Latrice Alston Woodard v. the County of Wilson; Wilson County Department of Social Services

08-2366Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit31 août 2010

Texte intégral

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-2366
LATRICE ALSTON WOODARD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
THE COUNTY OF WILSON; WILSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
District Judge. (5:07-cv-00006-D)
Argued: March 24, 2010 Decided: August 31, 2010
Before MICHAEL and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and Eugene E. SILER,
Jr., Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Angela Newell Gray, GRAY NEWELL, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Mary Craven Adams, WOMBLE, CARLYLE,
SANDRIDGE & RICE, PLLC, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: James R. Morgan, Jr., WOMBLE, CARLYLE,
SANDRIDGE & RICE, PLLC, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Latrice Alston Woodard, a social worker with the
Wilson County Department of Social Services (WCDSS), was
dismissed from her employment under WCDSS’s anti-nepotism policy
after she married the son of a WCDSS day porter. Woodard sued
WCDSS and the County of Wilson, North Carolina, alleging
violation of her constitutional right to marry and various state
tort claims. After discovery, defendants successfully moved for
summary judgment in the district court. Finding this case
indistinguishable from Waters v. Gaston County, 57 F.3d 422 (4th
Cir. 1995), where we upheld a similar anti-nepotism policy under
rational basis review, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for defendants.
I.
WCDSS is a governmental division of the County of
Wilson, North Carolina. WCDSS maintains an anti-nepotism
policy, entitled “Statement of Relatives’ Employment.” The
policy prohibits “[t]wo members of an immediate family” from
being “employed within the same department/agency.” J.A. 196.
It defines “immediate family” to include a mother-in-law and
daughter-in-law. The WCDSS policy is authorized by the North
Carolina Administrative Code, 25 NCAC 01I.1701-1702, which is in

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turn authorized by North Carolina statute, N.C.G.S. § 126-1, et
seq.
The anti-nepotism policy has been consistently
enforced at WCDSS over a number of years. It was created in
1985, and James Glenn Osborne, Jr., the current director of
WCDSS, kept the policy in place when he became director in 1994.
Director Osborne maintained the policy because he believed it
was in the best interest of the citizens of Wilson County. He
thought it prevented violations of confidentiality, prevented
the public appearance of unfair hiring and promotion practices,
avoided domestic disputes in the workplace, and limited
potential conflicts of interest. Of the other two known
incidents of WCDSS employees violating the policy, one of the
two employees voluntarily resigned to ensure compliance. There
is no instance where two employees violated the policy and
thereafter both were allowed to remain at WCDSS.
Plaintiff Woodard began working for WCDSS in August
2001 as a Child Protective Services Social Worker. Prior to
being hired, Woodard was made aware of the anti-nepotism policy
and acknowledged the Statement of Relatives’ Employment with her
signature. Judy Vaughn, Woodard’s current mother-in-law, has
worked as a day porter at WCDSS since August 15, 1994. Neither
woman supervised the other, although Vaughn was in charge of

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cleaning Woodard’s office, and the two would occasionally cross
paths at work.
Woodard met Vaughn’s son at a restaurant in Wilson
County, and the two started to date in March 2003. They became
engaged on May 1, 2005. After a series of meetings with
supervisors, human resource employees, and Director Osborne,
Woodard was informed that no exception to the anti-nepotism
policy would be made. Director Osborne gave Woodard an
opportunity to resign and offered to make a favorable
recommendation for employment with nearby counties.
Woodard married Vaughn’s son on July 15, 2006. This
made Woodard a daughter-in-law to Vaughn and Vaughn a mother-in-
law to Woodard, thus causing both to violate WCDSS’s anti-
nepotism policy. After confirming that Woodard had married
Vaughn’s son and would not resign, Director Osborne dismissed
Woodard from WCDSS on July 25, 2006. On August 3, 2006,
Director Osborne memorialized the decision in a letter to
Woodard, explaining that Woodard was dismissed, rather than
Vaughn, because Woodard initiated the action that caused both
her and Vaughn to violate WCDSS’s anti-nepotism policy.
On December 5, 2006, Woodard filed a complaint against
WCDSS and the County of Wilson in the General Court of Justice,
Superior Court Division, for the County of Wilson, North
Carolina. The complaint asserts state and federal

