Hobert L. Buzzard v. Michael H. Holland

CORRECTED OPINION
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 HOBERT L. BUZZARD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL H. HOLLAND; MARTY D.
HUDSON; JOSEPH P. BRENNAN; B. V. No. 03-1406  HYLER, as Trustees of the United
Mine Workers of America 1974
Pension Plan and Trust; UNITED
MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 1974
BENEFIT PLAN AND TRUST,
Defendants-Appellees. 
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.
John T. Copenhaver, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-01-172-2)
Argued: January 20, 2004
Decided: April 26, 2004
Corrected Opinion Filed: May 17, 2004
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Duncan wrote
the opinion, in which Judge King joined. Judge Niemeyer wrote a dis-
senting opinion.

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COUNSEL
ARGUED: Robert B. Wilson, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appel-
lant. Jerry Mims, Office of General Counsel, UMWA HEALTH &
RETIREMENT FUNDS, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON
BRIEF: Glenda S. Finch, Deputy General Counsel, Office of the
General Counsel, UMWA HEALTH & RETIREMENT FUNDS,
Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
OPINION
DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
Hobert L. Buzzard appeals the district court’s entry of summary
judgment in favor of the Trustees of the United Mine Workers of
America 1974 Pension Plan and Trust ("Trustees"). The district court
found no abuse of discretion in the Trustees’ decision that Buzzard
was not entitled to a disability pension under the 1974 Pension Plan.
We find that the denial of disability pension benefits in this case is
not supported by substantial evidence. We accordingly reverse and
remand with instructions that judgment be entered in favor of Buz-
zard.
I.
A. Mine Accident and Subsequent Medical Treatment
Buzzard was employed as a laborer in the West Virginia coal
mines from October 20, 1970 to June 3, 1987. On June 3, 1987, Buz-
zard hit his head on an airlock while driving a scoop in the mines.
Buzzard was immediately hospitalized and treated for injuries to his
head, neck, jaws, shoulders, and back. A doctor examining Buzzard
on the day of the accident diagnosed his condition as blunt chest
trauma and acute cervical strain.
On August 3, 1987, Dr. John Schmidt, a neurologist, examined
Buzzard for complaints of headaches, neck pain, dizziness, forgetful-
ness, and irritability. He diagnosed cervical strain and post-
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concussion syndrome. Dr. Schmidt subsequently noted in a letter to
the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Fund that although his
physical examination of Buzzard was "within normal limits," Buzzard
appeared "somewhat depressed." Dr. Schmidt recommended a course
of physical therapy and Elavil, an anti-depressant medication.
For several months, Dr. Schmidt continued to see Buzzard in con-
nection with his mine injury, and noted that Buzzard’s condition was
steadily improving. In October 1987, Dr. Schmidt wrote to the Work-
ers’ Compensation Fund that Buzzard was improving and "wants to
try to return to work." Dr. Schmidt estimated that Buzzard "could
return to his former occupation as of October 19, 1987."1 It was not
possible, however, for Buzzard to return to his former occupation
because his job had been terminated when the mine closed in Septem-
ber 1987.
Dr. Karen Pettry, a doctor of osteopathy, saw Buzzard periodically
from August 1989 to April 1995. A treatment note dated August 8,
1989 indicates that Dr. Pettry prescribed Halcion to treat Buzzard’s
insomnia and Xanax to treat his anxiety.2 On September 4, 1989, she
observed that Buzzard "does well on meds[,] bad off. Xanax .5
doesn’t help. Much stress in family." Dr. Pettry renewed his prescrip-
tions for Xanax and Halcion. Her notes from October 25, 1990 reveal
that Buzzard continued to suffer from anxiety, although he appeared
to be "less depressed." On June 27, 1991, Dr. Pettry wrote that Buz-
zard was experiencing chronic fatigue, paranoid delusions, which she
believed were related to anxiety and depression, and that Buzzard had
experienced violent suicidal thoughts. At this time, she added Elavil
to Buzzard’s treatment regimen. Buzzard continued this course of
treatment while he remained under Dr. Pettry’s care.
1Dr. Adnan Silk performed a neurosurgical evaluation of Buzzard the
following month and likewise noted that although Buzzard had been out
of work since September of 1987, he was "willing to go back to work in
the future."
2Xanax may also be used for the treatment of depression. J.A. at 108.
