06-1839, 06-1840, 06-1841, 06-1842, 06-1843, 06-1844, 06-1845, & 06-1846 in Re:… v. Richard S. Hentosh; Christine Smith in Re: Frederick H. Banks

DLD-121 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 06-1838, 06-1839, 06-1840, 06-1841,
06-1842, 06-1843, 06-1844, 06-1845, & 06-1846
________________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.
RICHARD S. HENTOSH;
CHRISTINE SMITH
__________________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.
AMERICAN EXPRESS
__________________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.
ACTION SOFTWARE; SAMANTHA BELFER;
U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
__________________

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IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.
101 DISTRIBUTION;
DAMON EVANS
__________________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.
REBECCA NORDTVEDT
__________________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.
STEVE RABIN
__________________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.

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TERESA COLLEEN HICKMAN
__________________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.
DON PINKAS
_________________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.
DAVE TAYLOR
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. Nos. 05-cv-00603, 05-cv-00604, 05-cv-00605, 05-cv-00606,
05-cv-00607, 05-cv-00608, 05-cv-00609, 05-cv-00610, 05-cv-00611)
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 8, 2007
BEFORE: BARRY, AMBRO and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Filed March 2, 2007)
_________________
OPINION
_________________

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The United States Attorney’s Office, a nominal party to these appeals, has filed, with1
the United States, a motion for summary affirmance in C.A. No. 06-1840. While the
United States Attorney’s Office sought to intervene in one of the underlying cases in the
District Court, and the United States tried to do the same in two of the underlying
bankruptcy actions, neither takes issue with the orders directly affecting them.
Furthermore, the order from which Banks appeals does not affect their rights.
Accordingly, they lack standing to argue the merits of the C.A. No. 06-1840 appeal.
See Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Products Co., 622 F.2d 1176, 1188 (3d Cir. 1980)
(concluding that nominal parties on appeal have no standing to defend the merits of a
decision); In re St. Clair & Karen M. St. Clair, 251 B.R. 660, 670 & n.11 (D.N.J. 2000).
We therefore deny the motion for summary affirmance in C.A. No. 06-1840.
PER CURIAM
On November 1, 2001, Frederick H. Banks filed for bankruptcy protection under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The appointed trustee in bankruptcy filed a report of
no assets. In 2005, Banks instituted many adversary actions, including the nine at issue in
these related appeals. The Bankruptcy Court, holding that it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over these adversary actions because they related only to post-petition acts
unrelated to the administration of Banks’ bankruptcy case, dismissed them. Banks
appealed to the District Court. The District Court affirmed the order dismissing the
adversary actions. Banks appeals.1
The District Court had jurisdiction to review the Bankruptcy Court’s order
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), and we have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s
order under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) & 1291. We exercise the same standard of review as the
District Court, subjecting the Bankruptcy Court’s legal determinations to plenary review
and reviewing its factual findings for clear error. See In re United Healthcare Sys., 396
F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2005).

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Although Banks took issue in the District Court with the Bankruptcy Court’s action to2
dismiss his adversary actions sua sponte, as the District Court explained, the Bankruptcy
Court was obligated to evaluate its jurisdiction and dismiss the actions over which it
lacked jurisdiction.
5
In similar appeals brought by Banks, we have visited the issues relevant to these
cases. As in those other cases, we will summarily affirm because no substantial question
is presented on appeal. See L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. For the convenience of the parties,
we set forth the reasoning most pertinent to our decision.
The Bankruptcy Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the listed adversary
actions. Two statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157, provide the source of a bankruptcy2
court’s jurisdiction. See Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 372 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir.
2004). Under these statutes, and relevant to our analysis here, a bankruptcy court has
jurisdiction over those cases “‘at least “related to” the bankruptcy.’” In re Marcus Hook
Dev. Park, Inc., 943 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). Litigation is related
to a bankruptcy if its outcome could “conceivably have any effect on the estate being
administrated in bankruptcy.” See Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.
1984); see also In re Marcus Hook Dev. Park, Inc., 943 F.2d at 264 (stressing the term
“conceivably”). More specifically, an action is related to bankruptcy if its outcome
“could alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively
or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the
bankruptcy estate.” See Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994. The listed adversary actions were
unrelated to bankruptcy because, as Banks plainly alleged in his complaints, the supposed

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wrongs occurred in 2002 and 2003, at the earliest, after he had filed for bankruptcy
protection. Accordingly, they are not property of the bankruptcy estate such that their
resolution would affect the handling or administration of the estate. See In re Bobroff,
766 F.2d 797, 803 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541 for the proposition that “the
only property interests of a debtor that become part of the estate are those existing ‘as of
the commencement of the case.’”)
In sum, because the Bankruptcy Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, we will
affirm the order insomuch as it dismissed the listed adversary actions.

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