Mohamed Sanoussi Diallo v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES On Petition for Review of a Decision of the…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-2223
___________
MOHAMED SANOUSSI DIALLO,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A098-478-664)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Rosalind Malloy
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 24, 2010
Before: BARRY, STAPLETON and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed :March 24, 2010)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Mohamed Sanoussi Diallo seeks review of a decision by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) rendered on July 25, 2008. For the following reasons, we
will deny the petition for review.

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I. Background
Diallo is a native and citizen of Guinea. He entered the United States on a visitor’s
visa in July 2004 and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Diallo claims he suffered past persecution and
fears future persecution and torture in Guinea on account of his political opinion and
ethnicity. Specifically, Diallo is a member of the “RPG,” Guinea’s political opposition
party. He is of Fulani ethnicity, while the ruling party, the “PUP,” is comprised of people
of Soussou ethnicity. Diallo claims that because of his ethnicity and political affiliation,
authorities in Guinea imprisoned him four times, tortured him, and subjected him to
inhumane conditions. He claims to fear returning to Guinea because he will be
imprisoned for life or executed.
Diallo conceded removability. After a hearing on the merits, the Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) issued an oral decision on August 24, 2006. She concluded that Diallo was
not credible and therefore denied his application. On appeal, the BIA adopted and
affirmed the IJ’s decision. The BIA concluded that the IJ’s findings of fact were not
clearly erroneous, and that the numerous shortcomings and inconsistencies the IJ had
identified were substantial, went to the heart of Diallo’s claims, and were not adequately
explained. The BIA also rejected Diallo’s argument that the IJ misapplied the legal
standards for credibility and corroboration.

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Diallo did not receive prompt notice of the BIA’s July 25, 2008, decision. Pursuant1
to a joint motion by Diallo and the Government, the BIA re-issued its decision on April 6,
2009. Diallo then filed his timely petition for review.
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Through counsel, Diallo filed a timely petition for review.1
II. Analysis
We generally review only final orders of the BIA. See Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d
157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 548-49 (3d Cir. 2001).
However, where the BIA adopts the IJ’s reasoning and discusses some of the bases of the
IJ’s decision, we also review the IJ’s order. Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir.
2004). We review adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence. Id. at
221-22. The adverse credibility finding therefore will be affirmed if it is supported by
“reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.”
Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002). To reverse, the evidence of Diallo’s
credibility must be so strong “that in a civil trial he would be entitled to judgment on the
credibility issue as a matter of law.” Chen, 376 F.3d at 222.
A.
We have closely reviewed the adverse credibility determination made by the IJ and
affirmed by the BIA, and we conclude that it rests upon substantial evidence. The IJ
specifically several serious inconsistencies and implausibilities in the evidence, including:
(1) Diallo provided a letter from an RPG leader to support his asylum
application. (See A.R. 419.) It indicated that Diallo requested the letter in
February 2000, although Diallo did not arrive in the United States and apply

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Diallo implies that “implausibilities” are inadequate to support an adverse credibility2
determination. However, assessment of an applicant’s credibility entails review of factors
such as inherent improbability. See Jishiashvili v. Att’y Gen., 402 F.3d 386, 392-93 (3d
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for asylum until 2004. Diallo and his counsel provided differing
explanations for the discrepancy and neither explained why, if the letter
contained an error, they failed to correct or address it.
(2) Diallo provided a doctor’s letter indicating that he was treated at a
government hospital in June 2004. The IJ found this implausible because
the hospitalization allegedly occurred immediately after Diallo escaped
from a nearby military camp in the same city, where he had allegedly been
imprisoned and tortured as a traitor to the government.
(3) Diallo obtained a visa to visit China in May 2004, during the time he was
allegedly imprisoned. The IJ found implausible Diallo’s explanation that
his business associates obtained the visa on his behalf so he could travel to
China on business after his release. In particular, she questioned whether it
is possible for a business associate to obtain a visa on behalf of someone
else and whether it is logical to obtain a visa for business travel for a
political prisoner who is being physically tortured and indefinitely detained.
(4) Diallo testified that he was treated in a hospital for serious injuries relating
to his imprisonment from June 9 to June 17, 2004, but he appeared at the
American Embassy to obtain a visa on June 15, 2004, and did not seek
asylum at that time.
(5) Diallo obtained a Guinean passport in May 2003, despite having been
allegedly arrested as a traitor to the government three times before that date.
The IJ concluded that these issues, taken together, “severely diminish [Diallo’s]
credibility to the point where the Court finds that respondent’s accounts of his arrests in
Guinea and torture and persecution to be incredible.” (A.R. 132, IJ Decision at 32.)
The IJ provided specific, cogent reasons for concluding that the implausibilities
and inconsistencies undermined Diallo’s credibility. These issues, particularly2

