US v. Willie Hicks

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4125

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

WILLIE LAMONT HICKS, a/k/a Will Woodward, a/k/a CW,
Defendant - Appellant.

No. 24-4127

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MARY ANN MENDOZA, a/k/a Mary Ann Manuel, a/k/a Trinity, a/k/a M3, a/k/a
Emily James,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge. (8:21-cr-00500-TDC-1; 8:21-cr-00500-TDC-2)

Argued: March 20, 2026 Decided: August 14, 2025

2

Before NIEMEYER, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Meghan Skelton, SKELTON LAW LLC, Cabin John, Maryland; Charles
Burnham, BURNHAM & GOROKHOV PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Mary
Jessica Kirsch Munoz, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kelly O. Hayes, United States Attorney, David C.
Bornstein, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

3

PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Willie Lamont Hicks and Mary Ann Mendoza (collectively,
“Appellants”) were convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. They
now raise various challenges to the proceedings below.
We see no error and therefore affirm.
I.
A.
Background
This case arises from a fraudulent scheme carried out by Appellants. Although
they were never legally married, the two held themselves out as husband and wife, and
together put on workshops in which they purportedly taught people the keys to financial

success. Appellants’ definition of “success” varied with the circumstances of those
paying for Appellants’ services.
Sometimes, success meant getting out of debt and the
students improving their financial wellbeing. Other times it meant estate planning. Hicks
presented the lectures during the workshops, while Mendoza handled the financial aspects
of the business, although at times she also interacted with the students.
1

The problem was that neither was qualified to dispense financial advice and the
lectures were a sham. For instance, Hicks advised students that they could gain an
advantage with the IRS by using a certain color ink on mortgage or tax forms. He also

1
For example, while Hicks was in charge of the male students, Mendoza had control
over the female students, who Appellants referred to as “the Emilys,” and routinely
assigned them errands to run on her behalf.

4

advised those who were current on their mortgages to stop paying their mortgage. Beyond
that, Hicks assisted students in fil ing fake documents, such as promissory notes and money
orders, which purported to show that the students’ debt was erased when, in fact, it was
not.
Although the advice was bad, it came at a price. Appellants accepted monetary
payments and payments in kind from their students. For example, students would
sometimes buy items for Appellants, such as a MacBook. Other times students would
allow Appellants to charge expenses to their credit cards. As a result, Appellants lived a
high quality life at the expense of their students. Their students, in contrast, did not live
the good life financially as a result of following Appellants’ advice. Some entered
bankruptcy. Others lost their homes.
B.
Pre-Trial
Ultimately, a grand jury sitting in the District of Maryland indicted Appellants on
December 22, 2021, on charges of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire and mail
fraud. The two were later indicted via a superseding indictment on August 17, 2023. The
superseding indictment levied five counts against Appellants. Count I charged Appellants
with conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud. Counts II through V charged them with
substantive wire fraud.

5

Prior to trial, Hicks decided to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. An
initial Faretta
2
hearing was held before a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge found
that Hicks had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. However, the
Government later asked the district court to conduct its own Faretta hearing to ensure that
Hicks’ waiver of counsel was valid. The district court then also held a Faretta hearing.
Because Hicks had already waived his right to counsel, he appeared pro se at the second
Faretta hearing, although he had standby counsel with him. The court engaged in a
lengthy colloquy with Hicks, the transcript of which spans roughly 50 pages.
The district court’s colloquy with Hicks delved into a range of topics. The court
asked Hicks about his mental health history, as well as whether he had any history of
alcohol or substance abuse.
3
The court also asked Hicks about this legal training and
whether he had ever personally tried a case. The court assured itself that Hicks understood
the charges against him and the potential penalties he faced if convicted. The court also
informed Hicks that if he proceeded pro se, he would be held to the same standard as an
attorney, would be required to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence, and must abide by
courtroom protocol. The court also cautioned Hicks that he would be better served by
accepting counsel, and that he would do himself a disservice representing himself at trial.

2
Pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), trial courts must ensure
that a defendant intends to waive their right to counsel and understands the consequences
of doing so.
3
Hicks told the court that he had no such issues or any mental health concerns.

6

See J.A. 3070
4
(“So, given all that, and given the fact you haven’t done one of these trials
before . . . in my view, a trained lawyer would provide you a better chance and would
defend you better than you doing it yourself.”).
Hicks stood steadfast in his desire to proceed pro se. He offered three reasons for
wanting to do so. First, Hicks complained that none of his lawyers (he was on his third at
the time) had gone through all of the discovery with him, which he wanted to do before
going to trial. Second, Hicks explained that he did not want to further delay his trial.
Expanding upon that, Hicks explained that he had three lawyers over 15 months, and that
accepting new counsel would further delay the proceedings. Thus, he preferred to waive
his right to counsel and proceed to trial as soon as possible. Third, Hicks advised the court
that his lawyers had referred to him as a “sovereign citizen,” and he did not appreciate
being given that label. As Hicks fielded questions from the court during the second
Faretta hearing, he conferred with his standby counsel six different times.
The district court advised Hicks several times that he would be better served by
accepting counsel for trial. Nonetheless, Hicks insisted on representing himself.
However, at one point, when the court asked Hicks if he would accept counsel if it meant
only a slight delay in his trial date, the following exchange took place:
Hicks: Well, Your Honor, I have thought long and hard about
this. And I keep going back and forth only because it’s hard for
me to sit here and look across, and that was my family. And
that still is my family. And so that makes it a conflict of interest
to a degree to me, as well. And so because of that, also two
board members that I will not be able to subpoena at any time,

