United States of America v.  Kareem Jamal Currence

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 05-4894 
KAREEM JAMAL CURRENCE,
Defendant-Appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
James R. Spencer, Chief District Judge.
(CR-05-231)
Argued: March 21, 2006
Decided: May 4, 2006
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and
SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the
opinion, in which Chief Judge Wilkins and Judge Williams joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: John Staige Davis, V, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Vir-
ginia, for Appellant. Paul Geoffrey Gill, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Rich-
mond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Paul J. McNulty, United
States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Frank W. Dun-
ham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

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OPINION
SHEDD, Circuit Judge:
Kareem Jamal Currence is under indictment for possession of crack
cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of crack cocaine with
intent to distribute in a school zone. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 860.
Before trial, Currence moved to suppress evidence on the ground that
it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the district
court granted the motion. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731, the United
States now appeals the suppression order.1 We reverse and remand for
further proceedings.2
I
On July 6, 2004, Richmond, Virginia, police received information
from a confidential informant that a man on a bicycle was selling
drugs on a street corner in Richmond. The informant gave a detailed
description of the man. Police Detective Fred Bates and another
detective went to the location and approached Currence, who matched
the description given by the informant. At Detective Bates’ request,
Currence stepped off the bicycle and was frisked. The frisk uncovered
money, but no drugs or weapons.
Currence identified himself to the detectives, and they ran a radio
check on him. As a result, the detectives learned that Currence had
an outstanding criminal warrant. The detectives then handcuffed Cur-
rence and placed him under arrest pending confirmation of the war-
rant.
At that time, Detective Michael Bohannon arrived on the scene.
Detective Bates asked Detective Bohannon to search the bicycle,
1In accordance with § 3731, the United States certified to the district
court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evi-
dence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding. See J.A.
68.
2We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its
legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Cardwell, 433 F.3d 378, 388
(4th Cir. 2005).
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which was next to Currence and the detectives. Detective Bohannon
was aware that drug dealers sometimes use hollow areas on bicycles
to attempt to conceal drugs. As he was searching the bicycle, Detec-
tive Bohannon — without using any tools — slid off the end cap from
the right handlebar and discovered plastic baggies containing what
appeared to be crack cocaine inside the handlebar.
The detectives then arrested Currence for possession of crack
cocaine. Thereafter, the detectives informed Currence of his rights,
and he made incriminating statements. A subsequent test of the sub-
stance found in the handlebar indicated that it was crack cocaine.
II
Currence moved to suppress the crack cocaine under the Fourth
Amendment, which "generally requires police to secure a warrant
before conducting a search," Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466
(1999), and which renders a "warrantless search . . . invalid unless it
falls within one of the narrow and well-delineated exceptions" to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, Flippo v. West Virginia,
528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999). Contending that the crack cocaine was ille-
gally seized, Currence also argued that his post-arrest statements are
"fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963). In opposition to the suppression motion, the United States
argued that several exceptions apply, one of which is that the search
was incident to Currence’s lawful arrest. As we explain below, we
agree with the United States that the search of Currence’s bicycle
handlebar falls within this exception.
A.
"It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a tradi-
tional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment." United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). This
exception provides that when law enforcement officers have probable
cause to make a lawful custodial arrest, they may — incident to that
arrest and without a warrant — search "the arrestee’s person and the
area ‘within his immediate control.’" Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 763 (1969). "Such searches have long been considered valid
because of the need ‘to remove any weapons that [the arrestee] might
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seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape’ and the need
to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence." New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
However, "[t]he constitutionality of a search incident to an arrest does
not depend on whether there is any indication that the person arrested
possesses weapons or evidence. The fact of a lawful arrest, standing
alone, authorizes a search." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35
(1979). This is a "bright line" rule of constitutional law. United States
v. Porter, 738 F.2d 622, 627 (4th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
Like other warrantless searches, a search incident to arrest "must
be limited in scope to that which is justified by the particular purposes
served by the exception." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
Searches incident to arrest have both a geographic and temporal limi-
tation. Geographically, such searches must be confined to the
arrestee’s person and the area within the arrestee’s "immediate con-
trol," which is "the area into which an arrestee might reach in order
to grab a weapon or evidentiary items." Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. This
can include both open and closed spaces, see id. ("A gun on a table
or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to
the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested."), as well as locked items, see United States v. Silva, 745
F.2d 840, 847 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding search incident to arrest
where officer removed a key from the arrestee’s pocket and unlocked
a bag sitting next to the arrestee). Moreover, "officers may separate
the suspect from the [item] to be searched, thereby alleviating their
safety concerns, before they conduct the search." United States v.
Han, 74 F.3d 537, 542 (4th Cir. 1996). Temporally, searches incident
to arrest must be "substantially contemporaneous with the arrest,"
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964), and although a search
can occur before an arrest is actually made, see Rawlings v. Kentucky,
448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980), a search "may not precede an arrest and
serve as part of its justification," Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63
(1968).
B.
