Eladio Cruz v. Honorable Jan Jurden

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 19-1887
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ELADIO CRUZ,

Appellant

v.

HONORABLE JAN JURDEN;
WARDEN DANA METZGER
____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil Action No. 18-cv-00370)
District Judge: Honorable Leonard P. Stark
____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 2, 2020

Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 17, 2020)

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O P I N I O N
*

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PER CURIAM

*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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Appellant Eladio Cruz, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order
dismissing his complaint. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in part and vacate in
part the District Court’s order.
Cruz’s complaint concerned an alleged clerical error made in connection with his
August 6, 1991 sentencing. Cruz claimed that certain documents he received stated that
he would be eligible for parole as early as 2009. However, when he applied for parole in
2012, the Parole Board informed him that he was ineligible. After Delaware Superior
Court Judge Jan Jurden declined to correct his sentence, Cruz initiated this lawsuit
against her claiming a due process violation and the intentional infliction of emotional
distress. In addition to seeking damages, Cruz asked the District Court to “reverse the
lower court’s decision.” Complaint 6, ECF No. 2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a), the District Court screened Cruz’s complaint and
dismissed it as legally frivolous, holding that Cruz’s claims were barred by the statute of
limitations, as well as by Judge Jurden’s absolute immunity from suit. Cruz appealed.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s dismissal of Cruz’s complaint as legally frivolous. See
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
First, although Cruz does not challenge the District Court’s exercise of jurisdiction
over his complaint, we have an independent obligation to inquire sua sponte into the
District Court’s jurisdiction. United States v. Higgs, 504 F.3d 456, 457 (3d Cir. 2007).
Upon review, we conclude that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to the extent that
Cruz requested the District Court’s review and reversal of state court decisions. It is

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well-settled that inferior federal courts lack jurisdiction to review state court judgments.
See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars from federal
consideration “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). It is limited to cases where the
complained-of injury stems directly from the state court’s proceedings, see Great W.
Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2010), and
where the state court’s judgment was “effectively final,” see Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t
of State, 938 F.3d 453, 459 (3d Cir. 2019).
Cruz asked the District Court to reverse the Delaware Superior Court’s decision
not to correct his sentence with instructions to correct its alleged clerical error and
resentence him, and he renews this request on appeal. Cruz’s complained-of injuries
arose directly from his sentence and the Delaware Superior Court’s decision not to
correct his sentence, both of which were effectively final judgments. See Malhan, 938
F.3d at 459 (quoting Federacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del
Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2005)) (explaining that a state court
decision is effectively final where it has “reached a point where neither party seeks
further action”). To that extent, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Cruz’s
claims.

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Additionally, Cruz asked the District Court to award damages stemming from the
alleged fact that he was wrongfully denied parole. However, such a claim is not
cognizable because it implies the invalidity of Cruz’s continued detention and he is
unable to demonstrate that the parole decision has been invalidated. See Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994) (holding that a state prisoner’s claim for
damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if it calls into question the validity of
his confinement, unless he can demonstrate that the conviction has already been
invalidated); see also Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 176–77 (3d Cir. 2006)
(applying Heck where a prisoner’s § 1983 claim necessarily invalidated the Parole
Board’s decision to revoke his parole). Accordingly, the District Court should have
dismissed this claim pursuant to Heck without prejudice to Cruz bringing a § 1983 action
if he is ultimately successful in invalidating his conviction. See Trimble v. City of Santa
Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995).
Finally, Cruz’s complaint can be read to include claims that are not Heck-barred or
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(per curiam) (noting the obligation to construe pro se filings liberally). As to those
claims, the District Court was correct in concluding that they are either time-barred, see
Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining that if it is obvious
from the face of the complaint that a claim is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations, a court may dismiss the claim sua sponte under § 1915), or else barred by the
doctrine of judicial immunity, see Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006)
(per curiam). Additionally, the District Court did not err in determining that any attempt

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to amend those claims would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d
103, 111 (3d Cir. 2002).
In sum, we will vacate the order of dismissal in part and affirm it in part and
remand this matter to the District Court for further proceedings. We will vacate the
District Court’s decision to the extent that the District Court exercised jurisdiction over
claims barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and dismissed Heck-barred claims with
prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a). On remand, the District
Court is directed to dismiss the Rooker-Feldman-barred claims for lack of jurisdiction
and to dismiss the Heck-barred claims without prejudice. Finally, we will affirm the
District Court’s decision regarding any remaining claims.