Robert David Emery v. ROANOKE CITY SCHOOL BOARD, No. 04-2411 Defendant-Appellee

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 ROBERT DAVID EMERY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ROANOKE CITY SCHOOL BOARD, No. 04-2411 Defendant-Appellee,
and
ROANOKE CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant. 
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
James C. Turk, Senior District Judge.
(CA-02-859-7)
Argued: October 26, 2005
Decided: December 8, 2005
Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Williams and Judge Traxler joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Peter Duane Vieth, WOOTENHART, P.L.C., Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellant. Kathleen Shepherd Mehfoud, REED SMITH,
L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John L. Coo-
ley, Jr., WOOTENHART, P.L.C., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant.

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OPINION
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
This case requires us to decide whether the plaintiff can obtain
reimbursement for educational expenses pursuant to the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
(1994). When a school district’s educational choices for a disabled
child violate the IDEA, the child’s parents can unilaterally place him
in an appropriate educational setting and seek reimbursement from
the district. See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel.
Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993).
The district court dismissed this case on the ground that the statute
of limitations applicable to the IDEA barred plaintiff’s claim for reim-
bursement. We hold that the plaintiff has no standing to sue for reim-
bursement, because he has suffered no cognizable injury. We thus
affirm the judgment of the district court, albeit on a different ground.
I.
Plaintiff Robert David Emery seeks reimbursement under the
IDEA from defendant Roanoke City School Board (RCSB), which
operates Roanoke City Public Schools (RCPS). Plaintiff was born
without disability on July 19, 1981. Sadly, however, he fell victim to
a tragic accident as a nine-year-old boy. On March 30, 1991, a car
struck him as he was playing at a friend’s house, and he suffered a
serious brain injury. He remained in hospitals until September 27,
1991. Plaintiff has had trouble with his memory, behavior, movement,
and speech as a result of this accident.
RCPS determined that plaintiff was eligible for special education
under the IDEA because he was both learning disabled and emotion-
ally disabled. It thus developed an individualized education program
(IEP) for plaintiff for the 1991-1992 school year. Plaintiff’s father,
Ralph Emery (Mr. Emery), consented to this educational plan, and
RCPS sent him a notice of his procedural rights in September, 1991.
Pursuant to this IEP, in the fall of 1991, plaintiff began school in the
program for emotionally disabled students at Raleigh Court Elemen-
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tary School. It was quickly determined, however, that this program
was not appropriate for him.
Plaintiff thus transferred to the Blue Ridge Education Center, a pri-
vate school at the Lewis-Gale Psychiatric Center, in November, 1991.
Mr. Emery consented to the transfer. Plaintiff did well at this school,
which had a more structured environment. But he could not control
his behavior and the staff felt he was too aggressive and dangerous.
As a result, Blue Ridge expelled him at the end of the school year in
June, 1992.
There is no indication that RCPS provided plaintiff with an IEP for
the 1992-1993 school year. Mr. Emery has noted that a representative
of RCPS told him that the school system had no educational recom-
mendation for plaintiff and that he would have to find his son a place-
ment on his own. Mr. Emery thus placed plaintiff in the Cumberland
Hospital for Children and Adolescents at his own initiative. RCPS did
not take part in this placement.
Plaintiff began attending school at Cumberland on October 8,
1992, and remained there until April 23, 1993. Following Cumber-
land, he started attending The Woods School on June 2, 1993. Plain-
tiff does not currently challenge RCPS’s compliance with the IDEA
after this date.
The crux of the parties’ dispute is centered on the expenses
incurred at Cumberland. Cumberland charged over $200,000 for
plaintiff’s six months in its facility. Mr. Emery’s medical insurance
from his employment at ITT Electro Optical Products provided
$350,000 in lifetime medical benefits for family members, and he
paid plaintiff’s bills with the insurance. Thus, plaintiff paid none of
these expenses. His father’s insurance plan no longer covers him, and
he has his own insurance through Virginia Medicaid and is also eligi-
ble for Florida Medicaid. Plaintiff’s present insurance coverage is not
affected by the decrease in lifetime benefits in his father’s insurance
plan.
On several occasions in the 1990s, Mr. Emery and his counsel
requested reimbursement for the Cumberland expenditures. None of
his lawyers requested a due process hearing over plaintiff’s educa-
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tional placement for the 1992-1993 school year, as is allowed under
the IDEA. On October 11, 1999, RCPS rejected a further claim for
reimbursement in a letter responding to plaintiff’s current counsel.
This letter noted, inter alia, that the statute of limitations on the claim
had expired.
Plaintiff’s counsel thus requested a due process hearing. The par-
ties stipulated to the key facts. On June 28, 2002, the hearing officer
concluded that the statute of limitations applicable to the IDEA barred
plaintiff’s claim.
Plaintiff initiated this suit through his guardian following the hear-
ing officer’s resolution of the statute-of-limitations issue. RCSB filed
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the claim because the statute of
limitations had expired. The district court agreed with the hearing
officer that the claim was time-barred and dismissed the case. Plain-
tiff appeals this dismissal.
