. The court notes that the three-month
variance is not significantly higher than the higher limits of
the sentencing range. In applying an upward variance, the
district court noted DeLangel-Velasco’s disregard for a prior
order of deportation, his substantial criminal history while in
the United States, and the consequential need to provide

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adequate deterrence and respect for the law. Based on a review
of the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the upward
variance sentence imposed by the district court and find that
the sentence was reasonable under the circumstances. We
therefore affirm DeLangel-Velasco’s sentence.
Because we find DeLangel-Velasco’s sentence to be
procedurally and substantively reasonable under the district
court’s analysis of the four-level enhancement for a prior
felony conviction, we need not address the district court’s
classification of DeLangel-Velasco’s prior conviction for
abduction of children. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions were adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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