US v. Earl Griffin, Jr.

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4257

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

EARL LEROY GRIFFIN, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
George Jarrod Hazel, District Judge. (8:19-cr-00464-GJH-1)

Argued: January 29, 2026 Decided: August 14, 2026

Before GREGORY, HEYTENS, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Reversed, vacated, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Benjamin wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Gregory joined. Judge Heytens wrote a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Stuart A. Berman, LERCH, EARLY & BREWER, CHTD., Bethesda,
Maryland, for Appellant. Timothy Francis Hagan, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Erek L. Barron,
United States Attorney, Kelly O. Hayes, United States Attorney, David C. Bornstein,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

2

D
EANDREA GIST BENJAMIN, Circuit Judge:
This case turns on two basic requirements for residential search warrants: timing
and nexus. A warrant affidavit must connect the evidence sought to the place to be
searched and show that the evidence is likely to be there when the search occurs. The
affidavit here failed because the facts alleged were either not connected with the place to
be searched, too old, or both.

I. Background
A. Warrant and Affidavit
On August 30, 2019, the Calvert County Sheriff’s Office Drug Enforcement Unit
(“DEU”) applied for a no-knock search and seizure warrant for 6740 N. Solomons Island
Road. J.A. 34.
1
The warrant application was supported by a 21-page affidavit. J.A. 34–
55.
The affidavit described 6740 N. Solomons Island Road as a residence in an area
known as “Kent Bottom.” J.A. 36. Kent Bottom is accessible by a small dirt road off of a
Maryland state highway, just south of an intersection including Kent Road. J.A 36. The
dirt road leads through a tree line and into an open area at the bottom of a small hill. J.A.
36. Several residences are located along or near that dirt road, including 6738, 6740, 6750,
and 6754 N. Solomons Island Road. J.A. 36. The road also crosses or abuts portions of

1
Citations to “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix filed by the parties. The J.A. contains
the record on appeal from the district court. Page numbers for citations to the J.A. utilize
the “[J.A. or JA] #” numbering at the bottom of the page on each document.

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nearby properties, including 6790 Kent Road. J.A. 36. Indeed, the affidavit described the
open area at the end of the dirt road as connected to multiple properties, including 6790
Kent Road, 6738 N. Solomons Island Road, and 6740 N. Solomons Island Road. J.A. 37.
It stated that DEU had observed people congregating and distributing controlled dangerous
substances (“CDS”) “in this area.” J.A. 37.
The affidavit began with general background about Kent Bottom, stating that “[f]or
decades” DEU had known that controlled substances were sold there. J.A. 36. The affiant
described Kent Bottom as “an open-air drug market where multiple street and mid-level
dealers conduct CDS transactions.” J.A. 36. The affidavit stated that DEU’s familiarity
with Kent Bottom came from calls of service, citizen reports, confidential informants,
confidential sources, prior DEU investigations, and surveillance. J.A. 36. Based on that
history, DEU personnel claimed familiarity with the “area, the subjects who reside in or
frequent the area, and the manner in which these subjects conduct CDS transactions.” J.A.
36.
The affidavit then identified people whom DEU associated with Kent Bottom and
the nearby residences. J.A. 37–40. It identified Earl Griffin, Sr. and Yvette Griffin as the
listed owners of 6740 N. Solomons Island Road and stated that they were the defendant
Earl Griffin, Jr.’s parents, defendant’s brother Desmond Griffin’s parents, and defendant’s
son Ty’Lik Griffin’s grandparents. J.A. 37. It also stated that DEU had observed
in dividuals believed to be Ty’Lik and Desmond enter and exit the 6740 residence and that
Desmond had previously claimed the 6740 residence as his address. J.A. 38. The affidavit
separately associated other known distributors, Thomas Brown and Tony Brown, with the

4

nearby 6750 N. Solomons Island Road property and Joseph Brown with the nearby 6754
N. Solomons Island Road property. J.A 38.
Much of the affidavit’s general background came from old criminal histories and
earlier investigations in the area. J.A. 38–41. The affidavit identified several people as
“street to mid-level distributors operating in Kent Bottom,” including the defendant, a man
named Bobby King, Thomas Brown, Tony Brown, and Desmond Griffin. J.A. 38. It also
stated the defendant’s prior criminal history, including CDS convictions from 2006, 2014,
and 2015. J.A. 39. It listed Desmond Griffin’s 2006 CDS charges, which did not result in
a conviction. J.A. 39. It identified Ty’Lik Griffin as one of several people frequently
observed in Kent Bottom but stated that it was “unknown if they are directly involved in
CDS distribution.” J.A. 40.
The affidavit then recounted incidents from 2006, 2016, 2017, and 2018. J.A. 40–
41. Only the 2006 incidents directly involved the 6740 residence. J.A. 40–41. During that
2006 search, officers found the defendant inside the 6740 residence “attempting to flush a
plastic bag of Marijuana down the toilet.” J.A. 41. Officers also recovered money,
marijuana, and paraphernalia described as “indicative of distribution.” J.A. 41. The
affidavit next described later incidents from 2016 to 2018, but those incidents concerned
Kent Bottom or the Kent Road area generally. J.A. 41. And only one of those later
incidents mentioned the defendant personally: it described a 2017 traffic stop in which
officers recovered cocaine after a vehicle entered and left Kent Bottom and during which
an occupant of the vehicle identified the defendant and Bobby King as individuals who had
“possibly distributed” the cocaine. J.A. 41.

