LAWRENCE K. SILVA, Ph. D v. Bowie State Univ., No. CA-04-1984-RWT D. Md. June 22, 2005 . Next, Silva asserts…

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1760
LAWRENCE K. SILVA, Ph. D.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
BOWIE STATE UNIVERSITY, part of the University
System of Maryland,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (CA-04-
1984-RWT)
Submitted: January 25, 2006 Decided: February 10, 2006
Before WILLIAMS, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Lawrence K. Silva, Appellant Pro Se. Sara Slaff, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).

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PER CURIAM:
Lawrence K. Silva filed a second amended complaint
against Bowie State University (“BSU”), his former employer,
alleging that BSU terminated him in retaliation for engaging in
protected activity, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended. BSU moved to dismiss the complaint under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. The district court concluded that it need
not convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The court then granted BSU’s Rule
12(b)(6) motion, finding that, as a matter of law, BSU’s request
for Silva to undergo a medical examination was not an adverse
employment action. The court also concluded that Silva failed to
state a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, finding that
there was no causal connection between his protected activity and
the termination because BSU terminated him for refusing to undergo
the medical evaluation--not for filing his discrimination
complaint. Silva appeals. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and
remand for further proceedings.
Silva asserts on appeal that the district court erred by
failing to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment and that the court erred by finding that the request for
a medical examination was not an adverse employment action. We
have reviewed the record and find no reversible error relating to

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these issues. Accordingly, we affirm these portions of the
district court’s order for the reasons stated by the court at the
hearing held on June 21, 2005. See Silva v. Bowie State Univ.,
No. CA-04-1984-RWT (D. Md. June 22, 2005).
Next, Silva asserts that the district court erred in
granting BSU’s motion to dismiss his retaliatory discharge claim on
the grounds that there was no causal connection between the filing
of his complaint with BSU’s Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”)
officer and the termination and that insubordination was the reason
for his termination. We review de novo a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal,
“accept[ing] as true the factual allegations of the challenged
complaint and . . . view[ing] those allegations in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 407 F.3d
266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). “[A] district court
may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim only if it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
that would entitle him to relief.” Id.
To state a prima facie case of retaliation, Silva must
show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) an adverse
employment action was taken against him; and (3) there was a causal
connection between the first two elements. Price v. Thompson, 380
F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004). In determining whether there is a
causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action sufficient to state a prima facie case of

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retaliation, we have “held that a causal connection . . . exists
where the employer takes an adverse employment action against an
employee shortly after learning of the protected activity.” Id. at
213.
Here, Silva contacted the EEO officer on January 26,
2003. BSU terminated him on April 8, 2003--about ten weeks later.
Because “[t]he burden of establishing a prima facie case . . . is
not onerous,” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 (1981), we find that the ten-week lapse of time sufficiently
established a prima facie case of retaliation. See King v.
Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 151 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding that
ten weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action
“gives rise to a sufficient inference of causation to satisfy the
prima facie requirement” but noting that “[t]his length of time .
. . is sufficiently long so as to weaken significantly the
inference of causation between the two events”). Thus, the
district court erred in granting BSU’s motion to dismiss Silva’s
retaliatory discharge claim.
Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the district
court’s order and remand for further proceedings. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

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adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED

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