Carlos Blanco; Luz Lopez; Juan David Blanco; Jose Blanco v. Attorney General of the United States

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 07-3200
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CARLOS BLANCO; LUZ LOPEZ; JUAN DAVID BLANCO; JOSE BLANCO,
Petitioners,
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
Respondents,
______________________________
On Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Immigration Judge: Honorable Henry S. Dogin
(Nos. A72-375-960, A72-375-961, A72-375-962, A72-375-963)
______________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 14, 2008
Before: Chief Judge SCIRICA, FUENTES and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed May 20, 2008)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Carlos Blanco (“Blanco”), his wife Luz Lopez, and their children Juan David
Blanco and Jose Blanco, petition for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”), affirming the denial by the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) of their

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Lopez’s and the children’s applications are based on Blanco’s claims of past1
persecution.
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application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). Blanco testified before the IJ that he feared returning to Colombia because of
his past experiences with FARC guerillas. Blanco also testified that he feared returning
to Colombia because he would be persecuted for his past political activities. The IJ,
finding that Blanco’s experiences did not constitute persecution, denied Petitioners’
application. The BIA affirmed and adopted the IJ’s decision.1
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We uphold the BIA’s
determinations if they are supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on
the record considered as a whole. Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 197 (3d Cir.
2008). Where the BIA substantially adopts the findings of the IJ, we review the decisions
of both the IJ and the BIA. He Chun Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).
To obtain withholding of removal, the Petitioners must demonstrate a clear
probability that their lives or freedom would be threatened in Colombia on account of
their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Romanishyn v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 175, 178 n.1 (3d
Cir. 2006). The Petitioners can be eligible for withholding of removal under the CAT if
they show that it is more likely than not that they would be tortured upon return to their
country. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c).

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According to Blanco, the FARC believed that teachers were spies for the2
Colombian government.
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We agree with the IJ and the BIA that Petitioners failed to establish past
persecution; thus they are not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of future persecution.
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b); Gabuyina v. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2006).
Blanco testified that in 1985, while he was a teacher in a village in Colombia, his assistant
teacher was killed by FARC guerillas. The family then moved to Filandia in the2
province of Quindio, where Blanco became active in the now defunct Patriotic Union
political party and unsuccessfully ran for mayor. Blanco claimed that he received threats
from members of the victorious Conservative political party after the election. One year
later, in 1991, unidentified assailants fired gunshots at his house. Shortly thereafter,
Blanco immigrated to the United States. Blanco claimed that the shooting was motivated
by his activities on behalf of the Patriotic Union.
We agree with the IJ and the BIA that these incidents do not rise to the level of
persecution. As we have previously stated, persecution is limited to “threats to life,
confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to
life or freedom.” Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993). Blanco acknowledged
that he was not harmed, or even present when his co-worker was killed. The death of
Blanco’s co-worker is a tragic event; however, we fail to see how it constituted a threat to
Blanco’s life or freedom. Moreover, while Blanco resigned his teaching position after his

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co-worker’s death, he was able to maintain his membership in the teachers’ union and he
obtained a position working for his father. Finally, Petitioners’ fear of future persecution
based on this incident is dubious since they remained in Colombia for six years following
the incident without any further encounters with the FARC. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(1)(i)(B) (stating that the Government can rebut the presumption of a well-
founded fear arising from a showing of past persecution by proving that “[t]he applicant
could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of
nationality”).
Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that the 1991 shooting
was an isolated incident of random violence that falls short of persecution. See, e.g,
Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 494 (3d Cir. 2001). Blanco alleged that the shooting
was perpetrated by government forces dressed in civilian clothing. Blanco, however, did
not see the shooters, presented no evidence to substantiate his belief that the perpetrators
were government agents and acknowledged that the police never determined who was
responsible for the shooting.
We also agree with the IJ that Blanco’s 15 year old unsuccessful mayoral
candidacy is insufficient to show that Petitioners would “more likely than not” be tortured
if they returned to Colombia. Further, the IJ properly determined that Petitioners’ fear of
torture is undercut by the fact that Lopez and the children returned to Quindio for six
weeks in 1995 without suffering any harm. Therefore, the IJ and BIA also justifiably

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denied Petitioners’ application for protection under CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).
For the above-stated reasons, we will deny the petition for review.

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