4
Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

7

this is a very hard decision. And so the decision I have to make
at this time, Your Honor, I have to represent myself.
The Court: So you’re not interested in a continuance, meaning
a brief extension?
* * *
Hicks: I still go back, you know, to I’ve been sitting here, you
know, for 15 months. No discovery. You know, I’ve had
certain attorneys, you know, appointed to me. I’ve paid an
attorney appointed to me. I sat for nine months, you know,
under
the direction of Judge Sims and Judge Sullivan.
In my opinion, I followed what was given to me.
But because at that time, for whatever reason, the discovery
still wasn’t shown to me. And so but I did think about at the
same time since I’ve had assistance of counsel with [standby
counsel], I have thought about that.
But I also have to think about the fact, you know, this is a lot
on me, too. You know, sitting here deprived of my freedom,
you know, I have to think about that, too. And so, in thinking
about all that, I have given it consideration. And at this time,
the number one thing is: I do not want to keep sitting here. And
I know the discovery keeps growing, but I don’t get to see it. I
have to stick to the facts as just presented to me.
Ms. Fitzgibbons, six months. Mr. Young, nine months to
March. And so here I am sitting here again with assistance of
counsel this time. And what I do not want to do is continue to
waste the Government’s time or my time.
But I do appreciate you coming to me because I feel that’s fair.
But at this time, considering [standby counsel], as well, I would
like to move forward representing myself.

J.A. 3094–96. Counting this affirmation, Hicks told the district court at least 10 times
during the second Faretta hearing that he wanted to waive his right to counsel.
Despite professing offense that his attorney referred to him as a sovereign citizen,

8

Hicks in fact abides by the sovereign citizen ideology, and he let his ideology be known
during the Faretta hearing. For instance, after being sworn in, Hicks introduced himself
“by way of restricted special appearance [as] United States Elector William Lamont
Hicks.” J.A. 3055–56. Hicks also told the district court that the gold hinge on the flag in
the courtroom “mean[t] [that he was in] a war court.” Id. at 3061. And Hicks made a few
other unusual remarks, such as stating his belief that “the United States Government is in
a receivership,” id. at 3067, that the United States operates under “treaty law,” id. at 3066,
and that he wanted to speak to the United States Attorney for the District of Maryland to
“correct the tax matter, which [was] the reason” everyone was there that day, id. at 3064.
At the end of the Faretta hearing, the district court found that Hicks’ waiver
of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Thus, the district court accepted
Hicks’ waiver and allowed him to proceed pro se.
Following the Faretta hearing, a new issue arose. Vicky Foster, one of the victims
of the fraud scheme, was battling lung cancer. She lived in North Carolina and was
receiving chemotherapy there, so she was unable to travel to Maryland for the trial.
Therefore, in order to preserve Foster’s testimony, the Government decided to depose her
pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
5
The Government offered
to arrange for Hicks, who was detained, and Mendoza, who was out on bond, to attend the

5
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the Government to
depose a witness ahead of trial, and thereby preserve their testimony, if the witness will be
unavailable at trial. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(a)(1) (“A party may move that a prospective
witness be deposed in order to preserve testimony for trial.”).

9

deposition. But Hicks waived his right to appear in person, and Mendoza (through her
counsel) consented to appear virtually. As a result, the Government deposed Foster with
Mendoza and her counsel appearing virtually. Hicks and his standby counsel also appeared
virtually.
C.
Trial
The case proceeded to trial with Hicks representing himself. Hicks gave an opening
statement and a closing argument, cross examined witnesses, and made objections. Hicks
also testified in his own defense, telling
the jury that he believed in the methods he
taught his students, and that he never intended to dupe anyone. Hicks consulted with his
standby attorney once during the trial.
Hicks’ defense relied largely on sovereign citizen concepts. For instance, during
his opening statement, Hicks discussed the Uniform Commercial Code.
6
And during his
direct examination,
7
he testified:
So, in 1791, the Philadelphia convention introduced the United
States seat of government. And so in doing that, at conventions
we bring ideas. And ideas can be turned into products and
services that you get through your mind because your mind
was your spiritual estate. And so because of that, they chose
men because men were always to protect mothers and sons.
And so because of that, that is our American system.

6
The Uniform Commercial Code is a “uniform statute that governs commercial
transactions including sales of goods, secured transactions, and negotiable instruments.”
Uniform Commercial Code, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
7
Hicks’ direct examination was performed by standby counsel.