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B. SSDI Application and Medical Evidence
On March 10, 1993, Buzzard applied for Social Security Disability
Insurance ("SSDI") benefits, claiming that he was totally and perma-
nently disabled as a result of "an injury to his neck, head, shoulders
and jaws" in addition to his "severe depression and . . . nervous condi-
tion." In an April 22, 1993 letter to the SSA, Dr. Bruce Guberman
reported that he had examined Buzzard in connection with his appli-
cation for SSDI benefits, and that Buzzard was suffering from a num-
ber of ailments, including multiple arthralgias, post-traumatic cervical
strain, obstructive pulmonary disease, obesity, and tension headaches.
Buzzard reported to Dr. Guberman that he had experienced bouts of
depression and nervousness since the mine accident. Dr. Guberman,
himself, observed that Buzzard appeared "anxious and tense" and that
Buzzard had "difficulty in relating to the examiner." Dr. Guberman
concluded, however, that based on his examination of Buzzard, "con-
striction of interests and restriction of activities due to psychiatric
problems appears to be unlikely."
The SSA thereafter determined that Buzzard was not disabled.
Buzzard requested a reconsideration of the SSA’s denial and submit-
ted a July 20, 1993 letter from Dr. Pettry stating that, in her opinion,
Buzzard was totally disabled as a result of "Coal Workers pneumoco-
niosis, hearing loss, severe depression with anxiety states, insomnia,
recurrent prostatitis and hypertension." In addition, Dr. Pettry stated
that between September 1989 and November 1991, "Buzzard suffered
from severe depression with suicidal ideation" and that his condition
"required heavy sedation to control violent outburst [sic]." The SSA,
in turn, referred Buzzard to Dr. Robert Solomon for an evaluation. Dr.
Solomon reported to the agency that Buzzard was indeed suffering
from an affective disorder, but doubted the impairment was severe.
As a result, Dr. Solomon concluded that Dr. Pettry’s opinion that
Buzzard was totally disabled was not supported by the medical evi-
dence. The SSA subsequently reaffirmed its denial of SSDI benefits
to Buzzard.
Buzzard was then evaluated by John Atkinson, a licensed clinical
psychologist, at the request of his attorney. In a June 11, 1994 report,
Atkinson wrote that "[t]he patient reports the onset of depression after
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his injury in 1987. He states that since then he has been depressed on
a constant basis . . . ." Atkinson further observed that:
The patient is of quite modest intelligence but actually
worked fairly steady [sic] in the mines until he was injured
in 1987. He is now lapsed into a severe depressed state,
stays in bed all day and is up all night, . . . medication has
not helped this and the patient actually ought to be seen for
ongoing psychiatric help although he has no money to pur-
chase these services.
Based upon his evaluation of Buzzard, Atkinson concluded that Buz-
zard was totally and permanently disabled "due to a combination of
intellectual, physical and emotional factors," including severe depres-
sion and anxiety disorder.
Dr. Elma Bernardo, a psychiatrist, then evaluated Buzzard at the
request of the SSA. Buzzard reported to Dr. Bernardo that his shoul-
ders were injured and that he started to become forgetful in 1987 after
being involved in the mine accident. Dr. Bernardo noted her impres-
sion that Buzzard was suffering from major depressive disorder
among other physical and mental health problems. In summarizing
her report, Dr. Bernardo wrote that "I see this patient as being
affected by multiple medical problems, but I am concerned because
although he is depressed, he is not on a therapeutic level of his anti-
depressant."
Buzzard requested and received a hearing before an administrative
law judge ("ALJ") concerning his application for SSDI benefits. On
June 21, 1995, the ALJ reversed the SSA’s initial decision and
awarded Buzzard SSDI benefits. Specifically, the ALJ determined
that Buzzard suffered from "severe depressive disorder with anxiety
overlay," and that he had been disabled as a result of this condition
since June 3, 1987, the date of the mine accident. In reaching this
decision, the ALJ reviewed the extensive record of medical evidence
in Buzzard’s file, including Dr. Pettry’s treatment notes and the exam-
ination reports prepared by Dr. Guberman, Mr. Atkinson, and Dr.
Bernardo. The ALJ also noted that Dr. David Clayman, a licensed
psychologist, testified at the benefits hearing that Buzzard’s disabling
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condition "was a direct result of the injuries [he] sustained in the min-
ing accident in June 1987."
