Alemtsheay Eyoussu Dimka v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-2248
ALEMTSHEAY EYOUSSU DIMKA,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: August 26, 2009 Decided: September 2, 2009
Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Alan M. Parra, LAW OFFICES OF ALAN M. PARRA, Silver Spring,
Maryland, for Petitioner. Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General, Daniel E. Goldman, Senior Litigation Counsel, Paul T.
Cygnarowicz, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Alemtsheay Eyoussu Dimka, a native and citizen of
Ethiopia, petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing her appeal from the
immigration judge’s denial of her requests for asylum,
withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against
Torture, and voluntary departure.
Dimka first challenges the determination that she
failed to establish her eligibility for asylum. To obtain
reversal of a determination denying eligibility for relief, an
alien “must show that the evidence [s]he presented was so
compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the
requisite fear of persecution.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.
478, 483-84 (1992). We have reviewed the evidence of record and
conclude that Dimka fails to show that the evidence compels a
contrary result. Accordingly, we find that substantial evidence
supports the denial of asylum relief.
Additionally, we uphold the denial of Dimka’s request
for withholding of removal. “Because the burden of proof for
withholding of removal is higher than for asylum—even though the
facts that must be proved are the same—an applicant who is
ineligible for asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding
of removal under [8 U.S.C.] § 1231(b)(3).” Camara v. Ashcroft,
378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004). Because Dimka failed to show
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that she is eligible for asylum, she cannot meet the higher
standard for withholding of removal.
Finally, Dimka challenges the denial of her request
for voluntary departure. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f)
(2006), “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an appeal from
denial of a request for an order of voluntary departure . . . .”
See Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 193 (4th Cir. 2004). We
retain jurisdiction, however, over constitutional claims or
questions of law pertaining to the voluntary departure
determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006).
Here, Dimka argues that the immigration judge and the
Board committed legal error by holding that an alien must
possess a valid passport in order to be eligible for voluntary
departure. Although this claim is arguably a question of law
over which we retain jurisdiction, it is squarely foreclosed by
8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(2) (2009), which provides that the alien
must present “a passport or other travel documentation
sufficient to assure lawful entry into the country to which the
alien is departing.”
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.* We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
(Continued)
* Dimka’s brief merely recites the requirements for
establishing a claim under the Convention Against Torture. She
fails to raise any specific claims in this regard and has
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
therefore waived appellate review. See Fed. R. App. P.
28(a)(9)(A) (“[T]he argument . . . must contain . . .
appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations
to the authorities and parts of the record on which the
appellant relies.”); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,
241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Failure to comply with the specific
dictates of [Rule 28] with respect to a particular claim
triggers abandonment of that claim on appeal.”); see also
Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 189 n.7.

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