In re: Donald Short, Sr. v. Mary M . Short

1
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-2337
IN RE: DONALD SHORT, SR., DEBTOR,
Appellant
v.
MARY M . SHORT,
Appellee
____________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-00282)
District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 11, 2004
Before: NYGAARD, McKEE, and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 17, 2004)
____________
OPINION
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
The appellant is the debtor in possession in a Chapter 13 proceeding. He
seeks to set aside the sale of realty owned by him and his wife as tenants by the entireties.
The appellant’s unhappiness with the sale seemingly is caused by the bankruptcy judge’s

-- 1 of 2 --

2
refusal to issue rulings on the validity of the option used to sell the property or the
applicability of a post-nuptial agreement. Apparently, these issues have some relationship
to the appellant’s divorce proceedings in Florida.
No stay was secured before an appeal was taken to the District Court, which
dismissed the case as moot pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(m). Our explanation of the
mootness status of unstayed sales orders is set out in L.R.S.C. Co. v. Rickel Home
Centers, Inc. (In re Rickel Home Centers, Inc.), 209 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2000) and Krebs
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490 (3d Cir. 1998). In Krebs,
we said, “there are two prerequisites for section 363(m) ‘statutory’ mootness: (1) the
underlying sale or lease was not stayed pending the appeal, and (2) the court, if reversing
or modifying the authorization to sell or lease, would be affecting the validity of such a
sale or lease.” Id. at 499.
The case before us satisfies both requirements and accordingly, the appeal
will be dismissed.

-- 2 of 2 --