Sylvester Shockley v. Ronald Hosterman

074599np-pdfCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit2 avr. 2008

Texte intégral

BLD-146
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-4599
___________
SYLVESTER SHOCKLEY,
Appellant
v.
RONALD HOSTERMAN;
THOMAS CARROLL;
JOHN DOE PRISON OFFICIALS
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-00497)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
___________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 28, 2008
Before: McKEE, RENDELL and SMITH, Circuit Judges
Filed: April 2, 2008
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
PER CURIAM
Sylvester Shockley appeals from the dismissal of his civil rights lawsuit against

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several prison officials under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). For the forgoing reasons, we will
dismiss the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Shockley, an inmate at Delaware Correctional Center (“DCC”), filed a complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights when he was
removed from his position with the Braille Program at the DCC. According to the
complaint, in January 2006, prison officers conducted a “shakedown” in the Braille
Program room, whereby they found unauthorized items. Prison officials issued a
disciplinary report to Shockley because they found an open razor blade in his work area,
and as a result of the charges, officials suspended Shockley from the program. After a
hearing, a disciplinary officer found Shockley not guilty of the charges, and he was
reinstated to the program. Weeks later, however, defendants Ronald Hosterman and/or
the so-called “John Doe Prison Officials” ordered that Shockley be suspended from the
program pending reclassification. Although a classification committee approved
Shockley’s return to the Braille Program, Shockley was ultimately reclassified out of the
program and he was informed that he would not be returning to the program. Shockley
contends that Defendant Thomas Carroll ignored his objections to the reclassification,
and that he only received a statement in June 2007 from the deputy warden simply telling
him that he would not be returning to the Braille Program. Based on these events,
Shockley alleges violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as well as
retaliation by prison officials.

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One fact not included in this prior suit was the description of a June 2007 response1
from the deputy warden.
We interpret the District Court’s dismissal “without prejudice” to mean that the2
dismissal was without prejudice to Shockley’s filing a paid complaint. See Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992).
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Shockley originally filed suit on these essential facts in April 2007 against1
Hosterman and Carroll. After screening the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the
District Court dismissed it without prejudice because it was frivolous and because none of
Shockley’s claims stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court further2
found that amendment of the complaint would be futile. Shockley did not appeal from
that order. Instead, he filed the instant complaint in August 2007, adding the John Doe
Prison Officials as defendants and supplementing the facts with a description of the June
2007 response from the deputy warden. The District Court dismissed the new complaint
as frivolous or malicious because it echoed the prior complaint that had been dismissed.
Shockley filed a motion to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) in which he maintained that the facts and claims of the new complaint
differed from the prior one he filed. The District Court denied the motion, again stating
that the instant complaint duplicated the previous one that had been dismissed for
frivolousness and failure to state a claim. Shockley filed this appeal.
Because Shockley is proceeding in forma pauperis, we must analyze his appeal for
possible dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that statute, we must
dismiss an appeal if it lacks arguable merit in fact or law. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490

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U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
We agree with the District Court that the recent complaint is barred under the
principles of res judicata. A dismissal under the in forma pauperis statute for
frivolousness carries preclusive effect for purposes of any future in forma
pauperis actions. See Cieszkowska v. Gray Line New York, 295 F.3d 204, 205-06 (2d
Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992) (dismissal
under § 1915(e) “could . . . have a res judicata effect on frivolousness determinations for
future in forma pauperis petitions”)). Shockley’s latest complaint is clearly based upon
the same transactions and occurrences at the center of his previous complaint: his
reclassification and removal from his work assignment and the institution’s response to
his protestations. His recent legal claims do not differ in any significant way from his
prior claims. Furthermore, his attempt to add John Doe Prison Officials to the other
defendants he named before does not change this conclusion because they are all prison
officials in privity with one another. See Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 194 (3d
Cir. 1999) (doctrine prohibits successive suits against the same defendants and those in
privity with them based on the same underlying events). Shockley’s second lawsuit, filed
after the court adjudged the first to be frivolous, lacked arguable merit in fact or law
because it was barred under the principles of res judicata as announced in Denton.
Likewise, his appeal from that second dismissal also lacks any arguable merit in fact or
law.

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We will dismiss the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

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