C. Application for Disability Pension
On November 8, 1995, Buzzard applied for disability pension ben-
efits from the UMWA 1974 Pension Plan and Trust. The eligibility
requirements for a disability pension are set forth in Article II, Part
C of the 1974 Pension Plan, which provides in pertinent part that:
A Participant who . . . becomes totally disabled as a result
of a mine accident . . . shall, upon retirement . . . be eligible
for a pension while so disabled. A Participant shall be con-
sidered to be totally disabled only if by reason of such acci-
dent such Participant is subsequently determined to be
eligible for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits
. . . .
1974 Pension Plan, Art. II, pt. C (emphasis added). Therefore, to
qualify for a disability pension under the 1974 Plan, Buzzard had to
establish (1) that he was involved in a mine accident, (2) that he had
been awarded SSDI benefits, and (3) that he was disabled "as a result
of" a mine accident.
In an August 13, 1996 letter, the Trustees denied Buzzard’s appli-
cation on the grounds that the medical records "fail[ed] to support the
conclusion that his depression and anxiety resulted from a mining
accident." The Trustees subsequently reconsidered the medical evi-
dence and again determined that there was no causal connection
between the mine accident and the disabling condition found by the
SSA.
Buzzard again requested that the Trustees reconsider their denial
and submitted in support of his request a March 25, 1997 letter from
John Atkinson stating that although Buzzard may have had "some
pre-existing emotional difficulties," "his depressive disorder began
with his injury and the fact that he can no longer control his life but
in fact after [the accident] his body controlled him and his life was
at the mercy of others including various agencies, etc." Atkinson fur-
ther suggested that Buzzard’s depression was
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probably due to the fact that the patient had gotten some of
his self-image and ego strength from his employment, his
role as provider, he has had a stable marriage and on the job
he worked for seventeen years having left his job in June,
1987 because of his injuries. It is noted that prior to the
injury, the patient did have some psychological problems
with his Chronic Anger State Disorder but it is noted that he
had never left any job because of any kind of emotional or
behavioral factors as of the time of his injury.
On July 10, 1997, the Trustees denied Buzzard’s application for a
disability pension, again finding that there was no causal nexus
between the mine accident and the disabling condition for which Buz-
zard was awarded SSDI benefits. By letter dated July 9, 1998, the
Trustees refused any further consideration of Buzzard’s application,
stating that he had failed "to establish that a causal relationship exists
between the mining accident of June 3, 1987 and the total disability."
On February 23, 2001, Buzzard filed suit against the Trustees
alleging that they had unlawfully denied his application for disability
pension benefits. On March 28, 2003, the district court entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Trustees, finding that substantial evi-
dence supported the denial of a disability pension in this case. This
appeal followed.
II.
We generally review the district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo. Brogan v. Holland, 105 F.3d 158, 161 (4th Cir.
1997). However, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101 (1989), the Supreme Court held that "a denial of benefits chal-
lenged under [ERISA] is to be reviewed under a de novo standard
unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretion-
ary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the
terms of the plan." Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added). If the
plan confers such authority upon the plan administrator, a deferential
abuse of discretion standard applies to appellate review of the eligibil-
ity determination. Id. Because we have previously held that the 1974
Plan vests the Trustees with "full and final" authority to determine
who is eligible for benefits, our review is limited to ascertaining
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whether the Trustees abused their discretion. Boyd v. Trs. of the UMW
Health & Ret. Funds, 873 F.2d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1989). The Trustees’
denial of a disability pension is not an abuse of discretion if that deci-
sion is supported by substantial evidence. Brogan, 105 F.3d at 168.
It is against this factual and legal backdrop that we evaluate the merits
of Buzzard’s appeal.3
Buzzard contends that the Trustees denied his application for dis-
ability pension benefits even though he satisfied all of the eligibility
criteria specified in the 1974 Pension Plan. If established, this would,
of course, constitute an abuse of discretion. See LeFebre v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 747 F.2d 197, 207 (1984) ("A trustee has the obli-
gation to guard the assets of the trust from improper claims, as well
as the obligation to pay legitimate claims.").
In this case, there is no dispute that Buzzard has met the first two
requirements of establishing eligibility for benefits under the Plan:
Buzzard was involved in a mining accident, and he was awarded dis-
ability insurance benefits by the SSA. The sole issue in dispute is
whether Buzzard was disabled "as a result of" a mining accident. The
Trustees denied Buzzard’s application for a disability pension on the
grounds that he failed to establish this requirement. We agree with
Buzzard, however, that the Trustees’ decision is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence.
