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DLD-64 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-3315
___________
TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR DOLLARS
($28,004.00), C/O JAMIE BROWN
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; OFFICE
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL
JAMIE BROWN,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-00053)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 29, 2007
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES and ROTH, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed: April 2, 2008
OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Jamie Brown, proceeding pro se, filed this action in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and the Office of the Pennsylvania Attorney General. He asserted that the
District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345 & 1355, which provide the
United States District Courts with original jurisdiction over actions commenced by the
United States and forfeiture proceedings initiated under an Act of Congress. Brown
alleged that defendants violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to forfeiture
proceedings in which he was forced to represent himself and which he was unable to
appeal. Specifically, Brown argued that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred in
denying his petition for allowance of appeal and that the Commonwealth Court erred in
dismissing his appeal on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of his claims.
He also made numerous arguments regarding the conduct of the forfeiture proceedings,
among them that the property subjected to forfeiture was discovered by virtue of an
unconstitutional search and was therefore inadmissible, that the trial court erred in
permitting counsel to withdraw from representing him, in failing to subpoena a key
witness and in denying his motion for a continuance, that he was denied his right to a jury
trial, and that the evidence was insufficient to support forfeiture. He sought an order
reversing the Court of Common Pleas’ forfeiture order and/or the Commonwealth Court’s
order dismissing his appeal.
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The District Court actually dismissed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d),1
which was the precursor to § 1915(e)(2)(B).
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The District Court dismissed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),1
holding that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it was without subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate Brown’s claims against defendants, because to do so would be
to exercise “jurisdiction over claims that were actually litigated or ‘inextricably
intertwined’ with adjudication by a state’s courts.” Parkview Assocs. P’ship v. City of
Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 2000); see also ITT Corp. v. Intelnet Int’l Corp., 366
F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2004). A federal claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a state
court claim if “‘federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court
was wrong.’” Parkview, 225 F.3d at 325 (quoting Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1430
(3d Cir. 1989)).
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because
Appellant has been granted in forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we
review this appeal for possible dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An
appeal must be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B) if it has no arguable basis in law or fact.
See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
The District Court properly determined that it was without subject matter
jurisdiction over Brown’s allegations regarding the forfeiture of his property, as any grant
of relief would “render [the state court] judgment ineffectual.” FOCUS v. Allegheny
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County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996). In fact, this is
specifically the relief Brown requests in his complaint: “an order dismissing the lower
court’s forfeiture order and/or the lower court’s order dismissing appeal.”
For the foregoing reasons, Brown’s appeal is without legal merit and will be
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Brown’s motion for the appointment of
counsel is denied.
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