Darrell Wayne Breighner v. JOSEPH CHESNEY, SCI-Retreat

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-1673
DARRELL WAYNE BREIGHNER,
Appellant
v.
JOSEPH CHESNEY, SCI-Retreat;
COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF DAUPHIN COUNTY;
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No.02-cv-01832)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
Argued on March 8, 2005
BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, ROTH AND FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 12, 2005 )
Robert N. Tarman, Esquire (Argued)
106 Walnut Street
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Counsel for Appellant

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James P. Barker, Esquire (Argued)
Office of District Attorney
Front & Market Streets
Dauphin County Courthouse
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Counsel for Appellees
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Darrell Breighner appeals the judgment of the District Court, denying his petition
for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons stated below, we will
affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I. Facts
Because we write only for the parties, we recount only the relevant facts. On
January 2, 1999, at approximately 7:00 p.m., the rental offices of Briarcrest Garden
apartment homes were burglarized and set on fire. Investigators determined that the
perpetrator must have been someone with access to the office and an inside knowledge of
the office policies because there was no sign of forced entry and the burglary occurred
around the first of the month, when the monthly rental checks would have been stored in
the office. Also, the accellerant used to fuel the fire was a furniture polish routinely used
by and stored in the apartment complex. Two separate witnesses reported seeing a red
pick-up truck parked in front of the office during the time leading up to the fire, and

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witnesses also reported seeing the truck driving away from the office at a high rate of
speed.
Police eventually focused their suspicion on Breighner, who was a maintenance
worker for the apartment complex and drove a red truck owned by the apartment
complex. During routine questioning, Breighner admitted to an officer that he was in
possession of the red maintenance truck the entire day of the fire. In a subsequent
conversation, Breighner changed his story after the officer informed him that a red truck
was witnessed in front of the office shortly before the fire. When pressed about the
sudden change in his story, Breighner became defensive and angry. Breighner also made
several statements to the officer about various expenses associated with his girlfriend’s
pregnancy and the need for additional money to meet his other child support obligations.
Prosecutors eventually charged Breighner with several counts of arson and
burglary, using circumstantial evidence to connect him to the crime. Breighner argued
that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed
the crime. After several days of trial in the Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, Court of
Common Pleas, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the arson and burglary charges. In a
supporting opinion, the trial court reviewed the circumstantial evidence and found
Breighner’s insufficient evidence argument to be without merit. On appeal, the Superior
Court affirmed the trial court’s verdict and indicated that a conviction for arson could be
based solely on circumstantial evidence. Breighner then filed a habeas petition under 28

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U.S.C. § 2254(d), essentially asserting that there was a lack of evidence to connect him to
the crime. After the District Court denied his petition, we granted him a certificate of
appealability.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction over Breighner’s habeas corpus petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction over the appeal by virtue of our grant
of a certificate of appealabilitiy and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s legal conclusions in a habeas proceeding, and apply a clearly
erroneous standard to factual findings in dispute. Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 191
(3d Cir. 2000).
III. Discussion
Breighner contends that the record evidence is not sufficient to convict him. His
first argument is that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the District Court erred by not
finding that the Superior Court incorrectly applied federal law as decided by the Supreme
Court. Breighner argues that the law established by the Supreme Court, which the
District Court should have applied, is correctly stated in Jackson v. Virginia: “whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
Breighner asserts that the only evidence connecting him to the crime is

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circumstantial evidence, and thus it is not enough evidence to convince a rational trier of
fact beyond a reasonable doubt that Breighner was guilty of the crimes with which he was
charged. However, as the Court later explained in Jackson, circumstantial evidence by
itself may suffice for a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 324-325. In the
present case, as set out above, there is plenty of circumstantial evidence connecting
Breighner to the crime. When evaluated as a whole, it is reasonable that a jury could find
Breighner guilty based on the record evidence, and thus it would meet the Supreme Court
standard enunciated in Jackson. Thus, the Superior Court’s decision was not contrary to,
or involving an unreasonable application of federal law, and the District Court committed
no error in finding that the Superior Court’s decision was correct. Id.
Breighner’s second argument is that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), the District
Court erred in determining that the Superior Court’s decision was reasonable in light of
the facts presented in the case. In his brief, Breighner attempts to cast doubt on the
credibility of the witnesses by highlighting a supposed discrepancy in their testimony.
However, despite the question of how much time it may have taken a witness to walk
from her apartment to a video store and back, when viewed in light of all the evidence
stated above, the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable determination of facts,
and habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2) was not warranted.

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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons state above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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