Peter Bay Homeowners Association, Inc v. Andrew R. Stillman

PRECEDENTIAL
Filed June 27, 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 01-3726, 01-3727, 01-3728
PETER BAY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
v.
ANDREW R. STILLMAN; JOY H. STILLMAN;
JOHN G. CATTS; SHEILA J. ROEBUCK
ANTONIO GODINEZ; BONNIE GODINEZ;
MICHAEL BURGAMY; ETHLYN HALL,
Intervening Plaintiffs in District Court
v.
JAMES HENRY; CAROL HENRY; L.D. KIRK; SCOTT F.
MEESE; DONNA G. MEESE; ARIE LIEBESKIND; DOREEN
LIEBESKIND; JIM R. HAYES; ZAQUIN S. HAYES;
JEFFREY PRICE; STEVEN PAUL; JANN PAUL; ST. JOHN
LAND INVESTMENT L.P.; ANDREWS ST. JOHN TRUST,
Intervening Defendants in District Court
Peter Bay Owners Association, Inc.,
Appellant in 01-3726
James Henry, Carol Henry and *Robert D. Blakeney II,
Appellants in 01-3727
*(Pursuant to Rule 12(a), F.R.A.P.)
Andrews St. John Trust,
Appellant in 01-3728
On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands,
Division of St. Thomas and St. John
(D.C. Civ. No 97-cv-00036)
District Judge: Honorable Stanley S. Brotman, United
States District Court Judge, United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation
Argued: Tuesday, May 14, 2002
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: June 27, 2002)
Matthew J. Duensing, Esq. (argued)
Margaret A. Duensing, Esq.
Stryker, Duensing, Casner &

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Dollison
P.O. Box 6785
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
USVI 00804
Attorneys for James Henry, Carol
Henry and Robert Blakeney
Susan Moorehead, Esq. (argued)
Grunert Stout & Bruch
P.O. Box 1030
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
USVI 00804
Attorney for Andrews St. John Trust
James M. Derr, Esq.
28-29 Norre Gade
P.O. Box 664
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
USVI 00804
Attorney for Peter Bay Owners
Association
2
Samuel H. Hall, Jr., Esq. (argued)
Birch, de Jongh, Hindels & Hall
1330 Estate Taarnebjerg
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
USVI 00802
Attorney for Ethlyn Hall
John H. Benham, Esq. (argued)
Watts & Benham, P.C.
No. 1 Frederiksberg Gade
P.O. Box 11720
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
USVI 00801
Attorney for Andrew Stillman and
Joy Stillman
Henry C. Smock, Esq. (argued)
Smock Law Offices, P.C.
P.O. Box 1498
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
USVI 00804
Attorney for Antonio Godinez
and Bonnie Godinez
OPINION OF THE COURT
GARTH, Circuit Judge:
In the normal course of a federal judge’s labours, rarely

