Lonnie Webber v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation

CPS-340 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-2020
________________
LONNIE WEBBER,
Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE;
BENJAMIN A. MARTINEZ; PA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; JEFFREY A. BEARD
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-01600)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 21, 2006
Before: BARRY, SMITH AND NYGAARD, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: October 2, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Lonnie Webber appeals the District Court’s order granting appellees’ motion for

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1 Webber was convicted of narcotics charges in 1991 and sentenced to four to twenty-
five and a half years in prison. He was paroled in 2000 and his parole was revoked in
2003.
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summary judgment. The procedural history of this case and the details of Webber’s
claims are well-known to the parties, set forth in the District Court’s thorough
memorandums, and need not be discussed at length. Briefly, Webber filed a civil rights
complaint against the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, its Chairman, the
Department of Corrections, and its Secretary. He alleged that he is a veteran with a
psychoneurotic disorder and was once addicted to cocaine. Webber argued that he was
entitled to placement in a community-based treatment program instead of being
imprisoned after his parole was revoked for technical violations.1 He further asserted that
the Board required him to participate in an eighteen-month residential substance abuse
treatment program despite his prior successful completion of a six-week treatment
program. He contended that the appellees’ actions violated his constitutional rights as
well as his rights under the Rehabilitation Act (RA) and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). The District Court granted the appellees’ motion to dismiss as to all of
Webber’s claims except his RA and ADA claims against the Board and its Chairman,
Benjamin Martinez. The District Court subsequently granted appellees’ motion for
summary judgment on the remaining claims. Webber filed a timely notice of appeal.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s orders granting appellees’ motions to dismiss and for summary

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2 While not dispositive of the issues on appeal, we note that according to documents
Webber has submitted on appeal, he was denied parole in October 2004, April 2005, and
April 2006. While in those decisions the Board indicated that it would consider at the
next review whether Webber had successfully completed a substance abuse treatment
program, the Board gave other reasons for its decisions including recommendations made
by the Department of Corrections, institutional misconducts, Webber’s prior history of
supervision failures, his interviews with the hearing examiners, and his minimization of
his offense.
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judgment. Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998). When
reviewing a complaint for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept the allegations in
the complaint as true. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The Court
should not dismiss a complaint unless it is clear that no relief could be granted under any
set of facts that could be proved. Id. A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if
our review reveals that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We
review the facts in a light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment
was entered. See Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d
144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993).
We agree with the District Court that Webber had no right to be placed in a
community-based treatment program for veterans instead of being imprisoned after his
parole was revoked. We further agree that appellees were entitled to summary judgment
on Webber’s claims that he was denied parole in July 2003 based on a disability or
perceived disability.2
Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the

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appeal. See Third Circuit LAR 27.4. For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by
the District Court, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See Third Circuit
I.O.P. 10.6.

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