10

J.A. 1111. Then, during his closing argument, Hicks told the jury:
Just because you didn’t know you were a beneficiary doesn’t
mean you weren’t or are not a beneficiary.
The [Fourteenth] Amendment Citizen is a beneficiary of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment: Congress is the trustee. And
citizens and beneficiaries have no control whatsoever over the
type, amount, content, substance, or frequency of distribution
of benefits they receive.
Just because you didn’t know you were a trustee doesn’t mean
you weren’t or are not a trustee.
Id. at 1352.
As to the substance of the scheme, Darshana Patel, one of the victims, testified at
trial that, around the time she met Appellants, she “was looking for creative ways to
finance more of [her] creative endeavors.” J.A. 665. Patel testified that after she met
Appellants, they told her that she could use “a trust strategy . . . that [was] beyond [her]
awareness” to grow a quarter million dollar investment into $2.5 million. Id. As a result,
in July 2017, Patel wired $5,000 to an account belonging to Appellants. At that time, Patel
had lived in Georgia for approximately two decades, and her wire request listed her Georgia
address and Georgia phone number. When asked at trial from where she had wired the
money, Patel testified that she “would assume Atlanta, Georgia.” Id. at 677. Evidence
admitted at trial demonstrated that the wire was sent to an account in Rockville, Maryland,
and the entire $5,000 was withdrawn from ATMs located in Rockville and Gaithersburg,
Maryland.
At the close of all the evidence, the jury convicted Appellants of conspiracy to
commit wire fraud and substantive wire fraud.

11

D.
Sentencing
After trial, Hicks underwent a forensic psychological evaluation ahead of
sentencing. According to the report, Hicks suffers from delusions. The report also
concluded that Hicks likely suffers from “schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type,” and did
not perceive his wrongdoing. J.A. 3170.
Hicks’ sentencing took place a week before Mendoza’s. Several victims testified at
Hicks’ sentencing. The victims described how Appellants’ actions had affected them. The
Government recognized that the victims’ testimony would also relate to Mendoza’s
sentencing. Therefore, the Government asked the court to consider that same testimony
when it came time for Mendoza’s sentencing. The court agreed to do so but also asked
the Government to obtain an expedited transcript so that Mendoza would have the
opportunity to review it prior to her sentencing. Although Mendoza was not present at
Hicks’ sentencing, her counsel was, and her counsel agreed that arrangement would be
“entirely satisfactory.” J.A. 2761.
The district court calculated Hicks’ United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“Guidelines”) range to be 235 to 293 months, and imposed a middle of the range sentence
of 264 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release.
Mendoza was sentenced the following week. At the outset of her sentencing,
Mendoza confirmed that she had received and reviewed the transcript from Hicks’
sentencing, and that she had no objections to it being used for her own sentencing. The
district court then calculated Mendoza’s Guidelines range at 108 to 135 months. However,

12

when imposing sentence, the court departed upward and imposed an above Guidelines
sentence of 144 months of imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised
release. In explaining its chosen sentence, the court emphasized the integral role Mendoza
played in the fraud scheme, given that she had managed the finances. The court also
highlighted that Mendoza was more culpable than most defendants in her shoes because
she had defrauded her victims in person,
rather than over the internet, and had
targeted individuals in dire financial positions as opposed to governmental or corporate
victims. Nonetheless, while the court departed upward based on Mendoza’s “major role”
in the fraud, the court stated that it would have imposed the same sentence through
an
upward variance and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) regardless. J.A.
3013 (district court stating, “[i]n the absence of such a departure, I would still vary upward
for the same reasons and based on the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense and Ms.
Mendoza’s role in it”). J.A. 3013.
This consolidated appeal followed.
II.
A.
Hicks’ Appeal
Hicks raises two related issues on appeal. First, he contends that the district court
erred in accepting his waiver of counsel and allowing him to proceed pro se. This issue
raises a mixed standard of review. We review for clear error the district’s factual finding
regarding competency. United States v. Snyder, --- F.4th ---, No. 25-4218, 2026 WL
2023813, at *5 (4th Cir. July 14, 2026). However, we review de novo whether a competent

13

defendant did in fact waive his right to counsel. Id. (“Whether a defendant waived his right
to counsel is a legal question we review de novo.” (citation omitted)).
Second, and in the alternative, Hicks argues that the district court erred by not sua
sponte ordering a competency evaluation for him prior to trial. We review this issue for
plain error. Snyder, 2026 WL 2023813, at *5 (“When, as here, a defendant asks us to
review whether a court should have ‘sua sponte reconsider[ed] its decision that [he] was
competent to stand trial and waive counsel,’ we review for plain error.” (alterations in
original) (citation omitted)). “To succeed on plain-error review, [an appellant] must show
(1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain or obvious; and (3) the error affected his
substantial rights.” United States v. Solis-Rodriguez, 144 F.4th 617, 623 (4th Cir. 2025).
But even if an appellant can satisfy all three requirements, “we will exercise our discretion
to correct the error only if a refusal to do so would ‘seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. at 623–24 (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
1.
Waiver of Counsel
a.
Sixth Amendment Rights
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees to a criminal defendant the right to the assistance
of counsel before he can be convicted and punished by a term of imprisonment.” United
States v. Ductan, 800 F.3d 642, 648 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citing U.S. Const. amend
VI). But “the Sixth Amendment also protects a defendant’s affirmative right to self-

14

representation.” Id. Because these two rights exist in tension with one another -- and
because pro se representation is the exception, not the rule -- we assume the defendant is
represented by counsel unless and until he clearly and unambiguously waives his right to
counsel. Id. at 650 (“[W]e have consistently held that as between counsel and self-
representation, counsel is the ‘default position’ unless and until a defendant explicitly
asserts his desire to proceed pro se.” (citation omitted)).
A defendant can waive their right to counsel at a Faretta hearing. A defendant’s
waiver is effective when it “is (1) clear and unequivocal[;] (2) knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary[;] and (3) timely.” United States v. Ziegler, 1 F.4th 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2021)
(quoting United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2013)). Of course, a
defendant must also be mentally competent when waiving counsel, but no additional
competence is required other than the competence required to stand trial.
8
Id.; see also
United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court has
made clear that the standard of competence for waiving counsel is identical to the standard
of competence for standing trial.”).
There is “no precise formula [that] binds district courts when evaluating the
competency to waive the right.” Ziegler, 1 F.4th at 229. “The trial court must simply