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do issues of real estate title, metes and bounds, or
easements come before the District Court. This appeal,
stemming from former District Court Judge Warren Young’s
opinion dated August 21, 1975, is the exception. This
appeal concerns the scope of an easement across certain
beachfront properties in an area in St. John, Virgin Islands,
known as Peter Bay. The question presented is whether the
easement across three parcels of land which make up a
portion of the beachfront property in Peter Bay-- Parcels 1,
2A, and 10A (the "relevant parcels") -- extends from the low
water shoreline to 50’ inland or to the vegetation berm
(which is less than 50’ inland in most places). According to
3
the parties, the size of this beachfront easement
significantly affects the value and utility of individual
parcels within the current Peter Bay subdivision and the
value of the subdivision as a whole.
I.
In 1997, the Peter Bay Owners Association, an
organization created for the collective benefit of the property
owners in Peter Bay (the "Association"), commenced suit
against four individual Peter Bay property owners in the
District Court of the Virgin Islands seeking dues and
declaratory judgment concerning, inter alia, certain
obligations stemming from a prior 1975 district court
opinion. A number of other Peter Bay property owners
intervened in the action. All issues were eventually settled
except for the easement issue. On August 22, 2001, the
District Court vacated a portion of its prior July 8, 1999
decision and ruled that the easement with respect to the
relevant parcels (Parcels 1, 2A, and 10A) ran only to the
vegetation berm.
The Association and certain property owners appealed
the August 2001 opinion and order. Other than the
Association, the appellants are: (1) James and Carol Henry,
owners of Parcel 2B (the "Henrys"); (2) Robert Blakeney II,
owner of Parcel 3, ("Blakeney"); and (3) Andrews St. Johns
Trust, owner of Parcel 13A ("Andrews Trust").
The appellees are: (1) Ethlyn Hall, owner of Parcel 16
("Hall"); (2) Andrew and Joy Stillman, owners of Parcel 10A
(the "Stillmans"); (3) Antonio and Bonnie Godinez, owners
of Parcel 2A, (the "Godinezes"); and (4) Michael Burgamy,
owner of Parcel 1 ("Burgamy"). We recognize that some of
the parties and intervenors were not the subject of the
District Court’s August 22, 2001 order, and hence we do
not review or rule upon the arguments which they have
presented in their briefs and on oral argument. Indeed, in
some instances, we are uncertain as to the relief they seek
in the context of the easement size.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the
restrictions set forth in the "Declaration of Protective
Covenants for the Partnership Property" (the"Protective

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4
Covenants") establish a 50’ easement across Parcels 1
(owned by Burgamy) and 2A (owned by the Godinezes). We
also conclude, however, that Parcel 10A (owned by the
Stillmans) is charged with only a berm line easement
because it is not subject to the Protective Covenants
inasmuch as the Stillmans received their property directly
from Harthman heirs.
Ethlyn Hall, the owner of Parcel 16, was not the subject
of the District Court’s August 2001 order and is an original
Harthman heir -- hence, her deed, which provides for an
easement to the vegetation berm, requires no relief from us.
Similarly, the Andrews Trust property (Parcel 13A), which
was not the subject of the District Court’s August 2001
order, is not reviewed by us, but is subject to the 50’
easement decreed by the District Court in its earlier July
1999 opinion since no motion for reconsideration was
sought. In any event, Parcel 13A is subject to the Protective
Covenants.
The Henrys’ Parcel 2B is also subject to the 50’ easement
provided in the Protective Covenants (and in some places,
to a 55’ easement), but, as noted, their parcel was not the
subject of the District Court’s August 2001 order, and
hence is not reviewed by us.
Lastly, Blakeney, whose Parcel 3 had been received from
Andrews Trust subject to the Protective Covenants, was not
the subject of the District Court’s August 2001 order, but
would not be affected either by this opinion or the
Protective Covenants to the extent that much, if not all, of
Parcel 3 lacks beach frontage. We record these various
prescriptions, however, only to clear the record and to
dispel any confusion that may have arisen from the
pleadings, the various proceedings, or the oral argument.
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in part and
reverse in part the District Court’s August 2001 judgment.
II.
A.
The history of this litigation began three decades ago
when Lillian Harthman Cheng brought suit in 1970 to
5
partition certain land in Peter Bay that had been inherited
by six Hartman heirs, of which Cheng was one. The action
was brought before the Honorable Warren Young, U.S.
District Court Judge of the Virgin Islands, who issued his
opinion and order in 1975. See Harthman v. Harthman, 12
V.I. 142 (D.V.I. 1975).