An applicant establishes total disability as a result of a mine acci-
dent by showing that the accident was the proximate cause of the dis-
ability. See Robertson v. Connors, 848 F.2d 472, 475 (4th Cir. 1988).
An applicant can establish proximate cause in either of two ways: 1)
by showing a direct relationship between the mine accident and the
disability found by the SSA, see Chicarelli v. UMWA Health & Ret.
3Buzzard also contends that he is entitled to conduct discovery to
learn, in addition to the specific reasons why he was denied benefits, the
analytical process behind the Trustees’ benefits decision. Buzzard claims
that he is entitled to statutory damages under ERISA for the Trustees’
alleged refusal to provide this information. However, Buzzard does not
contest the district court’s determination that relitigation of these claims
is barred by res judicata. J.A. at 30-33. Accordingly, we conclude that
the claims have been abandoned on appeal.
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Funds, 943 F.2d 457, 458 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing the "direct or
single approach method" of establishing proximate cause); or 2) by
proving that the mine injury combined with a pre-existing or subse-
quent impairment to result in total disability. See id. at 458-59 (dis-
cussing the "combination approach" to establishing causation). We
explained in Robertson that
if the plaintiff was injured in a mine accident and that injury,
whether in combination with a previous or subsequent con-
dition, is substantially responsible for plaintiff’s inability to
perform his job and for whatever medical or vocational rea-
sons he is unable to perform an alternative job, then his total
disability results from a mine accident.
Robertson, 848 F.2d at 475.
Buzzard points to the following evidence in support of his claim
that the 1987 mine accident proximately caused his total disability.
First, in August 1987, a mere two months after the mine accident, Dr.
Schmidt examined Buzzard and observed that he appeared "somewhat
depressed." Apparently, Buzzard’s condition was serious enough for
Dr. Schmidt to recommend that Buzzard begin a course of Elavil, an
anti-depressant medication. In addition, Dr. Pettry treated Buzzard for
anxiety as early as August of 1989. Together, this evidence reveals
the proximity between the date of the mine accident and Buzzard’s
treatment for depression and anxiety. Second, Mr. Atkinson examined
Buzzard and concluded that his depressive disorder began with the
mine accident. Third, Dr. Clayman testified at the SSA benefits hear-
ing that, based upon his review of Buzzard’s medical history, Buz-
zard’s disabling impairment was a direct result of the injuries he
suffered in the mine accident.
Fourth, and most important, the SSA administrative law judge con-
cluded that Buzzard became disabled on the date of the mine accident.
We have previously held that the disability onset date as found by the
ALJ is "entitled to great weight" in determining whether the disability
in question was proximately caused by a mining accident. Richards
v. UMWA Health & Ret. Fund, 895 F.2d 133, 138 (4th Cir. 1990).
This date is significant to our analysis as it reflects that the ALJ, hav-
ing reviewed all of the medical evidence on the question of disability,
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believed that a causal relationship exists between the mine accident
and the applicant’s total disability. Although the disability onset date
is not dispositive, Richards, 895 F.2d at 138, in cases where the ALJ
has found that the disability commenced on or near the date of the
accident, we have characterized the disability onset date as the "criti-
cal factor" in determining whether the mine accident caused the appli-
cant’s disability. Robertson, 848 F.2d at 476 n.5; Horn v. Mullins, 650
F.2d 35, 37 (4th Cir. 1981).
For their part, the Trustees denied Buzzard a disability pension
based on the following arguments and evidence. First, they contend
that Buzzard was unable to return to work because he had lost his job
in the mines, not as a result of any psychological impairment caused
by the mine accident. In a July 10, 1997 letter to Buzzard, the Trust-
ees stated that:
Regarding the temporal relationship between the June 3,
1987 mining accident and the date of onset of Social Secur-
ity disability, Mr. Buzzard claimed he was unable to work
as of the date of injury. However, the records show that he
had been released to return to work and had informed Dr.
Schmidt that he wanted to return to work. Meanwhile, the
mine had closed; Mr. Buzzard was laid off and had no job
to return to. Additionally, he reported to Dr. Silk on Novem-
ber 16, 1987 that he wanted to work in the future. There is
no indication that he was unable to work due to any effects
of the injury.
J.A. at 59-60.
