United States of America v. Alejandero Arango-Lopez, a/k/a Alejandero Jesus Arango

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-5036
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALEJANDERO ARANGO-LOPEZ, a/k/a Alejandero Jesus Arango,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Chief District
Judge. (1:07-cr-00002-BEL)
Submitted: July 27, 2009 Decided: August 7, 2009
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William J. Baker, MORENO & ASSOCIATES, Chula Vista, California,
for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney,
Bryan M. Giblin, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
After a jury trial, Alejandero Arango-Lopez was
convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine powder, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006), and was
sentenced to 151 months in prison. On appeal, Arango-Lopez
argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless search of the
commercial truck he was driving and his subsequent statements,
that he was entitled to a two-level reduction in offense level
pursuant to the statutory “safety valve,” and that his sentence
was unreasonable. Finding no error, we affirm.
This court reviews the factual findings underlying the
district court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error
and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Branch, 537
F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 943
(2009). The evidence is construed in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below. United States v. Uzenski, 434
F.3d 690, 704 (4th Cir. 2006).
We have recognized that “[o]bserving a traffic
violation provides sufficient justification for a police officer
to detain the offending vehicle for as long as it takes to
perform the traditional incidents of a routine traffic stop.”
Branch, 537 F.3d at 335. Thus, in the course of a routine
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traffic stop, an officer can a obtain driver’s license and
registration and perform a computer check on these documents
before issuing a citation. United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d
210, 217 (4th Cir. 2008). However, “[a]ny further investigative
detention . . . is beyond the scope of the Terry1 stop and
therefore illegal unless the officer has a reasonable suspicion
of a serious crime or the individual consents to the further
detention.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Reasonable suspicion requires more than a hunch but
less than probable cause, and may be based on the collective
knowledge of officers involved in an investigation. Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000); United States v. Hensley,
469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985). Courts assess the legality of police
conduct during a Terry stop under the totality of the
circumstances. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989).
Arango-Lopez was traveling over the speed limit and
Trooper Stines possessed sufficient cause to stop him, request
his license, registration, and other documents pertaining to
commercial trucking, and examine them. Arango-Lopez argues that
Trooper Stines had neither a reasonable suspicion nor probable
cause to detain him beyond the initial traffic stop. Trooper
Stines testified that during the initial traffic stop and review
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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of Arango-Lopez’s documentation he became suspicious of the
legitimacy of Arango-Lopez’s trucking business and itinerary,
thus justifying continued detention. Trooper Stines testified
that during the questioning Arango-Lopez appeared extremely
nervous and the nervousness did not dissipate once Stines
informed him that he was merely writing him a warning ticket.
Arango-Lopez’s bills of lading and log book also contained
inconsistencies, including a large load of expensive electronics
in an unsealed trailer, an unexplained day-and-a-half stop in
Arkansas, and a circuitous route that was hundreds of miles
longer than the more heavily-patrolled direct route. Based on
the totality of the circumstances, Trooper Stines had a
reasonable suspicion that Arango-Lopez was involved in criminal
activity to detain him beyond the initial stop.
We also conclude that the warrantless search of the
truck trailer was lawful. First, probable cause existed to
support the search after a trained drug dog alerted to drugs in
the truck trailer. Moreover, independent of probable cause,
Arango-Lopez provided voluntary oral and written consent to the
search. We therefore conclude that the district court did not
err in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search of the truck trailer or Arango-Lopez’s subsequent
statements.
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We also reject Arango-Lopez’s contention that the
district court erred in failing to apply the safety valve
provision. A defendant is eligible for an offense level
reduction and a sentence below an otherwise applicable statutory
mandatory minimum if he meets all five requirements set forth in
the statute.2 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2006); USSG § 5C1.2. To
satisfy the fifth requirement, the defendant must “truthfully
provide[] to the Government all information and evidence the
defendant has concerning the offense.” Id. § 3553(f)(5). We
have previously stated that the “plain and unambiguous language
of [18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5)] obligates defendants to demonstrate,
through affirmative conduct, that they have supplied truthful
information to the Government.” United States v. Ivester, 75
F.3d 182, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1996). Moreover, a defendant must
acknowledge responsibility before qualifying for an application
of the safety valve, and the decision to proceed to trial is
inconsistent with accepting one’s criminal actions. See United
2 The statute applies only if the defendant: (1) “does not
have more than one criminal history point”; (2) has not used
violence or possessed a dangerous weapon in connection with the
offense; (3) has not caused death or serious bodily injury; (4)
“was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others
in the offense”; and (5) “not later than the time of the
sentencing hearing, . . . has truthfully provided to the
Government all information and evidence” concerning offenses
that are part of the same course of conduct or a common scheme
or plan. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(f) (West 2006); USSG § 5C1.2(a)
(2006).
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States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142, 1147 (4th Cir. 1996). The
district court’s determination that a defendant has not
satisfied the safety valve criteria is a question of fact
reviewed for clear error. United States v. Wilson, 114 F.3d
429, 432 (4th Cir. 1997).
The district court found that Arango-Lopez was not
eligible for the safety valve because he did not accept
responsibility for his actions, citing his rejection of an
offered plea agreement that forced the Government to proceed to
trial. Further, even after his conviction, Arango-Lopez made no
affirmative effort to disclose all he knew to the Government.
We conclude the district court’s finding was not clearly
erroneous.
Finally, Arango-Lopez argues that his sentence was
unreasonable. When determining a sentence, the district court
must calculate the appropriate advisory guidelines range and
consider this in conjunction with the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
____, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007). Appellate review of a
district court’s imposition of a sentence, “whether inside, just
outside, or significantly outside the [g]uidelines range,” is
for abuse of discretion. 128 S. Ct. at 591. Sentences within
the applicable guidelines range may be presumed by the appellate
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court to be reasonable. United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468,
473 (4th Cir. 2007).
The district court followed the necessary procedural
steps in sentencing Arango-Lopez, appropriately treating the
sentencing guidelines as advisory, properly calculating and
considering the applicable guidelines range, performing an
individualized assessment of the § 3553(a) factors to the facts
of the case, and stating in open court the reasons for the
sentence. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir.
2009). (J.A. 88-89). The court determined that a sentence
within the guidelines was warranted, due to the serious nature
of the offense, but in light of Arango-Lopez’s good character
references and work history found a sentence at the bottom of
the guidelines range appropriate. Arango-Lopez’s sentence,
which is the bottom of the applicable guidelines range and below
the statutory maximum of life, may be presumed on appeal to be
reasonable. Thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing the 151-month sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

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