II.
Congress designed the IDEA with two purposes in mind. First, it
wanted to give children with disabilities a "free appropriate public
education" (FAPE) emphasizing "special education and related ser-
vices." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994).1 Second, it sought to ensure that
the rights of disabled children and their parents were protected. Id.
Congress thus provided substantive rights to disabled children and
gave children and their parents procedural rights. See AW ex rel. Wil-
son v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 372 F.3d 674, 678 (4th Cir. 2004).
1The IDEA has been substantially amended at least twice since 1997.
See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-446, Title I, 118 Stat. 2647; Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, Title I, 111
Stat. 37. Because the relevant conduct in this case occurred before the
amendments were in place, we only discuss the earlier IDEA sections.
See Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 526 n.2
(4th Cir. 1998) (refusing "to apply the [1997] amendments to conduct
occurring before their enactment" and noting that other courts follow the
same approach).
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A disabled child in any state that receives federal funds for special
education has the substantive right to receive a FAPE. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(1). The state delivers the FAPE principally through an indi-
vidualized education program (IEP), which is developed for each dis-
abled child with the cooperation of local school representatives and
the child’s parents. See id. §§ 1401(a)(20), 1414(a)(5); G ex rel. RG
v. Fort Bragg Dependent Sch., 343 F.3d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 2003). The
IEP sets forth, among other things, the goals for the child’s education,
the services that will be provided to him, and the time period for these
services. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20); Fort Bragg, 343 F.3d at 298-99.
The IDEA gives parents of disabled children several procedural
protections. School districts are required to provide them with written
notice of their procedural rights. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(D). The
parental right most relevant in this case is the opportunity to challenge
a child’s educational placement in "an impartial due process hearing"
conducted by the state or local educational agency. Id. § 1415(b)(2);
see also id. § 1415(b)(1)(E). If parents are "aggrieved by the findings
and decision made" at such a hearing, they have the subsequent right
to bring a lawsuit in state or federal court. Id. § 1415(e)(2).
When a party files suit under § 1415(e)(2), the court "shall grant
such relief as [it] determines is appropriate." Id. The IDEA does not
authorize courts to grant monetary damages. See Sellers ex rel. Sellers
v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 526-28 (4th Cir. 1998). But,
at the same time, courts can equitably reimburse parents for funds
expended on their child’s education because of the school district’s
failure to provide a FAPE. Id. at 527 (citing Sch. Comm. of Burlington
v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 358, 370 (1985)); see also Florence
County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993)
(reimbursement available for unilateral placement in private school if
(1) district’s proffered placement violated the IDEA and (2) parent’s
placement was appropriate).
III.
A district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is
reviewed de novo. Manning ex rel. Manning v. Fairfax County Sch.
Bd., 176 F.3d 235, 237 (4th Cir. 1999). We conclude that the district
court properly dismissed this case, but reach our decision on an alter-
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nate basis. We hold that plaintiff does not have standing to pursue his
claim for retroactive reimbursement, because he has suffered no non-
speculative injury.
A.
The Constitution restricts the federal courts to "Cases" or "Contro-
versies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. A party’s standing to file suit is thus
a constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998).
Since standing is jurisdictional, courts must independently ensure its
presence. White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube, 413 F.3d 451, 460 (4th Cir.
2005). The standing requirement is designed to guarantee that "the
plaintiff has a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of a dispute to
render judicial resolution of it appropriate." Friends for Ferrell Park-
way, LLC v. Stasko, 282 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2002).
There are three requirements to meet the "irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing." Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102 (internal quotation
marks omitted). A plaintiff must show: "(1) he has suffered an injury
in fact; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Friends for Fer-
rell Parkway, 282 F.3d at 320 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)). The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving each of these three elements. Id.
To show a sufficient personal stake, a plaintiff has to prove injury
in fact. He must have suffered "an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is concrete and particularized, as well as actual or
imminent." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling
Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The injury cannot
be "conjectural or hypothetical." Friends for Ferrell Parkway, 282
F.3d at 320 (internal quotation marks omitted).
B.
A school district’s failure to provide a FAPE gives rise to distinct
injuries. First, the child has suffered the core injury when he is not
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furnished with an appropriate education. In the context of this injury,
therefore, the disabled child is the real party in interest. See Doe v.
Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1998). While the IDEA
affords parents procedural rights to compel the school district’s com-
pliance with the IDEA, these rights stem solely from their disabled
child’s inability to pursue a remedy due to his incapacity. Id. Thus,
"parents and children are distinct legal entities under the IDEA." Id.
In this case, plaintiff has claimed an injury in fact because RCSB
violated the IDEA by not providing him with an IEP for the 1992-
1993 school year. But this core injury is no longer redressable here,
and plaintiff does not contend otherwise. A plaintiff cannot recover
compensatory or punitive damages for a violation of the IDEA. See
Sellers, 141 F.3d at 526-28. Nor does plaintiff seek injunctive relief.