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The land to be partitioned totaled 50.82 acres and was
legally described as "Peter Farm of Estate Peter Bay, 2 aa
Maho Bay Quarter, St. John, U.S. Virgin Islands,"
consisting of 26.07 acres south and 23.7 acres north of a
public road, plus an area of 1.05 acres for the road itself.
See Harthman, 12 V.I. at 147. It is located on the north
coast of St. John between Trunk Bay and Cinnamon Bay,
approximately three miles from Cruz Bay Town.
The Harthman Court appointed a number of
commissioners to recommend the most equitable way to
apportion the land among the six heirs. Dividing the land
into 17 distinct parcels, the Commissioners assigned
number values to certain features of each particular parcel,
and concluded with an overall weighted score to determine
the worth of each land grouping. In particular, the
Commissioners gave higher weight to the beachfront
properties, since their proximity to the shore provided
additional value. Together with the personal preferences
expressed by each heir, Judge Young distributed the
parcels based largely upon the Commissioners’ weighted
value system and recommendations. The actual distribution
among the heirs is not relevant to this appeal, except that
it should be noted that among the parcels received by
Ethlyn Hall -- one of the six original Harthman heirs --
was Parcel 16, a beachfront property.1
_________________________________________________________________
1. The labeling system used by the Commissioners and Judge Young --
which grouped the seventeen parcels into six groups (#1-6) and then
assigned a letter (A, B, or C) depending upon the terrain of the individual
parcel -- was replaced in 1977 by a new numbering system which
continues to be in effect today. The current system simply assigns each
parcel a number between 1 through 17. In subsequent years, some of
the parcels using the current system were further divided, resulting in A
and B subsections, such as Parcels 2A (owned by the Godinezes), 2B
(owned by the Henrys), 10A (owned by the Stillmans), and 13A (owned
by Andrews Trust). To avoid confusion, we will refer only to the current
numbering system.
6
In order to preserve access to the beach from some of the
non-beachfront properties, the Court ordered that an
easement be established across each of the beachfront
properties for the mutual use and enjoyment of all property
owners of the beach. Accordingly, the court ordered that
[t]here should be shown a beach easement from the
water’s edge to the berm line -- approximately 50 ’
inland -- on Parcels [1, 2A, 2B, 10A, 13A, 16]. The line
on Parcel [3] should be closer to the rocky shore.
Harthman, 12 V.I. at 157. The court also stated that
[a]ll owners of parcels and all future owners of plots
which may or shall be subdivided from the parcels
located in Estate Peter Farm, of Peter Bay, St. John,
shall have a perpetual easement of the use and

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enjoyment of the beach area existing approximately 50’
inland from the low water mark on all waterfront
parcels (except partially on [Parcel 3]). As a condition to
the continued use and enjoyment of said beach area,
the said owners, in accepting their title and this grant
of easement, covenant that they will share in the
cleaning and maintenance of such beach area in
accordance with the provisions contained in the
following paragraph relating to the use and enjoyment
of the subdivision roads.
Id. at 158.
Judge Young ordered Virgin Islands Engineering and
Surveying to complete a survey and map of Peter Bay
consistent with his instructions. Joseph Brennan, the
owner of Virgin Islands Engineering and Surveying,
surveyed and mapped the area for the Harthman plan. He
prepared PWD File No. D9-1330-T77 for the north or
beachfront section of Peter Bay and PWD File No. D9-1331-
T77 for the south or non-beachfront section of Peter Bay
(together, the "1977 maps").2 These maps display a straight
50’ easement line across the beachfront properties.
_________________________________________________________________
2. At the request of the Court, counsel furnished each member of the
panel with the relevant maps prior to oral argument.
7
B.
Since the Harthman decision, various parcels of Peter Bay
have been sold and transferred to different people and
entities. The parcel owners relevant to this action can be
divided into two groups: one group consists of Ethlyn Hall,
who is an original Harthman heir and has continued to own
Parcel 16 since the 1975 Harthman decision. The second
group consists of the remaining owners of the relevant
parcels, who received their properties directly or indirectly
from conveyances made by various Harthman heirs after
the 1975 decision. This second group can be further
subdivided into the Stillmans, who acquired Parcel 10A
directly from Harthman heirs, and the Godinezes, Burgamy,
the Henrys, Blakeney and Andrews Trust, who received
their properties directly or indirectly from St. John Land
Investment L.P. (the "Partnership").
The Partnership purchased Parcels 1-9 from various
Harthman heirs, pursuant to a Warranty Deed dated
December 9, 1986, which referenced both the 1977 maps
and the Harthman decision. In 1988, the Partnership
purchased additional property from the heirs, including
Parcel 13A. Shortly thereafter, the Partnership further
subdivided certain of the parcels it owned, put in roads and
made other improvements.3 It established an overall plan
for its subdivisions and filed a "Declaration of Protective
Covenants for the Partnership Property" (the Protective
Covenants) with the Recorder of Deeds, setting forth certain

