Raymond W. Konan v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 1983

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-2308
RAYMOND W. KONAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
NOEL D. SENGEL, Bar Counsel, Virginia State
Bar; STEPHEN H. RATLIFF, Chair-Designate
District Subcommittee, Virginia State Bar;
KAREN A. GOULD, Chairperson, Disciplinary
Board Virginia State Bar; BARBARA SAYERS
LANIER, Clerk of Disciplinary System, Virginia
State Bar; STEPHEN M. HALL, Assistant Attorney
General, Commonwealth of Virginia,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
ELIZABETH B. LACY; LEROY ROUNDTREE HASSELL;
BARBARA MILANO KEENAN; LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ,
JR.; DONALD LEMONS; G. STEVEN AGEE; CYNTHIA D.
KINSER, Justices of Supreme Court of Virginia,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (1:06-cv-00175-JCC)
Submitted: April 18, 2007 Decided: July 6, 2007
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Raymond W. Konan, Appellant Pro Se. Mike F. Melis, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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*See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to “cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also Davani v. Virginia Dep’t of Transp.,
434 F.3d 712, 718 (4th Cir. 2006).
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PER CURIAM:
Raymond W. Konan appeals from the district court’s order
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. The district
court dismissed Konan’s complaint on the grounds that Konan failed
to adequately state a claim for violation of the Equal Protection
Clause and that his Due Process claim was barred by collateral
estoppel. After having reviewed the record, we find that, pursuant
to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, * the district court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over Konan’s claims.
Konan’s claims seek redress for injuries caused by his
disbarment by the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, an
administrative agency of the Supreme Court of Virginia. See Va.
Code Ann. § 54.1-3910 (Michie 2005). While the Disciplinary Board
is not itself a state court, the form of the proceeding is not
determinative under Rooker-Feldman; rather, it is the nature,
character, and effect of the proceedings themselves that is
controlling. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482. In Feldman, the Supreme
Court took note of the judicial nature of state bar disciplinary
proceedings. Id. at 482 n. 15 (citing Middlesex County Ethics

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Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982)).
Additionally, this court has held that the disciplinary board of a
state bar can be considered as part of the “system of state courts”
and that their judicial decisions are not subject to review by the
federal courts. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. West Virginia State Bar,
233 F.3d 813, 817-18 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding Rooker-Feldman
doctrine deprived district court of jurisdiction to review decision
of West Virginia State Bar).
The Virginia State Bar is, by statute, an arm of the
Supreme Court of Virginia, and its decisions are judicial in
nature. See Allstate, 233 F.3d at 817; see also Supreme Court of
Virginia Rule Pt. 6, § IV, ¶ 13 (procedure for disciplining and
disbarring attorneys). In this case, while Konan challenges the
procedures of the Bar’s Disciplinary Board, the decision by the
Board was upheld by the Supreme Court of Virginia, the appropriate
court to review such challenges. Because the Board’s function is
judicial in nature, we hold that its rulings are subject to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and, therefore, not reviewable by a federal
district court. Accordingly, we modify the district court’s
dismissal to show that the case was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and affirm the dismissal as modified. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

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AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

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