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The affidavit’s more recent allegations began with surveillance from April 24, 2019,
about four months before the warrant issued. J.A. 43. That day, officers saw a white
Chevrolet Colorado arrive in Kent Bottom and park near the 6740 residence. J.A. 43. A
passenger later identified as Norman Terry briefly met with a man believed to be Thomas
Brown, whom the affidavit had associated with the 6750 property. J.A. 43. After the truck
left Kent Bottom, officers stopped it and found copper steel wool and a glass pipe used for
smoking crack cocaine. J.A. 43. Terry told a detective that he had gone to Kent Bottom
to buy crack cocaine and that Thomas Brown told him to return in about an hour. J.A. 43.
Later on April 24, officers saw an unknown man near a van at the 6750 residence,
the property associated with Thomas and Tony Brown, handling what appeared to be bags
containing a white substance. J.A. 43–44. The unknown man and Thomas Brown then
walked toward the 6740 residence. J.A. 44. The unknown man met with Ty’Lik Griffin
“in the side yard of 6740 N. Solomons Island Road.” J.A. 44.
A short time later, Ty’Lik allegedly conducted a hand-to -hand drug transaction with
Richard Berry “in front of 6740 N. Solomons Island Road.” J.A. 44. Officers later stopped
Berry’s vehicle and recovered approximately 0.5 grams of crack cocaine. J.A. 44. Berry
said he bought the crack cocaine from “lil smoke,” which DEU personnel knew as Ty’Lik’s
street name. J.A. 44.
The affidavit next described surveillance from August 9, 2019, about three weeks
before the warrant issued. J.A. 46–48. It described a suspected hand-to-hand transaction
involving a man believed to be Joseph Brown, whom the affidavit had associated with the
6754 property, and a silver car that had stopped near 6750. J.A. 46. It also described a

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dark vehicle parked under trees near the top of the gravel driveway in front of the 6740
residence and positioned out of view from the state highway. J.A. 46–47. Later that
evening, officers saw a silver car parked along the tree line in front of the 6740 residence
while multiple people walked up to it. J.A. 47.
The August 9 surveillance also included Desmond Griffin. J.A. 48. The affidavit
stated that Desmond was seen frequently in Kent Bottom that day. J.A. 48. It stated that
Desmond “was present at Kent Bottom during several suspected CDS transactions.” J.A.
48. It further stated that Desmond “was seen walking in and out of the residence at 6740
N. Solomons Island Rd before and/or after the transactions.” J.A. 48.
The affidavit also described surveillance from August 16, 2019, two weeks before
the warrant issued. J.A. 48–49. Officers saw several men approach a black pickup truck
near the entrance to Kent Bottom, which the affidavit described as consistent with CDS
transactions. J.A. 48. Later that afternoon, a white Lincoln and a black Nissan SUV arrived
in Kent Bottom and parked along the tree line in front of the 6740 residence. J.A. 48.
Multiple people went to the window of the white Lincoln before both vehicles left. J.A.
48.
After describing those events, the warrant application requested authority to search
6740 N. Solomons Island Road, including “all buildings, sheds, storage containers,” and
vehicles “found on the premises and connected to the residence and/or targets identified
herein.” J.A. 54. The warrant application also requested authority to search portions of
the Kent Bottom dirt driveway and any persons, containers, or vehicles located there. J.A.
54.

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A Maryland state judge issued a no-knock search warrant that same day. J.A. 31.
The warrant authorized officers to search 6740 N. Solomons Island Road, including “any
and all vehicles, building, sheds, and storage containers found on the premises.” J.A. 32.
The warrant also authorized officers to search portions of the Kent Bottom dirt driveway
and any persons, containers, or vehicles located there. J.A. 32.
B. Warrant Execution
Officers executed the warrant at the 6740 residence on September 5, 2019. J.A.
155. A green Chevrolet Tahoe was parked on the side of the residence and was initially
locked. J.A. 155. The defendant was the only person inside the residence when officers
entered, and Yvette Griffin arrived during the search. J.A. 155. Officers opened the Tahoe
with a lockout kit and found cocaine base, powder cocaine, marijuana, and a firearm inside
the vehicle. J.A. 157. Officers also recovered the defendant’s licenses and vehicle
registration from the Tahoe. J.A. 157. The officers arrested the defendant after finding the
Tahoe key. J.A. 157. No drugs were found inside the residence. J.A. 21.
C. Procedural History
A federal grand jury later charged the defendant with possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base, cocaine, and marijuana; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug-trafficking crime; and possession of a firearm by a felon. J.A. 14–17.
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the September 5, 2019,
search of the 6740 residence and the Tahoe. J.A. 20. He argued, among other things, that
the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the warrant was not supported by
probable cause of criminal activity. J.A. 20–30. The defendant specifically argued that

8

the affidavit failed to establish a nexus, or connection, between the residence and the
alleged drug activity in Kent Bottom. J.A. 189–90.
The district court held a suppression hearing and ultimately denied the defendant’s
motion. J.A. 183–356. The district court acknowledged that the affidavit “may not be the
strongest warrant affidavit” it had ever read but still concluded that the issuing judge had
substantial basis to find probable cause to search the 6740 residence. J.A. 243–44. The
court reasoned that Kent Bottom was a small area of several homes connected by a dirt
road, that the 6740 residence was close to the entrance, that Ty’Lik Griffin allegedly dealt
drugs near the house, and that Desmond Griffin had been present during suspected
transactions and had walked in and out of the 6740 residence. J.A. 243–44. The court
stated that those facts “by themselves” would not have been sufficient, but that they were
sufficient when considered with the affidavit’s broader description of Kent Bottom as a
“drive-up drug shop” or “open-air drug market.” J.A. 244.
The case proceeded to trial, where the jury acquitted the defendant of possession
with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking
crime, but convicted him of being a felon in possession of a firearm. J.A. 928–29; J.A.
1014. The district court later sentenced the defendant to 180 months’ imprisonment,
followed by five years of supervised release. J.A. 1165–66.

