United States of America v. Lestroy Bright

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 02-1190, 02-1193, 02-1215
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
LESTROY BRIGHT,
Appellant No. 01-1190
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
BRYAN FELIX,
Appellant No. 02-1193
______________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
REMY AUGUSTIN,
Appellant No. 02-1215
ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
(Dist. Court No. 00-cr-0004-1)
District Court Judge: Honorable Raymond L. Finch

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Argued: November 13, 2002
Before: SCIRICA, ALITO, RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: December 16, 2002)
Ronald E. Russell
116 Queen Cross Street, Frederiksted
St. Croix, V.I. 00840
Counsel for Appellant Bright
Martial A. Webster
116 Queen Cross Street, Frederiksted
St. Croix, V.I. 00840
Counsel for Appellant Felix
Jomo Meade
112 Queen Cross Street, Frederiksted
St. Croix, V.I. 00840
Counsel for Appellant Augustin
Ernest F. Batenga
Assistant U.S. Attorney
108 King Street, Suite 201, Christiansted
St. Croix, V.I. 00820
Counsel for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT

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PER CURIAM:
Because we write for the parties only, the background of the case need not be
set out. We reject the defendants’ challenges to their convictions and affirm the judgment
of the District Court.
First, because Article IV of the Constitution gives Congress plenary power to
regulate intra-territorial conduct, the Hobbs Act convictions in this case are not subject to
challenge based on the Commerce Clause. While the indictment could have been framed to
include only intra-territorial conduct under the Act, however, the government arguably
framed the indictment in such a way that a showing of obstruction, delay, or affect on
commerce between the Territory and any other territory or state was required. The relevant
issue, therefore, is simply whether the proof presented satisfied the statutory element
requiring conduct that “in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce,” 18 U.S.C. §1951(a), with
commerce being defined as commerce between the Territory and any other territory or
state, 18 U.S.C. §1951(b)(3). We conclude in this instance that there was substantial
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, on which a rational trier of
fact could find that the statutory elements had been satisfied and, consequently, that guilt
had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d
758 (3d Cir. 2000).
We also reject Defendant Augustin’s separate argument that the District Court
abused its discretion by denying his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal based on allegations

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that the Government failed: (1) to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he aided and
abetted Defendant Bright in the commission of the charged crimes and (2) to establish that
the robberies had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce and to come within the ambit
of 18 U.S.C. §1951. The latter of these arguments has already been disposed of above.
As to the former argument, in order to determine that Augustin aided and abetted,
the jury was required to find that Defendant Augustin (1) associated himself with the
venture, (2) participated in the venture as something he wished to bring about, and (3)
sought by his words or actions to make it succeed. See United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d
1281, 1288 (3d Cir. 1993); 18 U.S.C. §2. We determine that substantial evidence
presented at trial justified a finding by a rational trier of fact, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that defendant Augustin knew in advance that his partner intended to use the firearm in the
crime in which he was a participant, knew that his partner was using a gun to commit the
crime, and continued in the commission of the crime in spite of that knowledge. See See
United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526,
530 (3d Cir. 1996). Thus, there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant Augustin
under an aiding and abetting theory.
We also reject the argument of all three defendant that the District Court
improperly denied their motion for new trial, which was based on the allegation that the
Government violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1967). In evaluating an alleged
Brady violation, we review the District Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual
findings for clear error. United States v. Ramos, 27 F.3d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 1994).

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Under Brady, in order to satisfy the requirements of due process, the government
must disclose information that is both material–either to guilt or punishment–and favorable
to the defendant. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 780 F.2d 302 (3d Cir.
1986). Evidence is material “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). The government is obligated to
disclose only where the prosecutor possesses the evidence or where he “should [ ] have
known that the material at issue was in existence.” United States v. Joseph, 996 F.2d 36, 39
(3d Cir. 1993).
In this instance, the Defendants claim that the government violated its Brady
obligations because Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) Marshack knew that the car allegedly
used in the robberies in question was in the possession of a third party–Jimmy Davis–at the
time the robberies were committed. The defendants claim that he gained this information
when, during his tenure as an Assistant Territorial Public Defender, he represented Jimmy
Davis. The defendants contend that although AUSA Marshack possessed this knowledge,
during this present case he questioned the owner of the car allegedly used in the robberies
in such a way as to create the impression that Defendant Augustin at the time and date of the
robberies had sole use and possession of that car. The defendants further allege that the
knowledge that AUSA Marshack acquired while in an Assistant Territorial Public Defender
must be imputed to the United States. The Government, on the other hand, claims that
Marshack was not aware of Davis’ use of the vehicle. The Government also argues that, as

