Andi Siswanto v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA On

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________________
NO. 04-3172
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ANDI SISWANTO,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Board No. A95-153-909)
______________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 12, 2005
Before: ALITO, BECKER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 28, 2005)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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BECKER, Circuit Judge.
Andi Siswanto, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of an order

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of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)
denial of Siswanto’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We will deny the petition for review.
First, it appears that we may lack jurisdiction because Siswanto failed to file his
asylum application within one year of his arrival in the United States. Pursuant to
§ 208(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3), this
Court does not have jurisdiction to review an IJ’s determination by clear and convincing
evidence, see INA § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), that an alien failed to file his
asylum application within one year of his arrival in the United States. See Tarrawally v.
Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he language of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3)
clearly deprives us of jurisdiction to review an IJ’s determination that an asylum petition
was not filed within the one year limitations periods, and that such period was not tolled
by extraordinary circumstances.”). The IJ made such a determination here, and Siswanto
does not address this jurisdictional defect in his brief.
At all events, his petition fails on the merits. He recites a number of incidents that
occurred in Indonesia which suggest hostility on the part of the majority Muslim
population against the minority of Chinese Christians. The parties are familiar with these
incidents, and they were discussed by the IJ. Hence we need not recount them here,
though we will advert to some of them below.
The IJ concluded that Siswanto had neither established past persecution nor a well-

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founded fear of future persecution, and so was not eligible for asylum. Although
Siswanto contended that his parents’ store was robbed on the basis of mixed motive—in
part because they were Chinese—the IJ noted that Siswanto could not state whether stores
owned by other ethnic minorities, such as Indians, were exempt from robberies. The IJ
properly found that the incidents experienced by Siswanto as he was growing up, such as
being called names by Muslim young people, constituted discrimination, not persecution.
With regard to his Christianity, Siswanto testified that his parents, who remain in
Indonesia, are Christians. The IJ found no basis for a religious persecution claim,
observing that the government of Indonesia does not persecute Christians, and Siswanto’s
parents have not been harmed. The IJ also rejected Siswanto’s claims for withholding of
removal under the INA and CAT.
The IJ’s conclusions were sound. The attempts to obtain money from Siswanto’s
parents’ store were apparently the result of criminal activity. Siswanto acknowledges
this, noting that “[h]is father and uncle . . . were victims of extortion by angry Muslim
mobs.” But “ordinary criminal activity,” such as extortion and robbery, “does not rise to
the level of persecution necessary to establish eligibility for asylum.” Abdille v. Ashcroft,
242 F.3d 477, 494 (3d Cir. 2001). Concomitantly, we note that there is no allegation of
government-sponsored persecution, which, if present, could support an asylum case. And
there is no evidence of a pattern or practice of persecution against individuals of Chinese
descent in Indonesia at this time. See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530 (3d Cir. 2005).

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Clearly name-calling years ago by Muslim youths does not constitute persecution.
If Siswanto’s claims are for religious (as opposed to ethnic) persecution, they also
fail. The State Department reports that the Indonesian “Constitution provides for freedom
of religion for members of officially recognized religion [including Christianity] . . . and
the Government generally respects this right in practice . . . .” United States Department
of State, International Religious Freedom Report (2001). Moreover, the reasonableness
of a petitioner’s fear of persecution is undercut when his family remains in the native
country unharmed for a long period of time after petitioner’s departure, as is the case
here. See Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 2004) (no well-founded
fear of religious persecution where parents and siblings remained in Ukraine as practicing
Baptists and no evidence was presented that they were persecuted).
Our standard of review is extremely deferential; we must uphold the IJ’s findings
if they are “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole,” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992), and may not
reject them “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Under this standard, it is clear that the IJ’s decision
is supported by substantial evidence. Siswanto makes general allegations that the
Immigration Judge “failed to comprehend the case,” and failed to “show[] any
appreciation for the realities of life for the Chinese Christian minority in Indonesia.”
Those allegations are baseless.

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The petition for review will be denied.

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