8
Hicks asserts that there is a higher level of competency required to waive counsel
than that needed to stand trial. In support, he cites Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178
(2008), where the Supreme Court held that States may refuse to allow a borderline
incompetent defendant to represent himself. Hicks misreads Edwards. Edwards does not
preclude courts from allowing a competent (even if barely so) defendant to proceed pro se.
As we explained in United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 588–90 (4th Cir. 2013),
Edwards merely gave courts discretion to refuse the pro se option to borderline defendants.

15

‘assure itself that the defendant knows the charges against him, the possible punishment[,]
and the manner in which an attorney can be of assistance.’” Herrington v. Dotson, 99
F.4th 705, 717 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Roof, 10 F.4th 314, 359 (4th Cir.
2021) (per curiam)). Finally, because the district court sits in a far “superior position to
observe and understand” the defendant, we “grant district courts considerable discretion”
when walking the “tightrope” that is strung at a Faretta hearing. Ziegler, 1 F.4th at 226.
b.
Hicks’ Waiver of Counsel was Valid
As explained above, the district court conducted a thorough Faretta hearing.
Throughout the district court’s detailed and lengthy colloquy with Hicks, the court covered
a range of topics. The court made sure that Hicks knew the charges against him, the
potential penalties if convicted, and that he had the right to have a lawyer defend him
at trial.
The court inquired as to why Hicks wanted to proceed pro se, to which Hicks
provided rational reasons -- namely, his dissatisfaction with his attorneys, his desire to get
to trial as soon as possible, and his resentment at being referred to a sovereign citizen by
his counsel. The court also cautioned Hicks that, if he proceeded pro se, he would be
required to abide by courtroom protocol, be held to the Federal Rules of Evidence, and be
liable for his own defense. Additionally, the court repeatedly told Hicks that he would be
better off having counsel represent him at trial. And the court made sure that Hicks’
decision was of his own free will and not the product of coercion.

16

Throughout all of this, Hicks stood firm in his desire to waive his right to counsel
and represent himself at trial, and following this colloquy, the district court accepted that
waiver. We see no fault in that decision.
c.
Hicks’ Counter Arguments Fail
Hicks argues that the district court should have rejected his waiver, and he offers a
few reasons in support. First, Hicks contends that his waiver was not knowingly and
intelligently made. This is so, he contends, because of the “nonsensical answers” he gave
throughout the hearing. Hicks’ Opening Br. at 13.
To be sure, Hicks made some questionable statements at the Faretta hearing -- for
example, his beliefs that a gold hinged flag indicated he was in a war court and that the
United States operates under treaty law. But those statements do not cast doubt on the
validity of his waiver. As explained, Hicks assured the district court that he understood
the charges against him, knew the penalties if convicted, knew that he would need
discovery to prepare a defense, and knew he would face a challenge at trial given his lack
of legal training. Suffice it to say, Hicks knew what he was getting into when he asked to
proceed pro se, and his sovereign citizen style statements do not vitiate that knowledge.
9

9
Hicks also asserts, in a single paragraph, that his waiver was not voluntary because
he acted under “some imagined compulsion” when waiving his right to counsel. Hicks’
Opening Br. at 14. However, Hicks cites neither law nor any part of the record to support
this argument. We therefore deem the argument waived. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A)
(requiring the argument section of an appellant’s opening brief to state the appellant’s
“contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the
record on which the appellant relies”); see also Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856
(Continued)

17

Next, Hicks argues that his waiver was equivocal and therefore ineffective.
Toward the end of the Faretta hearing, after the court asked Hicks whether he would accept
new counsel if it meant only a slight delay in the upcoming trial, Hicks responded that he
“ha[d] thought long and hard about [that]” and that he “keep[s] going back and forth.” J.A.
3094. From that single line, Hicks asserts that his waiver was equivocal. We disagree.
When viewed in context, that lone statement was Hicks merely explaining his
rational for wanting to represent himself. After he made that statement, Hicks went on to
explain to the court that he had prior attorneys who he felt had withheld discovery from
him, how he felt that failure had prolonged the case, and how he wanted a trial soon so he
could go home once he was acquitted. After unpacking those reasons, Hicks concluded:
“But I do appreciate you coming to me because I feel that’s fair. But at this time,
considering [my current counsel], as well, I would like to move forward representing
myself.” J.A. 3096.
Thus, when viewed in context, Hicks’ single remark about “going back and forth”
actually underscores his thorough consideration of the decision to waive his right to counsel
and represent himself as opposed to being a demonstration of equivocation.
10

F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A party waives an argument by failing to present it in its
opening brief or by failing to develop [its] argument—even if [its] brief takes a passing
shot at the issue.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting
Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 923 (4th Cir. 2015))).
10
Hicks also makes a last ditch argument that his performance at trial was so
lackluster that the district court should have reconsidered
whether he was competent to
waive his counsel. We need not consider whether a defendant’s post-Faretta hearing
conduct can negate an otherwise valid waiver because, as discussed below, Hicks’
(Continued)

18

2.
Competency Evaluation
a.
Due Process and Statutory Background
“The conviction of a defendant when he is legally incompetent is a violation of due
process.” United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th Cir. 1995). “[T]he legal test
for competency is whether the defendant ‘has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” Bernard, 708 F.3d at
593 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam)).
To ensure that no incompetent defendant is ever placed on trial, Congress enacted
18 U.S.C. § 4241. That statute requires “trial courts [to] conduct competency hearings
under specified circumstances.” United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 742 (4th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mason, 52 F.3d at 1289). Relevant here,
§ 4241(a) requires a district court to order a competency evaluation of a defendant, even
when no party requests one,
if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may
presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect
rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.

unorthodox trial strategy did not give the district court any reason to question Hicks’
competency.