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the car had been impounded by the Virgin Islands Police Department, Davis could not have
been using the car in connection with either the three criminal charges brought against him
or in connection with his arrest for driving without a license, which occurred during the
days on which the robberies were allegedly committed by the Defendants.
The District Court denied the Brady motion based on a determination that: (1)
Marshack, as Davis’s public defender, would have had no reason to seek information from
Davis regarding the car as there is “generally no inquiry into the underlying crime” during
procedural hearings of the sort at which Marshack had represented Davis, and (2) all the
offenses that Davis might have had occasion to discuss with Marshack occurred “well after
the Hobbs Act robberies.” See App. at 371.
This Court will overturn a District Court’s findings of fact only upon a finding of
clear error. There is no indication that the District Court erred in determining that the
Government did not withhold or suppress any evidence regarding Jimmy Davis’s alleged
use of the Mitsubishi Mirage that was allegedly used in the robbery. We therefore affirm
the District Court’s denial of the defendants’ Motion for a New Trial.
Finally, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by excluding
testimony regarding prior prosecutorial decisions of the Virgin Islands Attorney General’s
Office. We review the District Court’s decision to admit or deny evidence for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Scott, 223 F.3d 208, 210 (3d Cir. 2000). Defendants
Bright and Felix allege that the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to allow
them to present evidence that the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands chose not to

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prosecute them for some of the crimes charged in the superseding indictment. Defendants
Bright and Felix rely on this Court’s decisions in United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380
(3d Cir. 1991), and United States v. Rockwell, 781 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1986). Reliance on
this precedent is misguided, however, and there is no indication that the District Court
abused its discretion in refusing to allow the Defendants to present the evidence at issue.
In United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991), this Court found an
abuse of discretion where the District Court refused to allow the Defendant to present
“reverse 404(b) evidence” where there had been another crime very similar to the crime
charged, there was evidence that the identification by the eye witness in the case was faulty,
and the defendant was seeking to offer evidence of the other similar crime to impeach the
eye witness’s identification. Stevens is not applicable here as Defendants Bright and Felix
were simply attempting to introduce evidence that the Office of the Attorney General of
the Virgin Islands had exercised its prosecutorial discretion in relation to the robberies and
decided that it would seek dismissal of proceedings against Bright and Felix without
prejudice. While Bright and Felix allegedly desired to present this evidence to impeach the
government witnesses’ in-court identification of the accused, there is no indication either:
(1) that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the Office of the Attorney General was
based on its inability to obtain witnesses to identify Bright, Augustin, and Felix or (2) that
this evidence was probative as to how a government witness would testify at trial regarding
identification. Stevens is thus not applicable here.
Defendants Bright and Felix also rely upon United States v. Rockwell, 781 F.2d 985

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(3d Cir. 1986), but Rockwell is also inapposite. The evidence ultimately admitted in that
case regarded the dismissal of a state weapons charge in a prosecution for a federal
weapons charge. In Rockwell, the evidence of the dismissed state charge was admitted for
the purpose of showing that an officer actually planted a gun on the defendant. Defendants
Bright and Felix, in contrast, attempted to introduce evidence regarding the Attorney
General’s request for dismissal of territorial charges merely in order to impeach the
government’s witnesses by implying that the Attorney General must have been unable to
procure witnesses who could identify Bright and Felix as perpetrators of the robberies.
Rockwell is not relevant here.
We find no indication that the District Court abused its discretion by excluding the
evidence of the Attorney General’s prior exercise of prosecutorial discretion in dismissing
territorial charges against the Defendants.
We have considered all of the defendant’s arguments and see no basis for reversal.
Therefore, we affirm the District Court’s judgment in whole.

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