07-3209 Adam Goodmann v. Hasbrouck Heights School District

Hon. Arthur L. Alarcón, Senior Judge, United States*
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 06-3676, 07-3209
ADAM GOODMANN,
Appellant
v.
HASBROUCK HEIGHTS SCHOOL DISTRICT;
ALAN C. STEPHENS,
Deputy, NJ Attorney General’s Office
v.
ARTHUR GOODMANN,
Third-Party Defendant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 04-cv-05861)
District Judge: Hon. Joel A. Pisano
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 18, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and ALARCÓN , Circuit Judges*
(Filed: April 21, 2008)

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OPINION
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
I.
Because we write principally for the parties, we provide only those facts relevant
to our disposition.
Appellant Adam Goodmann was hired as a chemistry teacher in Hasbrouck
Heights School District (“School District”) pursuant to an employment contract dated
July 25, 2002. It provided that Goodman would teach from September 1, 2002 through
June 30, 2003, and that either party could terminate the contract upon sixty days written
notice.
In November 2002, Principal Peter O’Hare told Goodmann that he needed to
improve his teaching performance, including classroom management skills, connecting
with students, and questioning techniques. In February 2003, O’Hare observed
Goodmann in the classroom over three days and wrote an evaluation deeming
Goodmann’s overall teaching “Unsatisfactory.” App. at 69. Goodmann disputed the
evaluation and submitted a written response. He met with O’Hare on March 18, 2003 to
discuss the evaluation.
There is a disputed issue of fact concerning what occurred at the March 18th

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meeting. Goodmann testified at his deposition that O’Hare fired him, stating that March
19 would be Goodmann’s last day. O’Hare testified that he told Goodmann that if his
performance did not improve, Goodmann would not be hired back the following year, not
that he was being fired immediately. Goodmann taught all of his classes on March 19,
but he did not return to school after that.
Both O’Hare and the School District Superintendent, Joseph Luongo, tried to reach
Goodmann by phone, but Goodmann’s father answered the phone and stated that
Goodmann could not come to the phone. The parties dispute what transpired on the
phone between Luongo and Goodmann’s father. Luongo testified that he told
Goodmann’s father that Goodmann could return to school to teach. On the other hand,
Goodmann’s father stated that Luongo said Goodmann had two choices – be fired or
resign – and that it would look better for his record if he resigned. Goodmann’s father
then crafted a resignation letter purporting to be from Goodmann and sent it to Luongo
via email. Goodmann later stated that he had not authorized the letter and did not know it
had been sent. At the meeting of the Board of Education on March 27, 2003, the Board
approved Goodmann’s resignation.
On November 30, 2004, Goodmann filed suit in federal court against the School
District and Deputy Attorney General Alan Stephens, alleging that he was terminated
without proper notice and an opportunity to be heard, which injured him because his
teaching certification was provisional and he needed to complete a training program to

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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1
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become completely certified. He also alleged that Stephens made false and misleading
representations in the state court proceedings related to litigation over Goodmann’s
unemployment benefits, in violation of his right to due process. Goodmann’s complaint
contained several state law allegations, including breach of contract and wrongful
discharge.
During the proceedings in the District Court, the parties had a discovery dispute
about whether Goodmann had to disclose certain medical records to justify a period of
absence in February 2003. When the District Court ordered them disclosed, Goodmann
filed a motion for a temporary restraining order followed by a motion for a preliminary
injunction, both of which the Court denied. Goodmann immediately appealed those
orders, but the District Court granted summary judgment to the School District and
Stephens on June 25, 2007, from which Goodman also appealed. The District Court held
that Goodmann did not have a property interest in his job, and therefore could not state a
claim for a procedural due process violation. In addition, it held that Goodmann had not
properly served Stephens, nor had he shown good cause for failing to do so; thus, the
Court dismissed the claim against Stephens. The District Court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
The appeals were consolidated.1

