in Re: Gabriel G. Atamian, Md, Msee, Jd v. Gomez, 189 F.3d 1239, 1243 10th Cir. 1999 rejecting challenge to informal rotating…

ALD-328 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 07-3247
________________
IN RE: GABRIEL G. ATAMIAN, MD, MSEE, JD,
Petitioner
____________________________________
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware
(Related to D. Del. Civ. No. 07-cv-00355)
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
August 2, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES AND COWEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Filed August 21, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Gabriel G. Atamian, an attorney proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of
mandamus compelling the reassignment of his pending bankruptcy appeal from the
Honorable Sue L. Robinson to another District Judge selected at random. Mandamus is
an “extraordinary remedy” that we have discretion to award only when a petitioner
demonstrates, among other things, a “clear and indisputable” right to relief. In re

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Atamian appears to rely on an amendment to § 137 proposed by a bill entitled the1
Blind Justice Act of 1999, S.1484, 106th Cong. (1999) (as referred to S. Comm. on the
Judiciary Aug. 4, 1999). The legislation proposed by that bill has not been enacted.
2
Pressman-Gutman Co., 459 F.3d 383, 398-99 (3d Cir. 2006). For the reasons that follow,
Atamian has no such right here, and we will deny the petition.
Since 1995, Atamian has filed nine actions in the United States District Court for
the District of Delaware. Each of these actions has been assigned to Judge Robinson.
Atamian challenges Judge Robinson’s assignment to his most recently-filed action. His
sole argument is that Judge Robinson’s assignment is in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 137,
which he contends requires that judicial case assignments be made at random. That
statute, however, does not require any particular method of case assignment:
The business of a court having more than one judge shall be divided among the
judges as provided by the rules and orders of the court. The chief judge of the
district court shall be responsible for the observance of such rules and orders, and
shall divide the business and assign the cases so far as such rules and orders do not
otherwise prescribe.
28 U.S.C. § 137. As other Courts of Appeals have recognized, this statute “vests the1
district court with broad discretion in assigning court business to individual judges,” and
does not require the formal adoption of any particular assignment procedure. United
States v. Gomez, 189 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting challenge to informal
rotating assignment system). Whether considered under this statute or under principles of
due process, litigants “do[] not have a right to have [their] case heard by a particular
judge,” have “no right to any particular procedure for the selection of the judge,” and

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The District Court does not appear to have formalized its case assignment procedure.2
Cf. D. Del. LR 40.1(a). Before filing his petition, Atamian requested that Chief Judge
Gregory M. Sleet reassign his bankruptcy appeal. Chief Judge Sleet responded by letter
that the District Court generally uses a random selection process, but that certain specific
assignments are made in the interests of efficiency when, for example, a particular judge
already is familiar with a party, which Chief Judge Sleet explained appeared to have
happened here. Atamian argues that his bankruptcy appeal is not “related” to his other
actions but, even assuming that were true, Atamian has failed to point to any requirement
that non-related cases be assigned at random.
3
“do[] not enjoy the right to have the judge selected by a random draw.” United States v.
Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1256 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (collecting cases).
Atamian has not raised any legitimate challenge to the District Court’s exercise of
discretion here. He does not allege that Judge Robinson harbors any potential bias that
might reasonably call her impartiality into question. Cf. 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 & 455. Nor
does he argue that the case assignment procedure has been manipulated or that Judge
Robinson’s assignment has been made for an improper purpose. Cf. Cruz v. Abbate, 812
F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987). Atamian also does not claim that the assignment of Judge
Robinson violates any local rule or standing order.2
In sum, Atamian has come forward with no basis to challenge the District Court’s
exercise of its broad discretion to make judicial case assignments, and thus has no “clear
and indisputable right” to reassignment by random selection here. Accordingly, his
petition will be denied.

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