United States of America v. Corey Wilson

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 08-2994
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
COREY WILSON,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Crim. No. 1:06-cr-00018-001)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 29, 2010
Before: RENDELL and JORDAN, Circuit Judges,
and PRATTER,* District Judge
(Filed: March 4, 2010)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
__________________
* Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter, Judge of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

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PER CURIAM
Corey Wilson appeals from the District Court’s judgment of conviction and
sentence. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
In February 2006, a federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging
Wilson with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). On October 10, 2007, Wilson entered into a plea agreement
with the Government, agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for a reduction in his offense
level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The agreement also stated that if the Government,
“in its sole discretion,” determined that Wilson had “provided substantial and truthful
assistance in an investigation or prosecution,” the Government would move for a
downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. (App. at 18.)
At the change of plea hearing, held the same day the parties executed the plea
agreement, Wilson testified that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation, that
the written plea agreement accurately reflected the parties’ bargain, that no one had made
any other promises or threatened him to enter the agreement, and that he understood the
rights he was foregoing by pleading guilty. Additionally, Wilson did not take issue with
any of the underlying facts set forth by the Government. Based on this colloquy, the
District Court concluded that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.

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The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate1
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
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On June 26, 2008, the District Court held Wilson’s sentencing hearing. During the
hearing, Wilson sought to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that he had been coerced
into pleading guilty. The District Court quickly rejected this request, noting that it had
already found his plea voluntary and that it had seen “no evidence to the contrary.”
(Supp. App. at 23.)
The court then proceeded to calculate Wilson’s sentencing range under the
Guidelines, concluding that the applicable range was 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment.
The Government declined to move for a downward departure, explaining that although
Wilson had tried to assist the Government, the information he had provided was merely
“historical.” Nonetheless, the Government did recommend that Wilson be sentenced
“somewhere from the low to mid end of the guideline range.” (Id. at 34.) The District
Court ultimately did just that, sentencing Wilson to 56 months’ imprisonment, with two
years’ supervised release. This timely appeal followed.1
II.
Wilson raises four claims in support of his appeal. He first argues that the District
Court erred in “summarily” denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea. We review
this aspect of the District Court’s judgment for abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001).

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Once a district court accepts a criminal defendant’s guilty plea, he does not have
an absolute right to withdraw it. See id. Rather, he may withdraw his guilty plea only if
he shows, before the court imposes sentence, that there is a “fair and just reason” for
doing so. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2). The burden of establishing a “fair and just
reason” is substantial. United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003).
Although Wilson claimed at sentencing that his plea had been coerced, a review of
the transcript from the change of plea hearing clearly undermines this allegation. During
the District Court’s thorough colloquy, Wilson testified that the written agreement
reflected the bargain entered into by the parties, and that no one had threatened him into
pleading guilty or made any promises to him that were not contained in the written
agreement. These unequivocal statements “carry a strong presumption of verity,” see
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977), and he has not made any argument that
would undermine this presumption.
Although nearly nine months separated his plea and sentencing hearings, Wilson
did not first allege that his plea was coerced until a few days before sentencing, when he
submitted a pro se filing claiming, inter alia, that “I was actually coerced into signing this
plea, but in a clandestine like manner.” (Supp. App. at 84.) That filing did not expand on
this allegation, nor did he formally move to withdraw his guilty plea; rather, he waited
until moments before the court imposed sentence to reassert this conclusory allegation.
Under these circumstances, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting

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Wilson’s oral request to withdraw his guilty plea. Nor did the court’s refusal to postpone
sentencing to allow Wilson to file a formal motion to withdraw his plea violate due
process.
Wilson next argues that, in rendering his sentence, the District Court failed to
meaningfully consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Pursuant to § 3553(c), a
sentencing court must, at the time of sentencing, “state in open court the reasons for its
imposition of the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). This provision does not
require “a full opinion in every case.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
As the Supreme Court has explained:
[W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a
particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy
explanation. Circumstances may well make clear that the
judge rests his decision upon the Commission’s own
reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence . .
. in the typical case, and that the judge has found that the case
before him is typical. Unless a party contests the Guidelines
sentence generally under § 3553(a) . . . or argues for
departure, the judge normally need say no more.
Id. at 356-57.
In this case, neither party challenged the court’s Guidelines calculation or argued
for a sentence outside the applicable Guidelines range. In recommending a sentence
within the applicable range, the Government addressed the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and
Wilson did not take issue with the Government’s proffer. Before rendering sentence, the
District Court noted that Wilson had a “fair[ly] substantial” criminal history, and that he

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Wilson’s first attorney withdrew after the change of plea hearing due to a conflict of2
interest. His second attorney represented him at sentencing and withdrew shortly after
this appeal was filed. Wilson is now represented by a third attorney.
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had “decided to put [his] energies into one direction, and that’s fighting the system.”
(Supp. App. at 29, 37.) In imposing a sentence within the applicable range, the court
stated that it had considered all of the § 3553(a) factors, and that the sentence imposed
“will protect the public while meeting the additional sentencing goals of punishment and
deterrence.” (Id. at 39.) Given the very simple, straightforward nature of this case, we
conclude that the court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors.
Wilson also contends that the District Court erred in failing to review, sua sponte,
the Government’s decision declining to file a downward departure motion. We disagree.
The Government’s decision was reviewable only for “bad faith or an unconstitutional
motive.” See United States v. Huang, 178 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 1999). There was no
indication, however, nor did Wilson allege, that the Government acted in bad faith or
based its decision on an unconstitutional motive. To the contrary, the Government
provided a cogent explanation for why it did not file a downward departure motion.
Finally, Wilson argues that his two attorneys in the District Court proceedings
were ineffective. We do not reach the merits of these claims, as they are not sufficiently2
developed to warrant review on direct appeal. See United States v. Morena, 547 F.3d
191, 198 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that ineffectiveness of counsel claims are “generally not
cognizable in the first instance on direct appeal,” as such claims are more appropriately

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reserved for collateral review, which “allows for adequate factual development of the
claim[s]”). Wilson remains free to raise these claims in a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.
In light of the foregoing, we will AFFIRM the Judgment and Commitment Order
of the District Court.

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