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The defendant now appeals, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress.
2
We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.

II. Discussion
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.

CONST. amend. IV. It represents the Framers’ “response to the reviled ‘general warrants’
and ‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage
through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity.” Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014). And it generally “seeks to secure ‘the privacies of
life’ against ‘arbitrary power’ ” and “to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating
police surveillance.” Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 305 (2018) (quoting Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
The protections of the Fourth Amendment are at their apex when it comes to the
home. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (“[W]hen it comes to the Fourth
Amendment, the home is first among equals.”). “[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. U.S.

2
The defendant also raises other issues related to his conviction and sentence, but
because we reverse the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, vacate his
conviction, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion, we need not address
his remaining arguments.

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Dist. Ct. for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). The Amendment thus
“draw[s] a firm line at the entrance of the house.” Id. at 590. “What lies behind that line
is of course not inviolable.” Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 303 (2021). For example,
“[a]n officer may always enter a home with a proper warrant.” Id. (emphasis added).
A proper warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate judge and
supported by probable cause. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. (“[N]o Warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause . . . .”); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (stating a warrant
“may not be issued unless probable cause is properly established”). The probable cause
requirement in particular “seek[s] to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable
interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime.” Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). “To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at
the mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.” Id.
Because a warrant must be supported by probable cause, a defendant may still seek
to suppress evidence obtained during a warrant-authorized search by challenging the
issuing judge’s probable cause determination. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238
(1983); Chatrie v. United States, __ S.Ct. __, __, No. 25-112, 2026 WL 1855568, at *17
(U.S. June 29, 2026) (“When officers have obtained a warrant, as they did here, a search’s
legality will thus depend on whether a magistrate has properly found probable cause to
support a particularly described search.”). When reviewing such a challenge, the court
does not assess probable cause de novo but instead determines whether the issuing judge
had a “substantial basis” for finding probable cause. United States v. Lyles, 910 F.3d 787,
791 (4th Cir. 2018). Reviewing courts must afford the initial probable cause determination

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“great deference.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,
419 (1969)). But even if the warrant application did not establish probable cause for a
search, courts will not suppress the evidence obtained from the search if the officers
executing the warrant relied on the warrant in objectively reasonable “good faith.” United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984) (outlining the “good faith” exception to the
exclusionary rule, the rule that generally bars the use of evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment).
Accordingly, the defendant’s challenge requires we conduct two inquiries: (A)
whether the warrant application gave the issuing judge a substantial basis to find probable
cause to search the 6740 residence and, if it did not, (B) whether the officers relied in “good
faith” on the issuing judge’s probable cause determination such that the evidence should
nevertheless be admitted.
A. Probable Cause
To determine whether a warrant application establishes probable cause, an issuing
judge must “make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit[,] . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. The affidavit must
establish a connection between the evidence of a crime and the place to be searched. See
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 & n.6 (1978). In other words, “[t]here must
[] be some nexus between the suspected crime and the place to be searched.” United States
v. Orozco, 41 F.4th 403, 409 (4th Cir. 2022). In addition to a physical nexus, probable
cause also requires a fair probability that evidence of the suspected crime will be found in

12

the place to be searched at the time of the search. See Lyles, 910 F.3d at 794 (finding
marijuana residue retrieved from a single trash pull did not provide probable cause for a
residential search warrant partly because the residue gave no indication when the marijuana
was consumed in the home); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure
§ 3.7(d) (6th
ed. 2025) (“The more complicated probable cause determination that must be made in
search cases may be said to include four ingredients: time; crime; objects; and place.”) .
These timing and nexus requirements are especially important when the place to be
searched is a home. See Lyles, 910 F.3d at 793.
The affidavit here failed to establish a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime would have been found in the 6740 residence at the time of the search because
the facts set forth in the affidavit were either (1) not connected to the 6740 residence, (2)
too old, or (3) both.
1. Nexus
Nexus may be established by factual assertions directly linking the items sought to
the place to be searched, such as factual assertions that criminal activity occurred at the
place to be searched or that evidence of the crime was observed there. See United States
v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 217–18 (4th Cir. 2005). Nexus may also be established
through reasonable, common-sense inferences from circumstantial evidence. See id.
(finding probable cause despite the absence of direct evidence that drugs were inside the
residences because a reliable informant identified the defendant as a drug dealer who used
stash houses, officers observed suspicious conduct and use of keys to access the homes,
and documents and witness statements connected him to the locations). But the existence

