Larry Jordan v. ALLGROUP WHEATON On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District…

081345np-pdfCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit26 août 2008

Texte intégral

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ALD-277 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-1345
___________
LARRY JORDAN,
Appellant
v.
ALLGROUP WHEATON
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 01-cv-03244)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph E. Irenas
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 21, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, FISHER and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 26, 2008 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Larry Jordan appeals pro se from the District Court’s orders denying his motions to
reopen this action and for reconsideration. We will summarily affirm. See 3d Cir. LAR

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27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
In 2001, Jordan filed a complaint alleging racial discrimination. The District Court
granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on September 4, 2002, and we
affirmed. See Jordan v. Allgroup Wheaton, C.A. No. 02-3622, 95 Fed. Appx. 462
(Table) (3d Cir. April 15, 2004).
On December 3, 2007, Jordan filed in the District Court the motion to reopen at
issue here. The motion does not contain any argument or allegation and instead merely
requests a 60-day “extension” in which to file a supporting certification. The District
Court denied the motion by order entered December 6, 2007. Jordan then filed a motion
for an “extension of time,” in which he requested an extension to file a motion for
reconsideration under Local Rule 7.1. Jordan alleged in his motion for an extension that
he required this time to subpoena records regarding “investigation from EEOC and
NLRB” but, once again, did not set forth any grounds for relief. The District Court
denied that motion by order entered December 19, 2007, and Jordan appeals.
We construe Jordan’s initial motion as one under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), and his
second motion as one under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). We review the denial of each motion
for abuse of discretion. See McDowell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 423 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir.
2005) (Rule 59(e)); Brown v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003) (Rule
60(b)). In this case, Jordan’s Rule 60 motion does not contain any allegations
whatsoever, let alone set forth grounds for relief from the District Court’s judgment.

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Jordan’s Rule 59 motion asserts that he requires time to subpoena certain records, but
does not assert why he is seeking those records only now, what he expects them to
contain, or how they might warrant reopening this action. Jordan’s filings in this Court
also fail to state any grounds that might warrant reopening this action.
Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jordan’s
motions to reopen and for reconsideration, and we will summarily affirm.

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