This argument fails. For one thing, the Trustees imply that Buzzard
could have returned to his former occupation if he had not already
been laid off. We stated in Boyd, however, that "‘a Social Security
disability award conclusively establishes the medical disability of the
pension applicant.’" Boyd, 873 F.2d at 59 (quoting Robertson, 848
F.2d at 475). The SSA indeed found that Buzzard was "disabled"
within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Stated differently, the
agency found that Buzzard was "unable ‘to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of [a] medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for
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a continuous period of not less than twelve months.’" Craig v. Chater,
76 F.3d 585, 592 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1382c(a)(3)(A) & 423(d)(1)(A)(second alteration in original)).
Thus, the SSDI award establishes that Buzzard’s "severe depression
with anxiety overlay," and not the loss of his job, rendered him unable
to work.4 See Boyd 873 F.2d at 59.
To the extent the argument suggests that the release to work is evi-
dence that any mental impairment caused by the mine accident was
"resolved" by October 1987, and that some other factor must have
caused Buzzard’s disabling depression, this, too, is resolved by Rob-
ertson and Boyd. The Trustees point to factors stemming from Buz-
zard’s difficult childhood as well as the financial struggles and loss
of self-image Buzzard experienced after losing his job. In both Rob-
ertson and Boyd, however, we held that plan administrators must not
limit their evaluation of a pension claim to the narrow question of
whether a mine accident, by itself, caused the applicant’s disability.
Boyd, 873 F.2d at 60; Robertson, 848 F.2d at 475-76. Those cases
make clear that a mine accident is also the proximate cause of an
applicant’s disability where the disabling condition found by the SSA
is based upon the effect of a mine injury working in combination with
a pre- or post-accident condition. Boyd, 873 F.2d at 60; Robertson,
848 F.2d at 475-76. Contrary to our holdings in Robertson and Boyd,
the Trustees failed to consider evidence in John Atkinson’s report that
the injuries Buzzard sustained in the mine accident exacerbated emo-
tional instability that pre-dated the accident.5 Similarly, the Trustees
did not consider evidence in Atkinson’s report that Buzzard’s mine
4The dissent, much like the Trustees, cites the release to work as evi-
dence that Buzzard was not disabled, and that he could have returned to
his job had he not already been laid off. See post at 15-16. We do not
sit, however, to question the existence of Buzzard’s medical disability.
The fact that Buzzard was awarded SSDI benefits "conclusively estab-
lishes" that he was unable to work as a result of his disability, not
because he had been laid off. Boyd, 873 F.2d at 59.
5We note that Buzzard never left his job due to the emotional problems
stemming from his troubled childhood. We are thus unpersuaded that
these problems alone caused his severe depression and anxiety disorder;
and neither the Trustees nor the dissent have considered their effect in
combination with the mine accident, as Boyd requires.
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injuries, his inability to work, and the resulting loss of "his self-image
and ego strength," worked in combination to produce the disabling
condition found by the SSA.
Second, the Trustees denied Buzzard a disability pension on the
grounds that only one of the physicians or medical experts that exam-
ined him personally concluded that the mine accident caused his
depression and anxiety. The Trustees point to the fact that Dr.
Schmidt, Dr. Silk, Dr. Pettry, Dr. Guberman, and Dr. Bernardo each
examined Buzzard, but did not conclude that the mine accident
caused his psychological impairment. However, the experts the Trust-
ees point to were asked to opine on the existence of a disability, not
the issue of causation. With the exception of Dr. Pettry, each expert
examined Buzzard for the sole purpose of determining whether he sat-
isfied the SSA’s eligibility criteria for the payment of SSDI benefits.
As a result, the opinions expressed by these experts were relevant
only to the question of Buzzard’s disability, and that question has
been settled by the SSA’s determination that Buzzard is totally and
permanently disabled. Significantly, the only medical evidence of
record as to causation supports Buzzard’s position that the mine acci-
dent proximately caused his disability.6 Both Dr. Clayman and Mr.
6Like the Trustees, the dissent suggests that the failure of certain medi-
cal experts to express an opinion concerning the cause of Buzzard’s dis-
ability is evidence that the 1987 mine accident did not proximately cause
his disability. See post at 16. The dissent misses the point that the evi-
dence provided (or not provided) by these experts, in the course of the
SSA’s efforts to determine the existence of Buzzard’s disability, is sim-
ply not relevant to the question of whether the disability ultimately found
by the SSA was proximately caused by a mine accident. At bottom, Buz-
zard has offered the only relevant evidence on the issue of causation, and
that evidence supports his claim that the mine accident was the proxi-
mate cause of his disabling condition.