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additional obligations and burdens on the Partnership’s
property, and establishing a 50’ easement across the
beachfront properties owned by the Partnership. The
Protective Covenants also provided for, created and
established the Association.
After purchasing these properties from Harthman heirs,
the Partnership sold various parcels to third parties. On
December 14, 1988, the Partnership sold Parcel 2A to
Danzler Lumber & Export Co. pursuant to a Warranty Deed
_________________________________________________________________
3. The new subdivisions are reflected on PWD D9-4392-T88, dated April
22, 1988 (the "1988 map"). This map also displays a 50’ easement line
across the beachfront properties.
8
which explicitly incorporated the Protective Covenants and
the 1988 map.
On May 13, 1993, Danzler Lumber & Export Co.
conveyed Parcel 2A to its president, Antonio Godinez, and
his wife, Bonnie Godinez, pursuant to a Warranty Deed.
While the 1993 deed does not expressly refer to the
Protective Covenants, it does incorporate the 1988 deed
between the Partnership and Danzler Lumber, as well as
the 1988 map.
Although the record is not complete as to the chain of
title of Parcel 1 from the Partnership to its current owner,
Michael Burgamy, we note that Burgamy purchased Parcel
1 from Paul and Genevieve Due (the "Dues"). In this appeal,
Burgamy does not dispute that his property is also subject
to the Protective Covenants.
In July 1992, the Partnership sold Parcel 2B to Bernard
Kramer, who sold it to the Henrys pursuant to a Warranty
Deed dated April 30, 1993.
Furthermore, on July 2, 1992, the Partnership sold
Parcel 13 (including 13A) to Andrews Trust pursuant to a
Warranty Deed. The Partnership also sold Parcel 3 to
Andrews Trust, which, in turn, sold Parcel 3 to Blakeney on
December 16, 1999.
The Henrys, Blakeney and Andrews Trust (all of whom
are appellants in this appeal) concede that their respective
parcels are subject to the Protective Covenants, which
provide a "uniform standard of rights, conditions,
covenants, reservations and restrictions for all the parcels
located in said subdivision which shall run with the land."
See Recitals, Protective Covenants.
C.
In 1997, the Association brought suit in the District
Court against the Stillmans, John Catts and Sheila
Roebuck seeking dues and a declaratory judgment

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regarding the applicability of certain deed restrictions and
other obligations stemming from the Harthman decision.
The Godinezes intervened and, together with the Stillmans,
they sought a declaration concerning the scope of the
9
easement across their properties. Eventually, Hall and the
Dues intervened, and they -- along with the Stillmans and
Godinezes -- filed summary judgment motions seeking a
declaratory judgment that their properties were subject to
a berm line easement. All other issues in this action were
adjudicated or otherwise settled.
On March 27, 1998, the District Court issued an order
stating that "[a]ll interested persons wishing to intervene in
the instant litigation and to be heard on the beach
easement issue must file their petitions for intervention no
later than May 1, 1998 or be bound by the outcome of this
litigation." A number of other property owners, including
the Henrys and Andrews Trust, joined a motion to intervene
which was granted on May 7, 1998.
The Association filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment seeking an across-the-board 50’ beachfront
easement with respect to Peter Bay beachfront properties.
The Henrys and Andrews Trust, as well as other
interveners, further cross-moved for summary judgment,
arguing that any claim that Peter Bay properties were
subject to a berm-line easement was barred by the statute
of limitations.
On October 26, 1998, the District Court denied the cross-
motion raising the statute of limitations issue and set a
bench trial date to decide that particular issue. The District
Court expressly reserved judgment on the remaining
motions. On July 8, 1999, the District Court issued
findings of fact on the statute of limitations issue, finding
that the berm line arguments were not time barred.
Also on July 8, 1999, the District Court issued a separate
opinion with regard to the remaining summary judgment
motions (the "July 1999 Opinion"). The District Court ruled
that the Harthman decision established an easement that
extended only to the vegetation berm line. Because Hall was
an original party to that decision, the court ruled that her
property, Parcel 16, was subject to the same berm line
easement. As to the other property owners, however--
those who received their parcels later and were not parties
to the Harthman decision -- the court ruled that their
parcels were subject to a 50’ easement. In so ruling, the
10
court noted that each of their respective deeds expressly
referred to maps which referenced a 50’ easement line.
Accordingly, the District Court

