Frank Taylor v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY On Appeal from the United States District Court for…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 02-3750
FRANK TAYLOR,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Court Judge: The Honorable John C. Lifland
(D.C. Civil No. 01-cv-01147)
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 7, 2003
Before: ROTH, BARRY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: March 19, 2003)
OPINION OF THE COURT
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Frank Taylor ("Taylor") appeals an Order of the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey, upholding the decision of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration ("Commissioner") that Taylor was no longer entitled to
disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act as of October 31,
1995. Taylor contends that the District Court erred in concluding that the ALJ’s findings
were supported by substantial evidence.
The District Court exercised jurisdiction over Taylor’s request for review of the
Commissioner’s denial of benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 405(g). Because the District
Court’s Order was a final judgment that disposed of all of the Parties’ claims, we exercise
jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291.
We review de novo the issue of whether the Commissioner’s denial of benefits was
supported by substantial evidence. See Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir.
1999) (stating that "[t]he role of this Court is identical to that of the District Court,
namely to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s
decision.") Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or significant amount of
evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

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adequate to support a conclusion." Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)
(citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)). "We will not set aside the
Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if we would have
decided the factual inquiry differently." Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 360 (citations omitted).
After a careful review of the record and the Parties’ arguments, we find no basis
for disturbing the District Court’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion. Taylor argues to
this Court that the ALJ violated the Cotter doctrine, which requires the ALJ to set forth
the factual findings, including both accepted and rejected evidence, on which his or her
decision is based. See Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705-06 (3d Cir. 1981). Taylor
raised this same argument before the District Court. After conducting a comprehensive
analysis of the evidence in the record, the District Court concluded that the ALJ properly
relied on the reports of the physicians who examined Taylor and that the ALJ’s decision
was supported by substantial evidence. We agree with the District Court that the ALJ
properly considered the physicians reports and adequately set forth the basis for his
decision. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment for substantially the same reasons set
forth in the record.
_____________________________
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
Kindly file the foregoing Opinion.
/s/ Julio M. Fuentes
Circuit Judg

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