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Cir. 2005).
Diallo filed his asylum application in 2004. Accordingly, the REAL ID Act, which3
modified this standard, does not apply to his claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B).
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concerning Diallo’s alleged periods of imprisonment in Guinea, clearly go to the “heart”
of his claims. See Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 323 (3d Cir. 2004). Although3
Diallo argues that the IJ should have accepted his “honest explanations” for the identified
inconsistencies, Diallo’s proposed alternative interpretations, even if plausible, do not
demonstrate that the IJ’s findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence.
B.
Diallo next argues that the IJ and BIA applied the wrong legal standards to his
claims. First, he contends the IJ erred by comparing his oral testimony to his
documentary evidence, because his oral testimony was “internally consistent” and,
considering his testimony alone, there are no “actual discrepancies.” He claims his
documentary evidence could only be considered in the context of whether or not he met
the standard for providing corroborating evidence, not in the course of assessing his
credibility.
We disagree. The IJ properly considered the record as a whole, including both
Diallo’s oral testimony and his proffered documentary evidence, in assessing the overall
credibility of his claims. See, e.g., Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 551 n.6 (a credibility
determination may be appropriately based upon “contradictory evidence” and “inherently
improbable testimony”). Diallo has offered nothing to convince us otherwise.

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We note one minor arguable error in this regard: When the IJ found that Diallo4
failed to provide a statement from his uncle, an important witness to many of the alleged
events, the IJ considered this shortcoming in the context of Diallo’s credibility rather than
in a separate corroboration analysis. However, as we previously discussed, the IJ found at
least five other substantial inconsistencies and implausibilities, which clearly support the
adverse credibility determination. Accordingly, this single arguable error is not sufficient
to undermine the conclusion that the adverse credibility finding rests upon substantial
evidence and did not flow in “substantial part” from a failure to corroborate. See id.
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Second, in a related argument, Diallo claims that the IJ and BIA erroneously
conflated the standards for credibility and corroboration. Diallo is correct that
“corroboration and credibility, although intuitively related, are distinct concepts that
should be analyzed independently.” Obale v. Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 151, 163 (3d Cir.
2006). In this case, however, the argument is to no avail. As we have already discussed,
the IJ and BIA rejected Diallo’s claims based upon his lack of credibility. Diallo has
failed to establish that the decision “flowed in substantial part from a lack of sufficient
corroboration.” See id.4
C.
Finally, Diallo urges us to apply a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, Diallo v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 764, 765-67 (7th Cir. 2006). In that case, the IJ
failed to make a credibility finding and denied the applicant’s claim based solely upon a
lack of corroborating evidence. The Seventh Circuit held that the IJ erred in several
respects: by failing to make a credibility finding, by failing to explain why the proposed
corroboration would have been reasonable, and by failing to support the factual findings
with specific, cogent reasons. See id. at 766. Even apart from the fact that this case is not

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binding precedent in this jurisdiction, Diallo has failed to convince us that the decision is
relevant to our consideration of his claims. In this case, the IJ and BIA rejected Diallo’s
application based upon his lack of credibility, not because of a failure to provide
corroborating evidence.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
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