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ORDERED that parcels 1, 2A, 10A and 13A of [Peter
Bay] are subject to an easement extending a flat fifty
feet inland from the 1975 low water mark, as depicted
on [the 1977 maps, the 1988 map], PWD D9-5369-T92
and OLG D9-5259-T92; and
. . . FURTHER ORDERED that parcel 16 of [Peter Bay]
is subject to an easement extending from the 1975 low
water mark to the berm line, as articulated in the
Partitioning Decree issued by this Court on August 21,
1975 in the case of Harthman v. Harthman, 12 V.I. 142
(D.V.I. 1975).
See Peter Bay Owners Assoc. v. Stillman, No. 97 cv 0036,
order at 2 (D.V.I. Jul. 8, 1999).
The Stillmans, the Godinezes and the Dues filed a motion
for reconsideration. On July 12, 2000, the District Court
held that it had erred when it failed to apply the
Restatement (Third) of Servitudes in its July 1999 Opinion,
citing to 1 V.I.C. S 4 (which directs the court to apply the
Restatement in the absence of local laws to the contrary),
granted reconsideration, and ordered supplemental briefing.
In response to a challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction
by the Stillmans, the District Court ruled on July 17, 2000
that it had jurisdiction to decide the issues relating to the
beachfront easement.
On August 22, 2001, the District Court vacated portions
of its prior July 1999 decision and declared that the beach
easement also extended to the vegetation berm for the
Stillmans, the Godinezes and the Dues (the "August 2001
Opinion"). Applying S 4.1 of the Restatement (Third) of
Property (Servitudes), the District Court focused upon the
intent of the transferring parties rather than the express
boundaries set forth in the deed to establish the scope of
the easement. The District Court held that all the evidence
showed that the intent of the respective parties was to
convey the relevant properties consistent with the
Harthman decision and that all references to a 50’
easement began from a single error -- namely, the
11
misinterpretation of the Harthman decision as establishing
a 50’ easement rather than a berm line easement.
Accordingly, the court
ORDERED that the Court’s Opinion and Order of July
15, 1999, are VACATED, insofar as they declare that
parcels 1, 2A and 10A of [Peter Bay] are subject to an
easement extending fifty feet inland from the 1975 low-
water mark; and
. . . FURTHER ORDERED that parcels 1, 2A and 10A
of [Peter Bay] are subject to an easement extending
from the 1975 low-water mark to the vegetation berm
line, as articulated in the Partitioning Decrees issued
on August 21, 1975, in Harthman v. Harthman, 12 V.I.