The district court found that Currence’s initial arrest "was sup-
ported by probable cause based on the outstanding misdemeanor war-
rant issued against him," that the arrest "was not based on the
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contraband found," and that "the detectives were authorized to make
a search incident to [his] lawful arrest." J.A. 65. These determinations
appear to be amply supported by the record, and Currence does not
appear to argue otherwise.3 Therefore, we accept for purposes of this
appeal that the detectives were authorized to arrest Currence for the
outstanding criminal charge and to search him and the area within his
"immediate control" contemporaneous with that arrest. See United
States v. Grandison, 783 F.2d 1152, 1156 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding
that "officers who rely upon [an outstanding arrest] warrant may
arrest a person at whom the warrant is addressed and conduct a con-
temporaneous search of the arrestee’s person and his possessions").
C.
This does not end our analysis, however, because although the dis-
trict court concluded that a search incident to Currence’s arrest was
permissible, it further concluded that the bicycle handlebar was not
within the permissible scope of that search. The district court
grounded this conclusion on Belton, in which the Court considered
"the question of the proper scope of a search of the interior of an auto-
mobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants." 453 U.S.
at 459. The Court in Belton, applying the general rule expressed in Chi-
mel,4 held that "when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest
of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous inci-
3In his appellate brief, Currence "acknowledges that the officers’ testi-
mony is consistent with [him] being arrested on an outstanding arrest
warrant, and about to be placed in a police car, prior to the bicycle search
. . . by Det. Bohannon." Brief of the Appellee, at 4.
4The Court stated: "Our holding today does no more than determine
the meaning of Chimel’s principles in this particular and problematic
context. It in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the
Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful cus-
todial arrests." Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.3. Although "Chimel stands in
a long line of cases recognizing an exception to the warrant requirement
when a search is incident to a valid arrest," Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S.
291, 295 (1973), we have referred to Chimel as being the "leading
authority" addressing this exception, and we have pointed to Belton as
one example of the Supreme Court "broadly" interpreting Chimel. See
Han, 74 F.3d at 541-42.
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dent of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automo-
bile," and in doing so "may also examine the contents of any
containers found within the passenger compartment. . . ." 453 U.S. at
460 (footnotes omitted). The Court stated that a "container" for pur-
poses of the search is "any object capable of holding another object,"
id. at 460 n.4, and that "[s]uch a container may . . . be searched
whether it is open or closed," id. at 461. The Court specifically
excluded the trunk of an automobile from the scope of its holding. Id.
at 460 n.4.
The district court held that "the search incident to arrest rationale
logically extends to searches of bicycles." J.A. 66. However, the dis-
trict court concluded that "the facts of this case exceed the parameters
of the authorized search." Id. In reaching this holding, the district
court explained:
The detectives dismantled a part of the bicycle (although
with very minimal intrusion) that was not a device created
to be a container. While the inside of the handlebar is an
"object capable of holding another object," it is not the type
of container that can be searched as defined in Belton. The
search of the handlebar is akin to the search of the trunk of
a car and may not be searched incident to arrest.
Id. The United States challenges this conclusion in this appeal.
D.
The district court’s focus on Belton, and more specifically its
attempt to analogize the bicycle to an automobile in order to fit this
case within Belton, is understandable in light of the relatively unique
factual circumstances of this case, as well as the United States’ argu-
ment below. See, e.g., Response of the United States to Defendant’s
Motion to Suppress, at 7 ("Following his lawful arrest, under Belton,
the officers could search the bicycle the defendant was operating, just
like any other vehicle."). However, we believe that this focus and this
analogy are unnecessary for resolution of this case. As we have noted,
Belton is merely one specific application — in the automobile context
— of the general rule concerning searches incident to arrest expressed
in Chimel. Although certain aspects of Belton are, of course, instruc-
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tive as to application of the general rule, the dispositive issue for our
purposes is not whether a bicycle is akin to an automobile or whether
a handlebar is akin to a trunk. Rather, the issue we must ultimately
decide is whether the area searched (i.e., the bicycle handlebar) was
at the time of the arrest within Currence’s "immediate control" — that
is, "the area into which [he] might reach in order to grab a weapon
or evidentiary items." Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. If it was, then the
search is constitutional.
Viewed in this light, we hold that the search of the bicycle handle-
bar was permissible as a search incident to Currence’s lawful arrest.
When the detectives first encountered Currence, he was on the bicy-
cle, and it appears that during the entire time before they discovered
the crack cocaine, he was in close proximity to the bicycle. The bicy-
cle was therefore within Currence’s "immediate control" and was (as
the district court recognized) subject to being searched incident to his
lawful arrest. We believe that because Detective Bohannon was able
to remove the handlebar end cap by simply sliding it off "with very
minimal intrusion," J.A. 66, there is no basis under Chimel to treat the
handlebar differently from other items within the immediate control
of an arrestee that may be opened during a search incident to an
arrest. Just as an arrestee’s ability to reach into, for example, a closed
drawer or a locked bag makes those items searchable incident to an
arrest, Currence’s ability to reach into the easily accessible handlebar
likewise makes it searchable.5
III
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the suppression order and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.6
REVERSED AND REMANDED
5As we have noted, there are limits to the scope of a search incident
to arrest. Nothing in this opinion should be construed as a holding that
all areas of a bicycle can automatically be searched in every case. We
merely hold that on the specific facts of this case, the search was permis-
sible as incident to the arrest.
6In light of this disposition, we need not address the United States’s
alternate theory that the search was lawful under the "vehicle exception"
to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
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