United States of America v. DAVID CHAPEL, III, a/k/a Pokey

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4139
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DAVID CHAPEL, III, a/k/a Pokey,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,
District Judge. (3:98-cr-00047-6)
Submitted: August 15, 2011 Decided: September 14, 2011
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Appellate Counsel, David R. Bungard, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth
Goodwin II, United States Attorney, Lisa G. Johnston, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
David Chapel, III, appeals the district court’s order
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to eighteen
months’ imprisonment and six months’ supervised release. On
appeal, Chapel contends that his sentence was plainly
unreasonable because the district court did not impose a lower
sentence in light of Chapel’s conviction and sentence for the
state offense that constituted his supervised release violation.
We affirm.
In reviewing a sentence imposed upon revocation of
supervised release, this court “takes a more ‘deferential
appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of
discretion’ than reasonableness review for [G]uidelines
sentences.”*
* Chapel’s contention that review of a revocation sentence
should be for reasonableness is foreclosed by our precedent.
See United States v. Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 388 (4th Cir. 1999)
(noting panel bound by court precedent).
United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656
(4th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
439 (4th Cir. 2006)). This court will affirm a sentence imposed
after revocation of supervised release if it is not plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th
Cir. 2010). The first step in this review requires us to
determine whether the sentence is unreasonable. Crudup,

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461 F.3d at 438. Only if the sentence is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable does our inquiry proceed to the
second step of the analysis to determine whether the sentence is
plainly unreasonable. Id. at 438-39.
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
advisory policy statement range based upon Chapter Seven of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
factors applicable to supervised release revocation. See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-40. A sentence
is substantively reasonable if the district court stated a
proper basis for concluding the defendant should receive the
sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d
at 440. “A court need not be as detailed or specific when
imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a
post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement
of reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the district court appropriately
considered the relevant factors. The court recounted the nature
and circumstances of Chapel’s offense, noting the conditions of
release had been modified to accommodate Chapel’s needs, and he
had been released early from a residential reentry program.
Nevertheless, shortly thereafter, he was engaging in drug use

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and selling “a significant amount of oxycodone.” Chapel’s
sentence is therefore procedurally reasonable. Because the
district court had discretion to impose a term for the
revocation of supervised release consecutive to any sentence of
imprisonment, Chapel’s sentence is also substantively
reasonable. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.3(f),
p.s. (2010).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

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