13

of some relevant facts does not make every inference connecting evidence to the place to
be searched reasonable. See Lyles, 910 F.3d at 794. Indeed, “[a]t some point an inference
becomes, in Fourth Amendment terms, an improbable leap.” Id. at 795.
Drug activity occurring at or near a residence is a relevant circumstance from which
an issuing judge may infer that evidence will be found inside. See United States v. Hodge,
246 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that the proximity of criminal activity to the
defendant’s home supported the inference that defendant stored drug related evidence in
his home). But proximity alone does not establish nexus. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S.
85, 91 (1979) (“[A] person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of
criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person.”
(citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62–63 (1968))). Instead, the affidavit must
provide additional facts connecting the criminal activity to the residence. See id. Such
facts may include evidence that a drug dealer lives at the residence and keeps drugs there,
see United States v. Sumlin, 956 F.3d 879, 886–87 (6th Cir. 2020); that a drug dealer
departed directly from the residence to make a drug sale, see United States v. Coleman,
923 F.3d 450, 457–58 (6th Cir. 2019); that a drug dealer returned to the residence
immediately after a sale, see United States v. Ellison, 632 F.3d 347, 349 (6th Cir. 2011);
that a drug dealer retrieved drugs from the residence, see Commonwealth v. Tapia, 978
N.E.2d 534, 541–42 (Mass. 2012); or that a drug dealer carried drugs or proceeds into the
residence, see United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 104 (3d Cir. 2002).
Here, the affidavit’s broader Kent Bottom allegations failed to provide additional
facts connecting the criminal activity to the 6740 residence. The affidavit stated that, “[f]or

14

decades,” DEU knew controlled substances had been sold in Kent Bottom, described the
area as an “open-air drug market,” and recounted suspected drug activity in the area. J.A.
36–49. The affidavit stated that people congregated and distributed CDS “in this area,”
but it did not say they stored drugs, proceeds, packaging, records, or firearms inside the
6740 residence. J.A. 37. And the specific criminal incidents from 2016, 2017, and 2018
concerned Kent Bottom, Kent Road, nearby properties, or other individuals not associated
with the 6740 residence. J.A. 41–43. These broader allegations about Kent Bottom may
have described drug activity in the area, but they did not supply a connection between that
drug activity and the 6740 residence.
The more recent August observations also failed to connect recurrent Kent Bottom
drug activity to the 6740 residence. On August 9, officers saw what appeared to be a hand-
to -hand transaction involving a man believed to be Joseph Brown and a silver car stopped
near 6750. J.A. 46. The affidavit associated Joseph Brown with 6754 N. Solomons Island
Road, not the 6740 residence. J.A. 38; J.A. 46. Officers also saw vehicles park near the
gravel driveway or along the tree line in front of the 6740 residence while people
approached them. J.A. 46–47. On August 16, officers saw several men approach a black
pickup near the entrance to Kent Bottom and later saw people go to the window of a white
Lincoln parked along the tree line in front of the 6740 residence. J.A. 48. But the affidavit
did not state that officers saw drugs, money, packaging, concealment, or identifiable
objects change hands during those August encounters. J.A. 46–48. Nor did it state that
officers stopped any alleged buyer, recovered CDS, or obtained an admission that any
August transaction occurred. J.A. 46–48. Most importantly, it did not state that anyone

15

departed the 6740 residence to conduct a transaction, returned there after one, retrieved
drugs from the residence, or carried drugs or proceeds inside. Again, these facts in the
affidavit may have modestly contributed to suspicion about outdoor activity in Kent
Bottom, but they did not create a substantial basis to believe that evidence would be inside
the 6740 residence. T he further inference that drugs or trafficking evidence would be found
inside that particular home was an “improbable leap.”
The fact that Desmond was present in Kent Bottom during these August incidents
does not change our conclusion. The affidavit stated that he was present in Kent Bottom
during the suspected CDS transactions and was seen walking in and out of the 6740
residence before or after those transactions. J.A. 48. But the affidavit did not state that
Desmond sold drugs, possessed drugs, carried proceeds, carried packaging, or exchanged
anything with anyone. J.A. 48. It did not identify any suspected transaction involving
Desmond that led to a CDS recovery or an admission from a buyer. J.A. 48. And it did
not say that Desmond carried anything into or out of the 6740 residence. J.A. 48. Walking
in and out of a family residence before or after suspected outdoor activity conducted by
others did not establish that drug evidence would be found inside.
The lack of concrete connection to the 6740 residence is important because the
Fourth Amendment does not permit suspicion by geography. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91.
Even in the reasonable suspicion context, where the government’s burden is lower,
presence in a high-crime area is a “weak and generic factor” that is given little weight
within the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Hawkins, 161 F.4th 242, 247 (4th
Cir. 2025). If a neighborhood’s reputation cannot justify a brief street detention without

16

particularized facts of criminal activity, it certainly cannot justify “ ‘the chief evil against
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’ ” Payton, 445 U.S. at 585
(quoting U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
The lack of specific and particularized facts related to the 6740 residence especially
undercuts probable cause here because the affidavit itself identified many other places
where drugs or evidence of drug activity could have been located. While it does not require
mathematical certainty, probable cause to search still requires some probability
determination as to specified items being in a particular place. See Maryland v. Pringle,
540 U.S 366, 371 (2003). That means when there are facts making multiple places likely
locations for the objects sought, there must be factual data creating a probability that the
evidence is in the place actually searched. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(e)
(6th ed. 2025). “The government cannot, for example, search every unit in an apartment
building because it has probable cause to believe that some unknown part of the building
holds evidence of a crime.” United States v. Chatrie, 136 F.4th 100, 153 (4th Cir. 2025)
(Berner, J., concurring), vacated and remanded by, Chatrie, __ S.Ct. __ , __ , No. 25-112,
2026 WL 1855568. And it follows that the government cannot select a single unit for
search unless the affidavit supplies facts making that unit a probable location for the
evidence. C.f. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 n.13 (1987).
Here, Kent Bottom included several residences and nearby properties, including the
6738, 6740, 6750, and 6754 residences on N. Solomons Island Road, and 6790 Kent Road.
J.A. 36–37. The affidavit associated people suspected of criminal activity with other
residences: Thomas and Tony Brown with 6750 and Joseph Brown with 6754. J.A. 38.

