Andrew Rapp, Executor of the Estate of John E. Rapp, Deceased v. THE CITY OF EASTON; SCOTT C. CAMERON Scott C. Cameron

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 02-1607
ANDREW RAPP, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF
JOHN E. RAPP, DECEASED
v.
THE CITY OF EASTON;
SCOTT C. CAMERON
Scott C. Cameron,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 00-cv-01376)
Magistrate Judge: Hon. Thomas J. Rueter
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 2, 2003
Before: SLOVITER, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 17, 2003)
OPINION OF THE COURT

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1 The parties consented to trial before Magistrate Judge Thomas J. Rueter pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). We therefore refer to the relevant order as entered by the District
Court.
2
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
I.
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant Scott C. Cameron, a police officer with the City of Easton at the relevant
time, shot and killed John E. Rapp in the course of his employment. Cameron pled guilty
to involuntary manslaughter. Thereafter, Andrew Rapp (“Rapp”), the executor for the
Estate of John Rapp, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Cameron
violated his constitutional rights by the use of excessive force. Rapp also sued the City of
Easton for failure to properly train but voluntarily dismissed that claim before trial. The
jury returned a verdict for Rapp and against Cameron in the amount of $472,955.
Cameron does not challenge that award on this appeal. Instead, this appeal is limited to
the issue of attorney’s fees which Rapp sought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Rapp requested fees and expenses for nine lawyers and one paralegal. After
consideration of the objections, the District Court granted in part and denied in part
Rapp’s motion for attorney’s fees, awarding three law firms a total of $163,218.35.
Cameron appeals, contending that the District Court erred or abused its discretion in the
amount of fees awarded.1 He does not contest the findings as to the correct billing rates
of Rapp’s attorneys. We have jurisdiction over the final decision awarding fees. 28

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3
U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Legal Principles
In a § 1983 action, a successful plaintiff may recover “reasonable” attorney’s fees,
reasonable in time expended and rate. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 568
(1986); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990). We review an award
of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. Rode, 892 F.2d at 1182 (citing Institutionalized
Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 909 n.21 (3d Cir. 1985)). The
Supreme Court has noted that a highly deferential standard “is appropriate in view of the
district court’s superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding
frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.” Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). On the other hand, “Whether the district court applied the
proper standards or procedures is a question of law subject to plenary review.” Rode, 892
F.2d at 1182 (citing Student Public Interest Research Group v. AT&T Bell Laboratories,
842 F.2d 1436, 1442 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988)).
We have stated that the prevailing party’s fee application should document “some
fairly definite information as to the hours devoted to various general activities,” enabling
the court to determine if the hours are reasonable. Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 713 F.2d 972,
978 (3d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).

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B. Failure to Keep Contemporaneous Time Records
Cameron’s principal contention is that Rapp’s counsel failed to provide proper
evidence of hours worked. Rapp concedes that his attorneys did not keep
contemporaneous records and that the hours for six of the attorneys were reconstructed.
The District Court accepted counsel’s explanation that they did not keep such records
because they usually work on a contingency fee basis. However, the District Court
decided that the reconstructed records were “sufficiently detailed to permit the defendant
to challenge specific items” and “to permit this court to make a thoughtful determination
as to the reasonableness of the services performed.” App. at 327. The court
“scrutinize[d] them carefully,” and denied the plaintiff’s request for payment on multiple
entries for each lawyer and the paralegal. App. at 327-33. The trial court also found that
Rapp did not offer evidence to support the reasonableness of the hourly billing rates of
eight of the nine attorneys and the paralegal. As a result, the court reduced the billing
rates of four of the attorneys and the paralegal by twenty-five percent and reduced the
billing rates of four other attorneys by fifty percent.
The District Court also reduced the hours for five of the nine attorneys and the
paralegal because they were either vague, unnecessary, unrelated, excessive or
duplicative. Of the attorneys, the District Court reduced W illiams’s hours from 37.60, to
16.90, Swartz’s hours from 53.20 to 30.20, Cohen’s hours from 296.35 to 286.70 (pre-
judgment) and 12.00 to 9.00 (post-judgment), Rambo’s hours from 39.80 to 37.60, and

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Baldo’s from 154.80 to 153.20 (pre-judgment). The court did not change the hours of
attorneys Seighman, Baldo (post-judgment), Pulcini, and Ryan, but decreased the
paralegal’s hours from 178.20 to 142.30 (pre-judgment) and from 30.00 to 25.00 (post-
judgment). Because the District Court followed the appropriate procedures in assessing
reasonable attorney’s fees, its decision will only be overturned for abuse of discretion. It
is apparent that the District Court scrutinized the fee application and reduced the hours
and rates claimed where it deemed appropriate. We will not disturb that calculation.
C. Time Spent on Dismissed Claim
Cameron contends that Rapp is not entitled to recover legal fees and expenses
associated with Rapp’s claim against the City of Easton for failure to train. The Supreme
Court has stated: “If . . . a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the
product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable
hourly rate may be an excessive amount.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. However, the
failure of some related claims does not mandate a reduction in awards. See West Virginia
Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 898 F.2d 357, 361 (3d Cir. 1990). In this case, the trial court
considered the issue and found that Rapp’s successful claim was “intertwined” with the
failure to train claim and that “the information obtained from the City was integral in the
case against Defendant Cameron.” App. at 308-09. It therefore properly analyzed the
issue and, because the law does not mandate a reduction of the award if some of the
claims are unsuccessful under these circumstances, the decision fell within its discretion.

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Cameron also argues that the District Court improperly included in the fee award
hours associated with the action brought by Rapp’s divorced wife on behalf of his
daughter. Cameron points in particular to fees awarded to Cohen, who handled that
action before it was voluntarily dismissed. In its opinion the District Court stated that it
had made “a thorough and careful review of the time entries of the Cohen Firm
Attorneys” and its calculation shows that it deducted hours because they were unrelated,
vague, excessive or unnecessary. App. at 331. Once again, we will not disturb that
calculation.
III.
CONCLUSION
Although Rapp’s attorneys’ failure to contemporaneously document their hours
was imprudent, the District Court acted within its discretion when it awarded attorney’s
fees. For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the order granting attorney’s fees.
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Dolores K. Sloviter
Circuit Judge

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