Robert Reynolds v. John

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-7000
ROBERT REYNOLDS,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
JOHN AND JANE DOE, One through Six, Northern Neck Regional
Jail; MS. CLARKE, Northern Neck Regional Jail; NORTHERN
NECK REGIONAL JAIL AUTHORITY; JEFFREY FRAZIER; MAJOR HULL,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior
District Judge. (3:07-cv-00700-RLW)
Submitted: April 28, 2011 Decided: May 24, 2011
Before MOTZ and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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Daniel A. Harvill, DANIEL A. HARVILL, PLLC, Manassas, Virginia,
for Appellant. Alexander Francuzenko, COOK, KITTS & FRANCUZENKO,
PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Robert Reynolds seeks to appeal the district court’s
orders granting summary judgment to Defendants in Reynolds’ 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) action and permitting Defendants to amend
their answers. Reynolds argues that the district court erred in
permitting Defendants to amend their answers to add the defense
of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and in finding
that he had not exhausted his remedies. Finding no error, we
affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s award of summary
judgment, viewing the facts and inferences reasonably drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See FOP Lodge No. 89 v. Prince George’s Cnty., 608 F.3d 183, 188
(4th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the
record shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
After reviewing the entire record, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
Defendants’ motion to amend their answers. See United States v.
Pittman, 209 F.3d 314, 316 (4th Cir. 2000) (providing standard).
Further, the court did not err in concluding that Reynolds had
not properly exhausted his administrative remedies. A prisoner
must properly exhaust available administrative remedies prior to

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filing a § 1983 action concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a) (2006); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006)
(requiring “proper” exhaustion of administrative remedies prior
to prisoner § 1983 actions); Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717,
725 (4th Cir. 2008) (discussing “availability” of remedies).
“[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is mandatory,” Anderson v.
XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 677 (4th Cir.
2005), and “applies to all inmate suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances or particular
episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other
wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion
of administrative remedies is mandatory, even where the inmate
claims that exhaustion would be futile. Booth v. Churner, 532
U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001).
We therefore affirm the orders. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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