17

The more recent observations also involved vehicles parked along the dirt road, near the
tree line, or near other residences. J.A. 43–48. So, even accepting the affidavit’s premise
that Kent Bottom functioned as an open-air drug market, the affidavit did not show why
evidence of drug trafficking would probably be found in the 6740 residence over the many
other locations in Kent Bottom that seemed equally as likely to contain the evidence sought.
2. Timing
“Time is a crucial element of probable cause,” and a valid warrant may issue only
on “facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of
probable cause at that time.” United States v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1331, 1335–36 (4th Cir.
1984) (quoting Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932)). The staleness inquiry is
not governed by “pat formulas or simple rules,” but by the circumstances, including “the
nature of the unlawful activity alleged, the length of the activity, and the nature of the
property to be seized.” Id. at 1336. Older facts may support probable cause if the nature
of the alleged criminal activity is recurrent or ongoing and the evidence sought is
intrinsically likely to remain where it was observed. See id. at 1337; Lyles, 910 F.3d at 794
(finding marijuana residue retrieved from a single trash pull did not provide probable cause
for a residential search warrant because the single trash pull was less likely to show
“recurrent or ongoing activity” and because the residue gave no indication that additional
marijuana would be found in the home). But older facts do not support probable cause
when they show isolated criminal conduct and give no reason to believe evidence remains
at the place to be searched. See United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.
2015) (finding a single old incident of criminal activity did not create a fair probability that

18

evidence would remain months later absent circumstances showing continuing interest or
retention); McCall, 740 F.2d at 1337; Lyles, 910 F.3d at 794.
The affidavit’s only concrete allegation of drug activity inside the 6740 residence
was stale. The affidavit stated that, in 2006, officers searched the residence and found the
defendant inside attempting to flush a plastic bag of marijuana down the toilet. J.A. 40–
41. Officers also recovered money, marijuana, and paraphernalia that the affidavit
described as indicative of distribution. J.A. 40–41. But that incident occurred thirteen
years before the warrant issued on August 30, 2019. J.A. 31; J.A. 40–41. And the affidavit
did not describe any repeated searches, controlled buys, informant reports, trash pulls, or
surveillance showing that the 6740 residence continued to be used for “recurrent or
ongoing” drug activity. Nor did it identify any feature of the evidence sought—CDS,
proceeds, packaging, records, firearms, or related items—that made it intrinsically likely
to remain inside the 6740 residence for thirteen years. The 2006 incident therefore showed
isolated historical conduct and could not establish a fair probability that evidence of drug
trafficking would be found inside the 6740 residence in 2019.
3

3. Both Nexus and Timing
The facts regarding the defendant’s son Ty’Lik were deficient in both respects. The
affidavit described an alleged April 24, 2019, hand-to-hand transaction between Ty’Lik
and Richard Berry in front of the 6740 residence. J.A. 44. Officers stopped Berry and

3
While the general Kent Bottom allegations discussed in Section II.A.1 refer to
incidents more than a year before the warrant application, we find they are not stale because
these allegations describe recurrent and ongoing drug activity in Kent Bottom.

19

recovered approximately 0.5 grams of crack cocaine. Id. Berry said he had purchased the
drugs from “lil smoke,” whom DEU knew as Ty’Lik. Id. That event occurred four months
before the warrant, and it was one isolated transaction, not ongoing recurrent activity. J.A.
44. And the affidavit did not explain why evidence from a street level drug sale in April
would remain inside the 6740 residence in late August. Moreover, the alleged transaction
took place outside, and the affidavit did not indicate that Ty’Lik entered the 6740 residence
before or after the transaction. It did not say any evidence or contraband moved between
Ty’Lik and the 6740 residence. J.A. 44. And although it was his grandparents’ home, the
affidavit identified Ty’Lik’s address as 4320 Pleasant Court in Huntingtown, not the 6740
residence. J.A. 44. Thus, even if Ty’Lik’s outdoor transaction established drug activity
near the 6740 residence, it did not establish a fair probability that evidence of that activity
would be found inside the home at the time of the search.
* * *
The affidavit failed to establish a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime would be found inside the 6740 residence at the time of the search because the facts
set forth in the affidavit were either too old, not connected to the 6740 residence, or both.
The only concrete allegation of drug activity inside the 6740 residence was 13 years old.
The allegations suggesting recurrent drug activity concerned Kent Bottom generally,
nearby properties, or individuals not associated with the 6740 residence. And the
remaining facts involving the 6740 residence showed only proximity and association:
Ty’Lik Griffin’s single outdoor transaction near his grandparents’ home and Desmond
Griffin’s unexplained movement in and out of the residence. Viewed together, those facts

20

did not establish probable cause to search the home. C.f. United States v. Valenzuela, 365
F.3d 892, 897 (10th Cir. 2004) (pointing out that while a court must look at the totality of
the circumstances rather than engage in a “divide-and-conquer” analysis, it may not “arrive
at probable cause simply by piling hunch upon hunch” (internal quotation marks
removed)).
4

