United States of America v. William Thorne, a/k/a GLOVE William Thorne

The Honorable Paul S. Diamond, United States District Judge for the Eastern District*
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-3312
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WILLIAM THORNE,
a/k/a
G LOVE
William Thorne, Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.N.J. Crim. No. 06-cr-156)
District Judge: The Honorable Joel A. Pisano
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 30, 2007
Before: BARRY, FUENTES, Circuit Judges, and DIAMOND, District Judge*
(Opinion Filed: January 28, 2008)
OPINION

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DIAMOND, District Court Judge
William Thorne appeals the sentence imposed on him by the New Jersey District
Court following his eighth felony drug conviction. We affirm.
I.
On March 3, 2006, Thorne pleaded guilty to distribution and possession with intent
to distribute approximately twenty-six grams of crack cocaine. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Because this was Thorne’s eighth such conviction, the District Court designated him a
career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, with a base offense level of 34.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)(B). The Court then decreased that level by three points -- to 31 --
for acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Thorne’s criminal history category
was VI, and his advisory Guidelines sentence ranged between 188 to 235 months. On
June 28, 2006, the District Court sentenced Thorne to a term of 200 months
imprisonment. Thorne filed a timely notice of appeal from that sentence.
Thorne contends that: 1) his classification as a career offender resulted in a
Guidelines calculation that was excessive; 2) the District Court erred in refusing to
consider the disparity between the Guidelines’ treatment of crack cocaine and powder
cocaine; 3) the District Court failed to give “meaningful consideration” to the factors set
out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
II
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review

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Thorne’s sentence for reasonableness. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261
(2005); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 2006).
III
The Guidelines require a defendant’s classification as a career offender if at the
time he committed the subject offense he was at least eighteen years old, the offense was
a felony involving either violence or a controlled substance, and the defendant had at least
two prior felony convictions involving violence or a controlled substance. U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1(a).
It is undisputed that Thorne meets these criteria. He was forty at the time of his
guilty plea in this case -- his eighth felony drug conviction. The District Court thus
properly calculated Thorne’s sentence according to the career offender provision of the
Guidelines. Thorne contends that the “shortcomings of the career offender provision”
resulted in an inappropriate Guidelines calculation. (Appellant’s Br. 14.) Thorne does
not elaborate on what he believes those “shortcomings” may be, nor are they apparent to
us. Accordingly, we cannot say that Thorne’s Guidelines calculation was inappropriate.
IV
Also meritless is Thorne’s contention that the District Court improperly refused to
consider the Guidelines’ disparate treatment of crack cocaine and cocaine. First, the
contention is beside the point. Thorne’s Guidelines sentence was determined by his

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designation as a career offender, not by his possession of crack cocaine. In any event, the
record demonstrates that the District Court recognized its “discretion not to sentence in
accordance with the guidelines.” (A35.) See United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 248-
49 (3d Cir. 2006) (district courts may consider disparity between the Guidelines treatment
of crack cocaine and cocaine as a factor in the sentencing process); see also Kimbrough v.
United States, No. 06-6330, __ S.Ct. __ 2007 WL 4292040, at *5 (U.S. December 10,
2007).
V
Finally, we conclude that the District Court properly considered the factors set out
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In Gunter, we set out the post-Booker procedures that district
courts must follow when imposing sentence. 462 F.3d at 247. Although Thorne’s
sentencing preceded by three months our decision in Gunter, the District Court
nonetheless followed appropriate procedures. The Court first calculated the advisory
Guidelines sentence. (A35.) The Court did not consider Guidelines departure motions
because none were filed. (A35.) Finally, the Court considered variances from the
Guidelines in accordance with the factors set out in § 3553(a).
The Court first considered the nature and circumstances of Thorne’s crime and his
history and characteristics. See § 3553(a)(1). It described the offense as a “garden
variety distribution of 26 grams of crack cocaine by a defendant . . . who has
demonstrated a history through his entire life of being a drug dealer.” (A35-36.)

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Pursuant to § 3553(a)(2), the Court emphasized that this offense was Thorne’s eighth
felony drug conviction, and that “seven other sentences have done nothing to deter him
from further criminal conduct.” (A36-37.) The Court also recognized the need to
“protect the community from Thorne” and his continual drug dealing. (A37.) Given Mr.
Thorne’s age and circumstances, the Court determined that Thorne did not need any
special educational or vocational training. (A37-38.) Pursuant to § 3553(a)(3), the Court
then considered the kinds of sentences available, and ruled (correctly, in our view) that
the Guidelines’ career offender provision applied to Thorne. (A38.) Finally, the Court
discussed Thorne’s personal characteristics, such as his role as a father, and the support
he received from his fiancee and daughter. (A39.)
Having applied these criteria to Thorne, the District Court imposed a sentence of
200 months incarceration. Thorne protests that the Court’s § 3553(a) analysis was
impermissibly “abbreviated.” (Appellant’s Br. 42.) We have held, however, that
sentencing courts need not engage in extended disquisitions respecting the § 3553(a)
factors to give them “meaningful consideration.” United States v. Vargas, 477 F. 3d 94,
101 (3d Cir. 2007). Rather, we require only that “ ‘the record makes clear the court took
the factors into account in sentencing.’ ” Id. (quoting Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329). The
record confirms that the District Court adequately considered the factors set out in
§ 3553(a). Accordingly, we reject Thorne’s contention that the Court failed to give the
factors “meaningful consideration.”

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VI
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.

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