It is correct, as the dissent notes, that Buzzard’s primary care physician
"gave no indication that any treatment she prescribed for Buzzard’s
insomnia and anxiety was required as a result of his mine injury." Post
at 16. However, there is no indication in the record that Dr. Pettry was
ever asked to opine on the issue of causation. In stark contrast to the neg-
ative inference the dissent draws from the absence of an opinion from
Dr. Pettry concerning the cause of Buzzard’s disability is the fact that
Buzzard offered the only evidence directed to the issue of causation. As
noted above, the Trustees proffered none.
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Atkinson concluded that Buzzard’s disabling condition was directly
related to the injuries he sustained in the mine accident.
The Trustees refused to credit Dr. Clayman’s testimony on the
grounds that he did not examine Buzzard and because his opinion that
the mine accident caused Buzzard’s disability is "not based on objec-
tive medical evidence." We are aware of no authority, and the Trust-
ees cite none, that it is inappropriate for a licensed psychologist to
render an expert opinion based upon an examination of the patient’s
medical records. In addition, Dr. Clayman’s conclusion regarding the
cause of Buzzard’s disability is indeed based on "objective" evidence,
most notably Dr. Schmidt’s diagnosis of depression a mere two
months after the mine accident.
Finally, the Trustees argue that John Atkinson’s opinion, as
expressed in his 1997 letter, that the mine accident caused Buzzard’s
disability should be disregarded because (1) Atkinson did not draw
any such conclusion in his 1994 letter, (2) Atkinson examined Buz-
zard only once and seven years after the accident, and (3) Atkinson
should have attributed Buzzard’s inability to work not to his psycho-
logical impairment, but instead to the fact that he had lost his job. We
find these arguments unpersuasive. First, Atkinson did, in fact, sug-
gest in his 1994 letter that the mine accident was causally linked to
Buzzard’s depressive condition. In his 1994 letter, Atkinson observed
that Buzzard "worked fairly steady in the mines until he was injured
in 1987. He is now lapsed into a severe depressed state . . . ." J.A.
at 147 (emphasis added). When Atkinson was specifically asked in
1997 to opine on what caused Buzzard’s disability, he relied on this
statement regarding causation from his 1994 letter. With regard to the
Trustees’ second argument, we are aware of no authority, and, again,
the Trustees cite none, that would prevent a claimant from relying on
the opinion of a trained medical expert that is based upon a review
of the medical records and the claimant’s oral history. The Trustees
were free to introduce evidence to the contrary, but chose not to.
Third, as we have noted above, Buzzard’s award of SSDI benefits
conclusively establishes that his depressive condition, and not the loss
of his job, was responsible for his inability to work.
III.
Although we are mindful of the limited and deferential nature of
our review, having evaluated the medical evidence and arguments
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presented in this appeal, we are nonetheless constrained to hold that
substantial evidence does not support the Trustees’ decision to deny
Buzzard a disability pension. The Trustees’ denial of pension benefits
was, therefore, an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we reverse the
order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the
Trustees and remand with instructions that the district court enter
judgment in favor of Buzzard.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
In denying Hobert L. Buzzard disability benefits under the United
Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Plan and Trust (the "Plan"),
the Trustees of the Plan found that Buzzard did not adequately estab-
lish a causal link between his 1987 mine accident, in which he hit his
head on an airlock, and his total disability from a severe depressive
disorder, recognized in 1995 by the Social Security Administration.
The district court affirmed the Trustees’ decision, concluding that the
Trustees had conducted a "principled reasoning process" and arrived
at their decision to deny benefits based upon "substantial evidence."
Accordingly, the district court found that the Trustees did not abuse
their discretion in denying Buzzard benefits under the Plan. I would
affirm.
Because the Trustees were given discretionary authority to review
disability applications and make awards, we review their decision for
abuse of discretion. See Brogan v. Holland, 105 F.3d 158, 161 (4th
Cir. 1997); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101, 111, 115 (1989). Thus, we will not disturb the Trustees’ decision
so long as it "is the result of deliberate, principled reasoning process
and . . . is supported by substantial evidence." Brogan, 105 F.3d at
161 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The relevant language of the Plan reads:
A Participant who . . . becomes totally disabled as a result
of a mine accident . . . shall, upon retirement . . . be eligible
for a pension while so disabled. A Participant shall be con-
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sidered to be totally disabled only if by reason of such acci-
dent such Participant is subsequently determined to be
eligible for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits
. . . .