19

18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). When considering whether reasonable cause exists, courts consider
“evidence of irrational behavior, the defendant’s demeanor at trial, and medical opinions
concerning the defendant’s competence.” Bernard, 708 F.3d at 592–93 (quoting Mason,
52 F.3d at 1290).
Here, Hicks brings what is known as a “procedural competency claim.” See Banks,
482 F.3d at 742. To prevail on this type of claim, the defendant “need not demonstrate on
appeal that he was in fact incompetent” at trial. Id. Rather, he need only show “that the
district court should have ordered a hearing to determine the ultimate fact of competency.”
Id. This is no small task. “Whether ‘reasonable cause’ exists is a question left to the
sound discretion of the district court.” Bernard, 708 F.3d at 592. And, again, we defer
“to the district court because it is in a superior position to adjudge the presence of indicia
of incompetency constituting reasonable cause to initiate a hearing.” Banks, 482 F.3d at
743. But again, because this issue was raised for the first time on appeal, we review it for
plain error. Snyder, (“When, as here, a defendant asks us to review whether a court should
have ‘sua sponte reconsider[ed] its decision that [he] was competent to stand trial and
waive counsel,’ we review for plain error.” (alterations in original) (citation omitted))
b.
The District Court Had No Reason to Order a Competency Evaluation
Hicks contends that the district court erred by not ordering a competency evaluation
for him. He asserts that his behavior before the district court was so unusual that the
district court had reasonable cause to question his competency, and the court therefore erred

20

in declining to sua sponte order a competency evaluation pursuant to § 4241(a). We
discern no error, much less plain error.
First, during the Faretta hearing, Hicks asked to waive his right to counsel and
proceed pro se. In doing so, Hicks provided the district court with three cogent reasons as
to why he wished to go to trial without counsel: he (1) felt his attorneys had withheld
discovery from him; (2) did not want to delay his trial by waiting for a new attorney to be
brought into the case and for that attorney to familiarize themselves with the evidence; and
(3) did not like that his lawyers were referring to him as a sovereign citizen. Additionally,
Hicks had standby counsel with him at the Faretta hearing, and he conferred with standby
counsel six times during that hearing.
Trial was no different. Hicks represented himself for the entirety of trial, during
which he gave an opening statement, cross examined witnesses, and objected multiple
times.
And Hicks even took the stand in his own defense and testified as to his
purported good faith belief in his “advice.” Such testimony, if believed by the jury, would
have led to an acquittal. See S. Atl. Ltd. P’ship of Tenn., L.P. v. Riese, 284 F.3d 518, 531
(4th Cir. 2002) (explaining that good faith belief is a complete defense to fraud charges).
Hicks also gave a closing argument, and he consulted with his standby counsel at least once
during trial.
Hicks’ behavior at trial did not provide reasonable cause to question his competence.
At all times, Hicks knew where he was and what he was doing. Hicks was even able to
develop a defense to the charges against him, which we have previously recognized is
some indication of competence. See Ziegler, 1 F.4th at 231 (recognizing that the

21

defendant’s “apparent ability to consider strategic choices, develop a defense strategy, and
operate in the courtroom is all evidence of competence to . . . stand trial”). And Hicks’
ability to consult with his standby counsel further confirms that he was competent to stand
trial. Thus, we do not fault the district court for not questioning Hicks’ competence.
c.
Hicks’ Counter Arguments Fail
Hicks’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Hicks’ primary argument rests on
the fact that he espoused sovereign citizen beliefs before the district court.
To hear Hicks
tell it, his sovereign citizen style responses to the district court’s questions at the Faretta
hearing were “incoherent and often nonresponsive,” and his performance at trial was an
“even greater display” of his incompetence, given that it relied largely on sovereign citizen
beliefs. Hicks’ Opening Br. at 8. Thus, Hicks suggests, after watching all this play out,
the district court had reasonable cause to order a competency evaluation.
Again, we
disagree.
First, as we and other courts have explained “[§] 4241(a) does not require a
competency hearing any time a defendant is . . . committed to a ‘frivolous legal strategy.’”
Ziegler, 1 F.4th at 231 (quoting Banks, 482 F.3d at 743); see also United States v. James,
328 F.3d 953, 955 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Sometimes [a defendant’s unusual] beliefs are
sincerely held, sometimes they are advanced only to annoy the other side, but in neither
event do they imply mental instability or concrete intellect so deficient that trial is
impossible.” (internal citation omitted)). And “bizarre or irrational” behavior “does not
invariably compel a finding of incompetency.” Bernard, 708 F.3d at 593.