He waited numerous years to bring this suit and is now past the age
that would even qualify him to receive a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(2)(B); Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-213 (2003). Plaintiff also does
not currently dispute RCSB’s compliance with the IDEA after June
2, 1993, when he began attending The Woods School.
In addition to this core injury, the IDEA allows for reimbursement
of funds that the child or his parents may have expended to provide
the education that was the school district’s responsibility. Sch. Comm.
of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370. This injury is a subsidiary of and
dependent upon the child’s failure to receive a proper education under
the IDEA. See Carter, 510 U.S. at 15. Standing doctrine requires that
reimbursement should flow only to those who actually expend
resources, whether it be the parents, see, e.g., Bernard v. Sch. Bd. of
Norfolk, 58 F. Supp. 2d 669, 672-75 (E.D. Va. 1999), or the child,
see, e.g., Shook ex rel. Shook v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 882 F.2d
119, 122-23 (4th Cir. 1989). In the usual case, the parents of the dis-
abled child will be the appropriate ones to seek reimbursement
because they will have incurred the expense and suffered the subse-
quent monetary injury. This explains why the Supreme Court has
noted both that parents who change their child’s placement "do so at
their own financial risk," Sch. Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373-
74, and that parents can only obtain reimbursement if the school dis-
trict actually violated the IDEA, Carter, 510 U.S. at 15.
Plaintiff here challenges the failure of RCSB to provide reimburse-
ment for the Cumberland expenses. But he has failed to prove he sat-
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isfies the constitutional requirement that he suffer an injury in fact
with regard to this subsidiary injury. Crucially for the purposes of
standing, he suffered no out-of-pocket loss himself for the services
that Cumberland provided. He paid no money for the educational
expenses incurred during the 1992-1993 school year. In fact, Mr.
Emery’s medical insurance provided by his employer paid the Cum-
berland expenses. Plaintiff has failed to show how awarding him this
amount would be anything other than a windfall.
Plaintiff was in no way shortchanged by the use of proceeds from
his father’s medical insurance policy to pay Cumberland’s bills.
Plaintiff has not, for example, shown that he failed to obtain appropri-
ate care as a result of any diminution in his father’s lifetime insurance
benefits. And his current insurance coverage is distinct from the med-
ical insurance used to pay Cumberland. Any payment to Cumberland
under his father’s policy has not lessened the benefits plaintiff enjoys
under his current plan.
Our decision in Shook is instructive. Shook was a unique IDEA
case in which the child had actually expended her own resources. 882
F.2d at 122-23. In that case, the plaintiff, a disabled woman, sued a
school board in order to obtain retroactive reimbursement for
expenses incurred at a private school when she was a child. Her
father’s employer had provided her "a special self-insurance plan"
with a lifetime benefit of $100,000. Id. at 120. It was made out
directly to her for her special therapeutic services. At the time of the
litigation, she still qualified to receive benefits under the plan. Id. The
court held that she had Article III standing because the expenses paid
to the private school through her insurance plan diminished the
amount of future benefits she could receive from it. Id. at 122-23.
In contrast, the relevant insurance in this case belonged solely to
plaintiff’s father. Any decrease in lifetime benefits will not affect
plaintiff, as it would the plaintiff in Shook, because he no longer is
covered by the insurance that paid his Cumberland expenses. Since
plaintiff has no legally cognizable injury in fact, he has no standing
to sue for reimbursement in this case.2
2The statute of limitations further bars plaintiff’s parents from request-
ing a due process hearing for retroactive reimbursement. A cause of
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IV.
In most instances, parents and their disabled child will jointly bring
suit under the IDEA in diligent fashion. A disabled child will be able
to require a school district to provide him a FAPE when he can still
realize its benefits, and parents who incur costs will be able to obtain
appropriate reimbursement. In this case, however, plaintiff sought to
fasten a substantial obligation on a public school district long after the
fact. This delay proved detrimental to his claim, because he no longer
had an interest in seeking injunctive relief to compel a suitable educa-
tion. And his parents could no longer seek reimbursement for their
expenses because of the applicable statute of limitations. See supra
note 2. We are not free to relax the constitutional requirements of
standing or statutory limitations periods in order to keep a school dis-
trict obligated for events that occurred so many years ago. For the
foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
action in an IDEA case accrues when the plaintiff knows of "an allegedly
faulty IEP or a disagreement over the educational choices that a school
system has made for a student." R.R. ex rel. R. v. Fairfax County Sch.
Bd., 338 F.3d 325, 332 (4th Cir. 2003). As such, the cause of action in
this case accrued, at the very latest, on June 2, 1993, at which point
plaintiff had completed his time at Cumberland without an IEP. The
applicable statute of limitations gave his parents one year from this date
to request a due process hearing. See Manning, 176 F.3d at 238-39 & n.2.
They failed to do so and their opportunity has thus expired.
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