Our conclusion serves the Fourth Amendment’s special protection for the home and
the function of the probable cause requirement. The home is “first among equals,”
Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6, and the probable-cause requirement safeguards citizens from “rash
and unreasonable interferences with privacy” and from searches based on “whim or
caprice.” Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176. Great deference to an issuing judge does not permit
a court to treat a neighborhood’s reputation as a substitute for facts tying evidence to a
particular residence. And totality review does not allow stale allegations, area-wide
suspicion, and ordinary movement around a family home to be combined into the missing
nexus. The affidavit may have supported suspicion that drug activity occurred somewhere

4
The totality of these facts are weak even by reasonable suspicion standards, which
is less demanding than probable cause, see Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
In United States v. Drakeford, the court held that officers lacked reasonable suspicion even
though they had (1) a confidential-informant tip that Drakeford was trafficking cocaine and
heroin; (2) months of surveillance; (3) two encounters officers believed were consistent
with drug transactions; (4) syringes recovered from a vehicle after one suspected
encounter; and (5) an officer’s belief that he saw a hand-to -hand transaction. 992 F.3d 255,
263–65 (4th Cir. 2021). The court reasoned that the officers did not see drugs or money
change hands and that an officer’s conclusory label that ordinary conduct is a drug
transaction cannot substitute for specific, articulable facts. Id. at 264–65; id. at 267 (Wynn,
J., concurring) (“[T]he success or failure of a suppression motion cannot hinge on an officer
saying, in essence, ‘I know it when I see it.’ ”). The facts here were no stronger as a basis
to suspect criminal activity, let alone as a basis to suspect criminal evidence was inside the
6740 residence.

21

in Kent Bottom, but it did not provide a substantial basis to cross the firm constitutional
line at the entrance of the 6740 residence.
B. Good Faith Exception
Under the good faith exception, evidence obtained from an invalid search warrant
will not be suppressed if the officer’s reliance on the warrant was “objectively reasonable.”
United States v. Perez, 393 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922). Leon identifies four circumstances in which an officer’s
reliance on a warrant would not qualify as “ ‘objectively reasonable’: (1) when the issuing
judge ‘was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would
have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth’; (2) when ‘the issuing
judge has wholly abandoned’ ” his detached and neutral judicial role; (3) when the
supporting “ ‘affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable’; and “ ‘(4) when the warrant was so facially
deficient in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized that
the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.’ ” Id. (cleaned up) (citing
Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).
The third limitation is relevant here. For the third limitation to the good faith
exception, the court asks whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that
the affidavit failed to establish probable cause despite the issuing judge’s authorization.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23. Although the good-faith inquiry is less demanding than the
probable cause inquiry, it still requires some indicia of probable cause. United States v.
Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the “so lacking in indicia” test

22

is less demanding than the “substantial basis” test). An affidavit with stale facts and a
missing residential nexus may be so lacking in indicia of probable cause that reliance on it
would be objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Lyles, 910 F.3d at 796–97; United States v.
Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 472–73 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cordova, 792 F.3d 1220,
1221–22 (10th Cir. 2015).
United States v. Lyles, 910 F.3d 787 (4th Cir. 2018), illustrates the residential nexus
defect. There, the court held that the affidavit did not establish probable cause and that the
good-faith exception did not apply. Lyles, 910 F.3d at 794, 797. Officers obtained a
warrant to search a home after a trash pull revealed three marijuana stems, three empty
packs of rolling papers, and a document addressed to the residence. Id. at 790. The court
reasoned that a “flimsy trash pull” producing “scant evidence” could not reasonably justify
“the indiscriminate rummaging through a household.” Id. at 797. Despite the fresh
physical evidence linking the residence to drugs, the court still concluded that the affidavit
did not suggest that marijuana would be found in the house at the time of the search. See
id.
Here, the affidavit had no comparable evidence linking drugs to the 6740 residence.
There was no trash pull from the residence, no recent drug evidence recovered from the
residence, and no observation of drugs or proceeds entering the house. As discussed above,
the Ty’Lik and Desmond allegations did not supply the missing nexus. Ty’Lik’s alleged
transaction occurred outside the 6740 residence, and the affidavit did not state that he lived
there, entered the home, retrieved drugs from it, returned proceeds to it, or otherwise used
it in connection with the sale. J.A. 44. Desmond’s alleged conduct was even thinner. The

23

affidavit said he was present during suspected outdoor transactions and walked in and out
of his family home, but it did not say he sold drugs, possessed drugs, exchanged anything,
carried anything, or moved contraband into or out of the residence. J.A. 48. If the fresher,
more place-specific evidence in Lyles could not support good-faith reliance, the more
attenuated showing here could not either.
United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460 (4th Cir. 2011), illustrates the timing defect.
There, the court held that the good-faith exception did not apply to a residential child-
pornography warrant because the affidavit gave “zero indication” when the crime was
committed. Doyle, 650 F.3d at 463. The affidavit relied on a child’s statement that Doyle
had shown him photographs, but it did not say when Doyle showed the photographs. Id.
at 465–66. The court explained that “even if the affidavit established probable cause, it
was completely devoid of indicia that the probable cause was not stale.” Id. at 475. The
court reasoned that “nothing indicated when or if child pornography allegedly existed in
Doyle’s home” and ultimately concluded that an “objectively reasonable officer would not
rely on a warrant application so devoid of necessary information.” Id.
Here, the affidavit’s timing defect was apparent as the affidavit’s dates showed why
reliance was unreasonable. Again, the only concrete allegation of drug activity inside the
6740 residence occurred in 2006, 13 years before the warrant issued. J.A. 40–41. The
April 24 Ty’Lik incident occurred four months before the warrant, outside the home, and
involved a street-level drug sale. J.A. 44. The affidavit did not say Ty’Lik entered the
6740 residence before or after the transaction, moved drugs or proceeds into the 6740
residence, or engaged in recurrent drug activity there. J.A. 44. Like how an officer could

