United States of America v. Adekunle Baruwa, a/k/a Auday

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-5135
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ADEKUNLE BARUWA, a/k/a Auday,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,
District Judge. (3:07-cr-00080-1)
Submitted: May 19, 2008 Decided: June 18, 2008
Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Matthew A. Victor, VICTOR VICTOR & HELGOE LLP, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States
Attorney, Monica L. Dillon, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Adekunle Baruwa appeals his conviction for distributing
five or more grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2008). We have reviewed
the record and find no reversible error.
Baruwa first claims the district court erred in admitting
statements made during the drug transaction because they included
evidence of an unrelated drug transaction. We review the admission
of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Forrest, 429
F.3d 73, 79 (4th Cir. 2005). Rule 404(b), Fed. R. Evid.,
prohibits the admission of evidence of “other crimes” solely to
prove a defendant’s bad character, but applies only to acts
extrinsic to the crime charged. United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d
281, 311 (4th Cir. 2003). “[W]here testimony is admitted as to
acts intrinsic to the crime charged, and is not admitted solely to
demonstrate bad character, it is admissible.” United States v.
Chin, 83 F.3d 83, 88 (4th Cir. 1996). “[A]cts are intrinsic when
they are inextricably intertwined or both acts are part of a single
criminal episode or the other acts were necessary preliminaries to
the crime charged.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
During the recorded drug transaction, the confidential
informant paid a prior debt of twenty dollars to Baruwa in addition
to the purchase price of the drugs. If the debt did relate to a

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prior drug transaction, the payment of that debt occurred during
the drug transaction and became part of a single criminal episode,
rendering it intrinsic to the current transaction. Id.
Additionally, while Baruwa implies the unnamed debt was related to
a prior drug transaction, no evidence presented to the jury
establishes the source of the debt, and the repayment of the
unknown debt is not likely to have prejudiced Baruwa under Fed. R.
Evid. 403. We conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Baruwa’s motion to exclude the evidence.
Baruwa next claims the Government failed to establish a
proper chain of custody for the cocaine base. This court reviews
challenges to the chain of evidence custody for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Jones, 356 F.3d 529, 535 (4th Cir.
2004). After reviewing the record, we conclude the district court
did not abuse its discretion when it found sufficient proof that
the evidence was what it purported to be and was not altered in any
material respect. See United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363,
366 (4th Cir. 1982).
Finally, Baruwa challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence. A defendant who challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his conviction faces a heavy burden. See
United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). In
reviewing a sufficiency challenge, “[t]he verdict of a jury must be
sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most

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favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). This court “ha[s] defined
‘substantial evidence,’ in the context of a criminal action, as
that evidence which ‘a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Newsome, 322
F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94
F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). After reviewing the
record in a light favorable to the Government, we conclude there
was sufficient evidence for a reasonable finder of fact to find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, we affirm Baruwa’s conviction. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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