22

Hicks denies that he is asking us to adopt a categorical rule that a district court must
sua sponte order a competency evaluation anytime a defendant makes a sovereign citizen
style defense. But we fail to see how that can be. After all, Hicks carried on a coherent
conversation with the district court at the Faretta hearing, he prepared his own defense at
trial, and he routinely conferred with his standby counsel. If we were to agree with Hicks
that a competency evaluation was necessary based on these facts, then we would
necessarily be agreeing that a sovereign citizen defendant’s conviction must be reversed
anytime a district court declines to question the defendant’s competence merely because
he espouses sovereign citizen beliefs, no matter how lucid he is. We decline to do so.
Hicks’ second argument -- that the district court failed to inquire into his
competency -- fares no better. To hear Hicks tell it, the “failure to exercise discretion is
itself an abuse of discretion.” Hicks’ Opening Br. at 9. And because Hicks posits that the
district court never inquired into his competency, Hicks contends that the district court
necessarily abused its discretion. But, Hicks’ argument rests on a faulty premise because
the district court did, in fact, address Hicks’ competence at the Faretta hearing when it
engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Hicks and found him competent to waive his counsel.
Because the “the standard of competence for waiving counsel is identical to the standard
of competence for standing trial,” we reject the argument that the district court failed to
address Hicks’ competence. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 559.
Hicks also points to his post-trial forensic psychological evaluation, which opined
that Hicks suffers from delusions, many of which “have a basis in fringe theories,” and that
his most likely diagnosis is “schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type.” J.A. 3169–70.

23

Because the district court was aware at sentencing that Hicks has some mental
impairments, Hicks now argues the district court should have ordered a competency
evaluation. Again, we disagree.
For one thing, Hicks’ psychological evaluation was conducted post-trial, and it was
intended to mitigate Hicks’ culpability. The district court had little reason to construe it as
an indictment of Hicks’ competency months earlier. This is especially so given that we
have said “retrospective competency hearings are generally disfavored.” Mason, 52 F.3d
at 1293. For another thing, we have repeatedly rebuffed defendants’ attempts to raise
competency concerns only after they have been convicted. See, e.g., Ziegler, 1 F.4th at
232 (“The first time Ziegler mentioned mental illness was after the jury found him guilty.
And the district court reasonably discounted Ziegler’s claims for having been raised only
after the jury verdict.”); see also Bernard, 708 F.3d at 593 (“In this case, we cannot say
Appellant’s behavior during his trial called into question the district court’s decision-
making concerning Appellant’s competency to stand trial and waive counsel . . . . In fact,
Appellant’s mental state did not show marked decline until the sentencing hearing.”).
Finally, the mere fact that Hicks had some mental infirmities was not enough to
entitle him to a competency evaluation. Ziegler, 1 F.4th at 231 (“[N]ot every manifestation
of mental illness demonstrates incompetence to stand trial.” (quoting Burket v. Angelone,
208 F.3d 172, 192 (4th Cir. 2000))); Bernard, 708 F.3d at 593 (“[T]he presence of some
degree of mental illness is not to be equated with incompetence.” (quoting Hall v. United
States, 410 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1969))). Hicks needed to show that his mental
illness(es) somehow impaired his ability understand the nature of the proceedings against

24

him or interfered with his ability to consult with counsel. See Bernard 708 F.3d at 593.
He has failed to do so.
Thus, we reject Hicks’ procedural competency claim and affirm his conviction.
B.
Mendoza’s Appeal
Mendoza raises four challenges on appeal. First, she claims the Government’s use
of Foster’s video deposition violated her Confrontation Clause rights. Second, she argues
that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to convict her of substantive wire fraud.
Third, she contends that she was denied the right to be present at her own sentencing.
Fourth, and finally, she argues that the district erred in departing upward from the
Guidelines. We reject each argument.
1.
Confrontation Clause
Mendoza first contends that her Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the
Government admitted the deposition testimony of Foster into evidence at trial. “Pursuant
to the Confrontation Clause, a court will not admit into evidence ‘testimonial statements of
a witness who did not appear at trial unless [s]he was unavailable to testify, and the
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’” United States v. Smith,
117 F.4th 584, 600 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Dargan, 738 F.3d 643, 650
(4th Cir. 2013)).
Mendoza argues that her Confrontation Clause rights were violated because the
Government deposed Foster virtually, which forced Mendoza “to cross examine Foster

25

over video,” rather than face to face. Mendoza’s Opening Br. at 12. Mendoza does not
dispute that Foster -- a woman in the middle of chemotherapy treatment in another state
-- was unavailable at trial. Instead, Mendoza challenges the procedure used to secure
Foster’s testimony ahead of trial. But Mendoza fails to grapple with the fact that she
consented to the deposition procedure she now complains of and thus waived this
argument.
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the process to preserve
the testimony of a witness that will be unavailable at trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(a)(1) (“A
party may move that a prospective witness be deposed in order to preserve testimony for
trial.”). To comply with the Confrontation Clause, Rule 15 provides the defendant with
an opportunity to be physically present at the deposition. See Smith, 117 F.4th at 601
(“[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that Rule 15 comports with the purposes of the
Confrontation Clause.” (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845–46 (1990))).
The process for exercising the right of a defendant to appear in person at a Rule 15
deposition varies with the circumstances. If the defendant is out on bond, as Mendoza was
here, they have the right to appear in person, but they must request the opportunity to
exercise that right. Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(c)(2) (“[A] defendant who is not in custody has
the right upon request to be present
at the deposition, subject to any conditions
imposed by the court.”). In other words, defendants on bond operate under an opt-in
system. See id.
This is where Mendoza’s argument falters. Mendoza was on pre-trial bond when
the Government deposed Foster, and she never requested to appear in person at Foster’s