24

not reasonably rely on the date-free affidavit in Doyle, an officer could not reasonably rely
on an affidavit whose dates showed that the facts regarding the 6740 residence were more
than 13 years old or involving a four-month-old street-level drug deal.
United States v. Cordova, 792 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2015), illustrates both defects.
There, the Tenth Circuit held that the good-faith exception did not apply because the
affidavit contained so few facts implicating Cordova or his current home that no reasonable
officer could rely on the warrant in good faith. Cordova, 792 F.3d at 1221. The affidavit
relied on a 21-month-old attempted delivery of 70 pounds of marijuana to a vehicle
registered to someone else and parked in front of Cordova’s former residence. Id. at 1224–
25. It also described one later incident, four months before the warrant, in which that other
person drove into the garage of Cordova’s current home. Id. at 1225. The court held that
these facts did not support good-faith reliance because the old transaction did not implicate
Cordova or his current home, and the later garage observation was an isolated event that
did not show the home was being used for ongoing drug trafficking. Id. at 1225–26. The
court emphasized that the good-faith exception is “broad” but “not boundless,” and that the
affidavit’s sparse connection to the current home amounted to “nothing more than a
hunch.” Id. at 1226.
Here, the affidavit was weaker than the affidavit in Cordova. The old information
in Cordova involved a planned 70-pound marijuana delivery—evidence of large-scale drug
trafficking. Id. at 1224–25. The old information here involved a thirteen-year-old
marijuana incident inside the 6740 residence and, at most, a four-month-old street level
drug sale outside it. J.A. 40–41; J.A. 44. Further, the recent residential connection here

25

was thinner too. In Cordova, officers at least saw a suspected drug associate drive into the
garage of the target home. 792 F.3d at 1225. Here, the affidavit alleged only that Desmond
walked in and out of a family residence before or after suspected outdoor transactions,
without stating that he sold drugs, possessed drugs, exchanged anything, carried anything,
or moved contraband into or out of the 6740 residence. J.A. 48. If the facts in Cordova
were too removed from the target home to support good-faith reliance, the facts here were
too.
Accordingly, the good-faith exception does not apply.
5
The affidavit had no fresh
physical evidence tying drugs to the 6740 residence. It had dates showing that the specific

5
We respect our good colleague’s different conclusion on what a reasonable officer
could conclude from this affidavit. We write briefly only to clarify the weight a court
should assign to the decisions of the issuing judge and the district court when determining
whether the third limitation on the good faith exception applies.

The dissent places some weight on the fact that “two judges—the state trial court
judge who issued the warrant and the federal district court judge who presided over this
case—concluded that the same materials were sufficient to establish probable cause.” Diss.
Op. at 29. We do not dispute that judicial probable cause determinations may bear on
whether an affidavit’s deficiency was reasonably apparent. Indeed, Leon considered
differing probable cause determinations of “thoughtful and competent judges” in
concluding that the officers there acted reasonably. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 926. But prior
judicial determinations cannot by themselves supply indicia of probable cause missing
from the affidavit.

For one, giving dispositive weight to the issuing judge’s probable cause
determination would risk making the good faith inquiry circular. Leon asks whether an
officer’s reliance on an issued warrant was objectively reasonable notwithstanding the
issuing judge’s erroneous probable cause determination. See id. at 922–23. This means
that every case in which Leon’s third limitation is at issue necessarily involves a judicially
issued warrant. If the issuance is given too much weight in the good faith analysis, the
third limitation to the good faith exception may never apply, because the issuing judge’s
decision would establish objective reasonableness even when the affidavit itself was
(Continued)

26

allegations related to the 6740 residence were stale or isolated. And it had an even weaker
connection to the searched residence than the affidavit rejected in Cordova. There was not

lacking indicia of probable cause such that no reasonably well-trained officer could rely on
it. Therefore, an issuing judge’s approval may support an officer’s reliance when the
affidavit presents a close or reasonably debatable question, but it cannot render reasonable
an officer’s reliance on an affidavit that is so lacking in indicia of probable cause, such as
the affidavit here.

Additionally, a district court’s decision approving the issuing judge’s probable
cause determination should not be given any deferential weight. The applicability of the
good faith exception “is purely a legal conclusion” that we review de novo. United States
v. DeQuasie, 373 F.3d 509, 520 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Smith, 30 F.3d 568,
571 (4th Cir. 1994)). We must therefore independently determine, based on our review of
the affidavit, whether the good faith exception applies. See Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 705 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]n de novo review, the ‘weight due’ to a
trial court’s finding is zero.”). Our probable cause standard here also shows that the district
court’s decision should not be afforded any deference. As discussed above, when
reviewing the underlying probable cause determination, we do not consider or defer to the
district court’s assessment. We instead ask whether the issuing judge had a “substantial
basis” for finding probable cause. Lyles, 910 F.3d at 791. Treating the district court’s
agreement with the issuing judge with any deference would be inconsistent with our
standards of review.

