David A. Roberts v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 1923

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1096
DAVID A. ROBERTS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
JOHN NICHOLAS, Commissioner, Maine Department
of Human Services, and individually; PETER
WALSH, Individually and in his official
capacity as Commissioner of Maine Department
of Human Services; KEVIN W. CONCANNON,
Individually and in his official capacity as
Commissioner (former) of Maine Department of
Human Services; MARK O. VAN VALKENBURGH,
Individually and in his official capacity as
Agent for the Maine Department of Human
Services; INGRID B. LAPOINTE, Individually and
in her official capacity as Agent for the
Maine Department of Human Services; ANNE-MARIE
JOHNSON, Individually and in her official
capacity as Agent for the Maine Department of
Human Services; LORETTA DUMOND, Individually
and in her official capacity as Agent for the
Maine Department of Human Services; MAINE
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-04-2039-WDQ)
Submitted: March 13, 2006 Decided: May 24, 2006

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Before TRAXLER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David A. Roberts, Appellant Pro Se. Joseph B. Spillman, Assistant
Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland; Christopher Coles Taub,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Augusta, Maine, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).

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PER CURIAM:
David A. Roberts appeals the order of the district court
dismissing his suit against the Maine Department of Human Services
and several current and former state officials (collectively
“MDHS”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This lawsuit
arose out of attempts by MDHS to enforce a Maine state court child
support order. Roberts sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000),
alleging that MDHS’s enforcement efforts violated his
constitutional rights. The district court held that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine barred Roberts’s suit. See Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
Subsequent to the district court’s dismissal of Roberts’s
complaint, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
125 S. Ct. 1517 (2005):
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of
the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.
Id. at 1521-22; see also Davani v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d
712, 713 (2006) (“Exxon requires us to examine whether the state-
court loser who files suit in federal district court seeks redress
for an injury caused by the state-court decision itself. If he is

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*Our disposition should not be read as indicating any view
regarding the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or the
other defenses asserted by MDHS, on the merits. We leave these
matters for plenary resolution by the district court, as that court
deems appropriate.
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not challenging the state-court decision, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not apply.”)
Roberts’s complaint alleges a constitutional injury
arising not expressly from the state court judgment itself, but
rather from MDHS’s post-judgment collection efforts. The district
court did not have the benefit of Exxon and Davani in its
assessment of the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Moreover, assuming that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine no longer
precludes Roberts’s suit from going forward, the district court has
not had an opportunity to address either the merits of Robert’s
complaint, or the other defenses raised by MDHS. Because the
district court is in the best position to evaluate these matters in
the first instance, we vacate the district court’s order and remand
the case for further consideration. *
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED

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