26

deposition. In fact, Mendoza (through her counsel) actually agreed to appear remotely at
the deposition and to cross examine Foster over video. Finally, Mendoza never once
objected to the video deposition being admitted into evidence at trial. Therefore, we
readily conclude that Mendoza waived any argument that Foster’s Rule 15 deposition
violated her Confrontation Clause rights. See United States v. Boyd, 5 F.4th 550, 555 (4th
Cir. 2021) (“[W]aiver is ‘the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right.’” (quoting Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 474 (2012))).
2.
Sufficiency of the Evidence of Wire Fraud
Mendoza next challenges her wire fraud conviction. “When reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a count of conviction, this Court considers whether
there is substantial evidence, taking
the view most favorable to the Government, to
support it.” United States v. Fall, 955 F.3d 363, 375 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
“The wire fraud statute provides that ‘whoever, having devised or intending to
devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of
wire communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals,
pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice shall be [guilty of
a felony].’” United States v. Taylor, 942 F.3d 205, 213 (4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1343).
The wire fraud statute has three elements. The first “[t]wo are substantive: (1) the
defendant [must have] devised, or intended to devise, a scheme or artifice to defraud; and

27

(2) the defendant [must have] used a wire to transmit any signal to execute the scheme or
artifice.” United States v. Elbaz, 52 F.4th 593, 603 (4th Cir. 2022). “The third element
is jurisdictional: The wire must [have] be[en] ‘in interstate or foreign commerce.’” Id.
(quoting Taylor, 942 F.3d at 214). Here, Mendoza challenges only the third element. She
contends that the Government failed to establish that a wire traveled across state lines. We
disagree.
To start, the evidence adduced at trial demonstrates that the wire originated in
Georgia. The victim who sent the wire was a Georgia resident, and she had lived there for
two decades. On the wire request, the Georgia based victim listed her Georgia address
and Georgia phone number. And at trial, the victim testified that she “would assume” she
made the $5,000 wire transfer to Mendoza from Georgia. J.A. 677. A reasonable jury
could have heard this evidence and concluded that the wire originated in Georgia.
A reasonable jury likewise could have found that the wire culminated in Maryland.
For one thing, the wire listed Rockville, Maryland, as its destination. For another, the
evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that every penny of the wire transfer was withdrawn
from ATMs in either Rockville or Gaithersburg, Maryland. Thus, a reasonable jury could
have found that the wire traveled from Georgia to Mayland. That is sufficient to
establish the jurisdictional element of § 1343.
In an attempt to avoid this conclusion, Mendoza argues that the Government failed
to carry its burden because it did not identify “the location of the bank’s servers or confirm
the wire’s actual path.” Mendoza’s Opening Br. at 8. This argument misses the point.
The Government did not need to show every twist and turn the wire took. The Government

28

only had to prove that the wire crossed a state line. And, as explained above, the evidence,
as a reasonable jury could have found it, demonstrated that the wire originated in Georgia
and traveled to Maryland. That is enough to prove the wire crossed a state line. We
therefore reject this argument.
3.
Sentencing
a.
Right to be Present at Sentencing
For her third assignment of error, Mendoza argues that she was deprived of her right
to be present at her sentencing. Hicks was sentenced a few days prior to Mendoza, and
some of the victims testified at Hicks’ sentencing. Rather than making those same victims
return to court and recount the same testimony at Mendoza’s sentencing, the district court
considered the victim impact testimony elicited at Hicks’ sentencing when it sentenced
Mendoza.
And because Mendoza did not attend Hicks’ sentencing, and therefore was
not present when the victims testified against her for sentencing purposes, she posits that
the district court denied her the right to be present at her own sentencing. This argument
blinks reality.
Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure guarantees a defendant the right
to be “present” at their own sentencing.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a) (“[T]he defendant must
be present at . . . sentencing.). That means physical presence. United States v. Lawrence,
248 F.3d 300, 303–04 (4th Cir. 2001).
But Mendoza was at her own sentencing. She
was there in person when the district court calculated her Guidelines range. She had an

29

opportunity to plead her cause and provide allocution face to face with the district court.
And she was there in the courtroom when the district court imposed her sentence. To state
the obvious, then, Mendoza was at her own sentencing, just as Rule 43 demands.
In reality, Mendoza is complaining about the fact that the district court considered
hearsay testimony when fashioning her sentence. Mendoza’s Opening Br. at 20 (asserting
that she “ha[d] a constitutional right to hear [the victims’ testimony] in person”). But that
grievance goes nowhere.
To start, Mendoza’s counsel explicitly agreed that the district court could consider
the victims’ testimony from Hicks’ sentencing when fashioning Mendoza’s sentence. J.A.
2761 (counsel stating that it would be “entirely satisfactory” to use the victim impact
testimony from Hicks’ sentencing so long as Mendoza could review a transcript of that
testimony prior to her sentencing); id. at 2981–82 (counsel confirming that Mendoza was
provided with and had reviewed the transcripts of the victim impact testimony from Hicks’
sentencing). That consent constitutes waiver. United States v. Boyd, 5 F.4th 550, 555
(4th Cir. 2021) (“[W]aiver is ‘the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right.’” (quoting Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 474 (2012))).
And even if this argument were not waived, we would review the issue for plain
error and be compelled to affirm. See United States v. Muslim, 944 F.3d 154, 162–63 (4th
Cir. 2019) (plain error review applies where the defendant “failed to raise this issue
below”). Although Mendoza contends that she had a constitutional right to hear the
victims’ testimony firsthand, we have unequivocally held “that the Confrontation Clause
does not apply at sentencing.” United States v. Powell, 650 F.3d 388, 393 (4th Cir. 2011).