For similar reasons, we are unpersuaded by the dissent’s effort to distinguish Lyles
on the ground that the district court there granted the defendant’s suppression motion. Diss.
Op. at 29. The court in Lyles independently concluded that the affidavit was so deficient
that no reasonably well-trained officer could rely on it. See Lyles, 910 at 796–97. The
district court’s decision did not affect the indicia of probable cause contained in the
affidavit. See id. Cordova further illustrates the point. There, the district court denied the
defendant’s motion to suppress under the good faith exception, yet the Tenth Circuit
reversed because the affidavit’s deficiencies rendered reliance on the warrant objectively
unreasonable. Cordova, 792 F.3d at 1226. Thus, whether a district court granted or denied
a motion to suppress cannot displace our duty to conduct a de novo review and
independently examine the affidavit itself.

Accordingly, to the extent the dissent treats the issuing judge’s approval as
independently sufficient to establish objective good faith, accords deferential weight to the
district court’s decision approving the issuing judge’s determination, or regards the district
court’s decision in Lyles as materially distinguishing that case, we respectfully disagree.

27

a single fact contained in the affidavit that would allow a reasonable trained officer to
believe drugs would be located in the 6740 residence at the time of the search. Indeed, as
discussed in footnote 4, the facts here may not even have established reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity, much less probable cause to arrest anyone or to search a home.
Because the affidavit’s facts related to the 6740 residence were stale, its recent facts were
merely described Kent Bottom generally, and its remaining facts showed only proximity
and association, a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the warrant failed
to establish probable cause to search the 6740 residence.
6

III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the district court’s denial of Earl Leroy
Griffin, Jr.’s motion to suppress, vacate his conviction, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED, VACATED, AND REMANDED

6
The warrant separately authorized officers to search persons, containers, and
vehicles located on portions of the Kent Bottom dirt driveway. J.A. 32. We need not
decide whether that broader provision was supported by probable cause. The Tahoe was
parked “on the side of” the 6740 residence and was searched as a vehicle found on the
residential premises. J.A. 155. A warrant authorizing the search of an entire premises
extends to vehicles on the property that are owned by or under the dominion and control
of the premises owner, or that reasonably appear to be so controlled. United States v.
Patterson, 278 F.3d 315, 318 (4th Cir. 2002). And a vehicle located within a home’s
curtilage does not lose the Fourth Amendment protection afforded that area merely because
it is an automobile. See Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 596 (2018). Accordingly, the search
of the Tahoe is connected to the warrant’s authorization to search the 6740 premises, not
its separate authorization to search vehicles on the Kent Bottom driveway.

28

TOBY HEYTENS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I would affirm Griffin’s conviction and sentence. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that the warrant here was constitutionally defective, the resulting evidence should
not be suppressed because the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to rely on a
facially valid search warrant.
Griffin admits the officers here “obtained a warrant and abided by its terms.” United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984); see Oral Arg. 1:37–:50. For that reason,
suppression is inappropriate so long as the officers were “objectively reasonable” in relying
on that warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. The Supreme Court has emphasized that searches
conducted after the issuance of—and consistent with—a warrant “will rarely require any
deep inquiry into reasonableness” and that suppression is appropriate only when the
relevant officers had “no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly
issued.” Id. at 922–23 (quotation marks removed; emphasis added).
In my view, that high standard is not met. Griffin makes no argument that the
magistrate who issued this warrant “wholly abandoned [their] judicial role.” Leon,
468 U.S. at 923. Griffin also takes—at best—a “passing shot at” suggesting the warrant
was “so facially deficient” that no officer could “reasonably presume it to be valid” in his
opening brief before abandoning any such suggestion in his reply brief. Grayson O Co v.
Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks removed) (first
quote); Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (second and third quotes). Instead, Griffin argues the
materials that officers submitted in support of the warrant application were “so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render” it “entirely unreasonable” for them to believe the

29

search was constitutional despite the existence of a facially valid warrant. Leon, 468 U.S.
at 923 (quotation marks removed).
I disagree. For one thing, two judges—the state trial court judge who issued the
warrant and the federal district court judge who presided over this case—concluded that
the same materials were sufficient to establish probable cause. To be sure, that fact alone
does not defeat Griffin’s argument. But having reviewed both the warrant application and
the district court’s explanation for reaching that conclusion, I cannot say the officers were
“entirely unreasonable” in relying on the warrant here. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (quotation
marks removed).
Griffin cites United States v. Lyles, 910 F.3d 787 (4th Cir. 2018), but that case does
not help him. In Lyles, the district court had granted the defendant’s suppression motion
after concluding the warrant application had been “obviously deficient” because it
“contain[ed] only vague allegations of ‘unlawful activity,’ virtually no facts, and
conclusory claims of the right to search for firearms and other evidence without any
explanation.” United States v. Lyles, No. TDC-17-0039, 2017 WL 5633093, at *7 (D. Md.,
Nov. 20, 2017). Griffin does not—and could not plausibly—argue that this case involves
that sort of “‘bare bones’ affidavit.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 926. Instead, Griffin makes a far
more granular claim, insisting the warrant affidavit’s extensive discussion of open-air drug
activity in a small area over the course of years was not “sufficiently linked” to him or his
residence to support probable cause. Griffin Br. 18 (emphasis added). This case thus strikes
me as falling well outside the “rare[]” “circumstances” in which officers’ reliance on a
facially valid warrant was nonetheless unreasonable. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926. And because

30

I am not persuaded by any of Griffin’s other challenges to his conviction and sentence, I
would affirm.