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II.
We have plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.
Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 303 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006). We will affirm a grant of
summary judgment if there are no issues of disputed material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir.
2005).
III.
In order to state a claim for a violation of procedural due process rights, a plaintiff
must, as a threshold matter, allege that s/he was deprived of a “cognizable liberty or
property interest. . . .” Mudric v. Attorney Gen., 469 F.3d 94, 98 (3d Cir. 2006). The
question in this case is whether Goodmann has a legitimate claim of entitlement to his
teaching job. See Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 205 (3d Cir. 2007). What
constitutes an entitlement is defined by an independent source, such as state law rules or
understandings. Id.
New Jersey law provides that tenured teachers may be terminated for cause only,
see N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10, but Goodmann was not a tenured teacher. As a non-tenured
teacher, the source of Goodmann’s claim to entitlement, if any, is the employment
contract. The employment contract, however, provides that the contract may be
terminated by either party for any reason, i.e., an at-will arrangement. An at-will
employment contract does not create a protected property interest in one’s job. See

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Unger v. Nat’l Residents Matching Program, 928 F.2d 1392, 1397 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)) (recognizing that a non-tenured
teacher’s employment contract with the state does not create a protected property
interest).
Although the contractual requirement of sixty days written notice prior to
termination may provide the basis for a state law breach of contract claim against the
School District, it does not bear upon the question whether Goodmann has a protected
property interest in his job. Neither does the fact that Goodmann was not yet fully
certified to teach give him an entitlement to his position because he cites nothing that
could be a viable source of such an entitlement.
Because Goodmann had no legitimate claim of entitlement to his teaching job and
thus no protected property interest, his procedural due process claim fails as a matter of
law.
With respect to the due process claim against Stephens, we agree with the District
Court’s analysis concluding that Goodmann failed to properly serve Stephens.
Goodmann did not serve Stephens personally, did not leave a copy of the complaint at
Stephen’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with a suitable person, and did not
deliver the complaint to an authorized agent; therefore, he did not meet the requirements
for proper service under Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule
4(e)(1), however, provides that service is proper if effected in accordance with state law,

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Under the constructive service provision of New Jersey2
Court Rule 4:4-4(b), in addition to submitting an affidavit swearing
to diligent efforts in attempting to serve the complaint, a plaintiff
must also send a copy of the complaint and summons by registered
or certified mail, return receipt requested, as well as by ordinary
mail, to the asserted defendant’s dwelling house or usual place of
abode.
The District Court also ruled that because Goodman had3
not prosecuted his case and never sought a default judgment
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in this case, New Jersey Court Rule 4:4-4. That rule provides for the same methods of
service as Federal Rule 4, which, as discussed above, Goodmann did not meet, but it also
provides for “substituted or constructive” service when a plaintiff can show by affidavit
that personal service could not be made despite diligent effort. See N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b).
In order to trigger that provision, the plaintiff must also show that s/he served the
complaint by a method of alternative service, such as registered or certified mail.
Although Goodmann submitted an affidavit stating that several attempts were made to
personally serve Stephens, he did not show that he served the complaint by an appropriate
means of alternative service. Goodmann argues that a person named G. Jackson of the
New Jersey Statehouse “received and signed for the Plaintiff’s letter enclosing the
summons and a copy of the complaint,” Appellant’s Br. at 10, but there is no evidence
that G. Jackson was Stephens’ authorized agent, or that such an attempt at service
otherwise qualified under any of the alternative service provisions of either federal or
state rules of service. Thus, the District Court did not err by dismissing Goodmann’s2
claim against Stephens pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3

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against Stephens, the claim should be dismissed under Rule 41(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute.
We express no view regarding that aspect of the ruling because the
service issue is dispositive. 8
Finally, Goodmann claims that the District Court erred by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. That contention fails. Under United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966), district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction when all federal claims have been dismissed. See also
Markowitz v. Ne. Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 106 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that “once all
claims with an independent basis of federal jurisdiction have been dismissed the case no
longer belongs in federal court”). Thus, the District Court did not err in declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Goodmann’s state law claims.
IV.
For the above-stated reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court
granting summary judgment to the School District, dismissing the claim against Stephens,
and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. In light of our decision, Goodmann’s
appeal from the District Court’s order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction is
moot.

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