30

So, there is no constitutional defect here. Nor is there any hearsay issue. Rather than
excluding hearsay at sentencing, federal law blesses its use. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No
limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and
conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive
and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”); see also Powell, 650
F.3d at 394 (observing that presentence reports are “often chock full of hearsay”).
Thus, we discern no error, let alone plain error, in the district court’s decision
to save the victims a second trip to court.
b.
Reasonableness of the Sentence
Finally, Mendoza challenges her sentence. We review a district court’s sentencing
decision for reasonableness. United States v. Oliver, 133 F.4th 329, 338 (4th Cir. 2025).
Reasonableness has two components: procedural and substantive reasonableness. United
States v. Fowler, 58 F.4th 142, 150 (4th Cir. 2023). For a sentence to be procedurally
reasonable, the district court must properly calculate the Guidelines range, consider the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and adequately explain the sentence imposed. United States v.
Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019). If a sentence is procedurally reasonable,
“[w]e then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account the
totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines
range and giving due deference to the district court’s decision that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors, on [the] whole, justify” the sentence imposed. Oliver, 133 F.4th at 338
(quoting United States v. Huskey, 90 F.4th 651, 677 (4th Cir. 2024)).

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Here, Mendoza raises two challenges to her sentence. She first contends that the
district court erred by using the wrong comparator when sentencing her. Put differently,
Mendoza claims that the district court sought to impose a similar sentence to the one Hicks
received instead of those received by defendants similarly situated to Mendoza. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (requiring courts to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct” when imposing sentence). And because the district court supposedly ignored
those similarly situated defendants, Mendoza claims her sentence is procedurally
unreasonable.
This argument does not withstand scrutiny. Indeed, an examination of the record
demonstrates that the district court considered defendants convicted of the same crime and
who landed in the same Guidelines range as Mendoza. But the court ultimately concluded
that Mendoza’s crime was more egregious than those of the comparator defendants and
therefore warranted a more serious punishment than most. Mendoza, unlike many other
fraudsters in her Guidelines range, personally interacted with her victims rather than
scamming them over the internet, which made her conduct more reprehensible in the
district court’s view.
And Mendoza chose to defraud individuals, rather than a
governmental entity or a corporation, meaning her victims were more personally
impacted by the fraud scheme, with some victims even losing their homes. Because the
district court adequately considered and rejected sentences received by similarly situated
defendants, including Hicks, we reject this argument.

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Next, Mendoza argues that the district court erred in departing upward from the
Guidelines sentencing range. We assume for present purposes that the departure was
erroneous, but we nevertheless affirm because the district court stated that it would have
imposed an identical above Guidelines sentence as a variance. That variance would have
been reasonable under the circumstances.
We review procedural sentencing errors for harmlessness. United States v. Mills,
917 F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 2019). An error is harmless if (1) the district court would have
given the same sentence absent the error and (2) that sentence would have nevertheless
been reasonable. United States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2011). The
government carries the burden of showing harmlessness. United States v. Simmons, 143
F.4th 200, 211 (4th Cir. 2025).
While a district court can utilize a departure to impose an above-Guidelines
sentence, the court can also reach that same destination through a variance.
11
United States
v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 164 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he advisory Guidelines departure
provisions provide[] one way for a district court to fashion a reasonable sentence outside
the Guidelines range, it is not the only way.”). Here, when departing upward, the court
explained that it would have varied upward to the same sentence using the § 3553(a) factors

11
“Departures are enhancements of, or subtractions from, a guidelines calculation
based on a specific Guidelines departure provision.” United States v. Legins, 34 F.4th 304,
324 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Brown,
578 F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 2009)). “Variances, in contrast, are discretionary changes to a
guidelines sentencing range based on a judge’s review of all the § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
(quoting Brown, 578 F.3d at 226).

33

had a departure been unavailable. Thus, even assuming the departure was erroneous, the
departure is harmless so long as that identical upward variance would have been
reasonable. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d at 123 (“[I]t would make no sense to set aside [a]
reasonable sentence and send the case back to the district court since it has already told us
that it would impose exactly the same sentence, a sentence we would be compelled to
affirm.” (citation omitted)). Here, we conclude that the sentence imposed would have been
reasonable.
As explained, the district court concluded that Mendoza was an atypical wire fraud
defendant, and her conduct did not align with that of other defendants in her Guidelines
range.
Mendoza stole from those she personally knew, and she caused severe harm to
her victims, including sending them into bankruptcy and causing some who had been
current on their mortgages prior to encountering Mendoza to lose their homes. On this
record, we cannot say that the district would have erred by imposing an upwardly variant
sentence. Therefore, we reject this challenge and affirm Mendoza’s sentence.
III.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the judgments below are
AFFIRMED.