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constitutional violations and state tort claims for wrongful
termination, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants
removed the action to the Eastern District of North Carolina on
January 5, 2007. The district court granted defendants’ summary
judgment motion on November 13, 2008, and Woodard now appeals.
II.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, viewing all facts and inferences in the light
most favorable” to Woodard. Food Lion, Inc. v. S.L. Nusbaum
Ins. Agency, Inc., 202 F.3d 223, 227 (4th Cir. 2000). Summary
judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Woodard argues that WCDSS’s anti-nepotism policy
violates her fundamental right to marry under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. The North
Carolina Supreme Court interprets these two constitutional
provisions conterminously. See Tri-County Paving, Inc. v. Ashe
County, 281 F.3d 430, 435 n.6 (4th Cir. 2002). The alleged
constitutional violations undergird Woodard’s state tort claims

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for wrongful termination, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
“It is well-settled law that the Constitution embraces
a fundamental right to marry” and that this right is “recognized
as a basic tenet of substantive due process.” Waters v. Gaston
County, 57 F.3d 422, 425 (4th Cir. 1995). However, “not every
restriction on the right to marry violate[s] the Constitution;
rather, ‘reasonable regulations that do not significantly
interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship
may legitimately be imposed.’” Id. (quoting Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978)). Therefore, strict scrutiny
applies “only to regulations that ‘significantly interfere’ with
the right to marry.” Id. (quoting Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388).
If the anti-nepotism policy does not significantly interfere
with the right to marry, then we will “facially review [it] to
determine whether there was a rational basis for its passage.”
Id. at 426.
In Waters we held that the anti-nepotism policy for
Gaston County, North Carolina, did not significantly interfere
with the right to marry. Id. Gaston County’s policy did not
allow spouses to be employed in the same department. In the
event two employees within the same department married, each was
given 90 days to obtain a transfer to another department. If a
transfer was not available, the policy described neutral methods

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for determining which employee would be terminated. Id. at 424
n.1. We found that this anti-nepotism policy “may [have]
touch[ed] upon the marriage relationship” but did “not directly
and substantially interfere with that right by preventing those
who wish[ed] to marry from doing so.” Id. at 426 (quotations
omitted). “At most,” we explained, “it [wa]s an unwelcome
hurdle, forcing one spouse to attempt to transfer to another
department within the County or to leave the County’s employ
altogether.” Id.
Waters stands for the general proposition that
anti-nepotism policies do not significantly interfere with the
right to marry and should be reviewed under the rational basis
standard. In an attempt to distinguish Waters, Woodard argues
that strict scrutiny should apply to WCDSS’s anti-nepotism
policy because WCDSS restricts not only married partners from
working together but also immediate family members. Although
the WCDSS policy covers more family members than the policy in
Waters, the reasoning in Waters does not depend on the number of
people affected by the policy. Like the policy in Waters, the
WCDSS policy does “not directly and substantially interfere with
[the] right [to marry] by preventing those who wish to marry
from doing so.” Id. (quotations omitted). Indeed, Woodard was
able to marry Vaughn’s son. “At most,” the WCDSS policy “is an
unwelcome hurdle, forcing” Woodard to attempt to find a position

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outside WCDSS “or to leave the County’s employ altogether.” Id.
This hurdle does not restrict marriage; instead, it “is a work-
related restriction with incidental effects on [Woodard’s]
marriage.” Id.
The remaining differences between the policy here and
that in Waters are not material to Woodard’s claim. Woodard
points out that the WCDSS anti-nepotism policy, unlike that in
Waters, does not explicitly provide an opportunity to apply for
a transfer, nor does it contain a neutral process to determine
which employee will be terminated. These differences are, at
most, relevant to whether the procedure for firing Woodard was
constitutionally sufficient and do not touch on the substantive
right to marry. Because Woodard has not pursued a claim of
inadequate process, we need not consider these differences
further.
Finding Waters indistinguishable, we hold that the
WCDSS anti-nepotism policy “does not significantly interfere
with the fundamental right of marriage.” Id. Thus, “we
facially review [it] to determine whether there was a rational
basis for its passage.” Id. Director Osborne explained that he
retained the policy because it “serves a number of proactive,
preventive measures.” J.A. 191. Among those articulated by
Director Osborne are “rational and laudable workplace goals”
that we approved of in Waters, such as “reducing favoritism or

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even the appearance of favoritism” and “preventing family
conflicts from affecting the workplace.” 57 F.3d at 426
(quotations omitted). The WCDSS anti-nepotism policy therefore
survives rational basis review.* Woodard’s state law tort claims
likewise fail for the same reason.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
district court is
AFFIRMED.
* Woodard argues that the WCDSS anti-nepotism policy is not
narrowly drawn because it is more restrictive than the County of
Wilson anti-nepotism policy. As discussed, the WCDSS policy is
not reviewed with strict scrutiny. The WCDSS policy is
authorized by North Carolina law, and WCDSS may choose an anti-
nepotism policy that is more restrictive than the County of
Wilson policy so long as it has a rational basis.

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