Construing this language, we have concluded that while an award of
Social Security Disability Insurance benefits conclusively establishes
medical disability status, it does not conclusively establish a causal
link between the disability and the mine accident. Hale v. Trustees of
UMW Health & Ret. Funds, 23 F.3d 899, 902 (4th Cir. 1994). The
causal-link determination is entrusted to the discretion of the Trustees.
Boyd v. Trustees of UMW Health & Ret. Funds, 873 F.2d 57, 59 (4th
Cir. 1989). In making this determination, the Trustees must take the
causal-link language — "as a result of a mine accident" — to mean
that the total disability must be proximately caused by the accident,
whether directly or in combination with a preexisting or subsequent
condition. Id.
In this case, the Trustees concluded that Buzzard did not ade-
quately prove that his disability for severe depressive disorder was
caused by his 1987 head injury. In reviewing this determination, we
are not free to substitute our judgment on causation for that of the
Trustees; rather we must determine only whether the determination
was made through a reasoned process and was supported by substan-
tial evidence.
There is no real dispute that the Trustees’ decision in this case was
the result of a deliberate and principled reasoning process. They care-
fully reviewed all of the evidence and analyzed it in a 13-page letter
that contains an assessment of all the operative facts, summarizes
Buzzard’s efforts to receive treatment, and examines the conclusions
reached by each of the various physicians involved.
On the central issue presented in this appeal — whether the Trust-
ees’ determination that Buzzard did not adequately prove a causal link
between his 1987 mine injury and his disability from depression —
the record shows that the Trustees’ determination was supported by
substantial evidence. The Trustees articulated the evidence upon
which they relied, and the district court spelled this evidence out in
its decision. First, Buzzard was released to work on October 16,
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1987, after recovering from his accident, and he failed to return to
work then only because he had been laid off as of September 1987
when the mine closed, not because of his June 1987 injury. Second,
Dr. Karen Pettry, Buzzard’s primary care physician through 1995,
gave no indication that any treatment she prescribed for Buzzard’s
insomnia and anxiety was required as a result of his mine injury. She
attributed these conditions to "[m]uch stress in [the] family." Third,
Dr. Pettry’s letters of July 1993 and February 1994 supported Buz-
zard’s claim for Social Security disability benefits based on his men-
tal condition but did not link Buzzard’s disability with his mine
accident. Fourth, two physicians, Dr. Robert Solomon and Dr. M.G.
Lembrecht, actually concluded that Buzzard was not totally disabled.
Fifth, three other physicians, Dr. John Schmidt, Dr. Adnan Silk, and
Dr. Bruce Guberman and one psychiatrist, Dr. Elma Bernardo, ana-
lyzed Buzzard’s various mental and physical ailments over the years
but never linked these ailments to the 1987 mine accident. Moreover,
a clinical psychologist, John Atkinson, also did not link Buzzard’s
disability to the mine accident in his 1994 report; he only did so three
years later, in 1997. The Trustees did not give Atkinson’s reversal
much weight because he failed to explain how he had arrived at this
new conclusion. In the Trustees’ view, Atkinson’s conclusion was
properly discounted because he relied only on Buzzard’s later state-
ments and Dr. Pettry’s inconclusive records and therefore his conclu-
sion in 1997 was "not supported and verified by objective evidence."
At bottom, the Trustees noted that Buzzard was fit to return to work
in late 1987 and that only intervening events — the mine closure and
his layoff — prevented his return. The mental conditions leading to
Buzzard’s disability were not causally linked to his mine accident for
several years, and only then retroactively to buttress his Social Secur-
ity claim.
While one might comb the record, as the majority does, to find
some evidence to support a possible causal link, it is not our function
to resolve factual differences in this way. Rather, we are limited to
determining only whether the Trustees had substantial evidence to
support the decision they reached. See Brogan, 105 F.3d at 161.
Under this standard of review, we do not enjoy the luxury of second
guessing the Trustees or coming to a different conclusion based on
our own evaluation of the evidence. I believe that, based on this def-
erential standard of review, we can only conclude that the Trustees’
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decision was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, I would
affirm the judgment of the district court on the reasoning it gave.
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