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142 (D.V.I. 1975).
Peter Bay Owners Assoc. v. Stillman, No. 97 cv 0036, order
at 2-3 (D.V.I. Aug. 22, 2001).
There, the District Court made clear that it was ruling
only as to the parcels owned by the Dues, the Godinezes
and the Stillmans, remarking that its original decision
concerning Hall’s Parcel (16) remained undisturbed.
Moreover, as to the parcel owned by Andrews Trust (Parcel
13A), the District Court explained that
[t]he Court’s determination that parcel 13A is burdened
by a flat fifty-foot easement also remains intact, given
that the parcel’s owner, the Andrews St. John Trust,
has not moved for reconsideration and that the deed
does not appear in the materials presented for the
court’s review.
Id. at 2 n.1.
Notably, the District Court did not address the Protective
Covenants, which prescribe a 50’ easement for the property
owners who took under them, i.e., the Godinezes (Parcel
2A), the Dues (Parcel 1), the Andrews Trust (Parcel 13A),
the Henrys (Parcel 2B) and Blakeney (Parcel 3). On August
23, 2001, the District Court substituted Burgamy as the
Dues’ successor-in-interest as to Parcel 1.
Timely notices of appeal were filed by the Association, the
Henrys, Blakeney4 and Andrews Trust challenging only the
_________________________________________________________________
4. Since Blakeney had purchased Parcel 3 from Andrews Trust on
December 16, 1999, he moved the District Court to become the real
12
August 22, 2001 decision. On October 26, 2001, the
Henrys and Blakeney moved the District Court to
reconsider its August 22, 2001 opinion. That motion was
denied by the District Court on February 6, 2002 as being
untimely.
In this appeal, the Association, the Henrys (owners of
Parcel 2B), Blakeney (owner of Parcel 3) and Andrews Trust
(owner of Parcel 13A) seek to reverse the District Court’s
August 22, 2001 decision as to the scope of the easement
across Parcels 1 (owned by Burgamy), 2A (owned by the
Godinezes), and 10A (owned by the Stillmans). Because
only the August 2001 order is challenged, the easement
across the parcels owned by Andrews Trust (Parcel 13A)
and Hall (Parcel 16), which was ruled upon in the District
Court’s July 1999 Opinion -- and, for that matter, the
easement across parcels owned by the Henrys (Parcel 2B)
and Blakeney (Parcel 3), which was never in dispute before
the District Court below -- are not at issue in this appeal.5
III.

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This Court reviews the District Court’s August 2001
grant of summary judgment de novo, Kelly v. Drexel
University, 94 F.3d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 1996), and applies the
same test as the District Court. We must determine,
therefore, whether the record, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-movant, shows that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). All legal
determinations made by the District Court, including
jurisdictional rulings, are also reviewed de novo. See Orvosh
v. Program of Group Ins. for Salaried Employees of
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 222 F.3d 123, 128-29 (3d Cir.
_________________________________________________________________
party in interest with regard to that parcel. Blakeney’s motion was
granted on February 11, 2002.
5. Accordingly, we do not address the arguments made by Andrews Trust
in this appeal concerning the District Court’s July 1999 ruling as to
Parcel 13A.
13
2000); In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Securities Litigation, 172 F.3d
270, 273 (3d Cir. 1999).
IV.
As a threshold matter, the Henrys, Blakeney and
Andrews Trust contend that the District Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to decide any issues beyond the
mere interpretation of the 1975 Harthman decision.6 They
contend that the District Court’s August 2001 judgment,
which ruled as to parties not directly affected by the 1975
decision, must be vacated as a result. We disagree.
In 1975, the district court exercised subject matter
jurisdiction over the partition action under Section 22 of
the Revised Organic Act of 1954, 48 U.S.C. SS 1541-1645
(West 1987 and Supp. 2001), which conferred general
jurisdiction (with limited exceptions) upon the District
Court of the Virgin Islands over all local matters. See Luis
v. Dennis, 751 F.2d 604, 607 n.3 (3d Cir. 1984). That
statute was amended in 1984, providing the Virgin Islands
legislature with the ability to vest jurisdiction over local
actions exclusively in the local courts. See Callwood v.
Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 631 (3d Cir. 2000). The Virgin Islands
legislature exercised this authority in 1990, effectively
"divest[ing] the District Court of the Virgin Islands of
jurisdiction over all local civil actions," Club Comanche, Inc.
v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 278 F.3d 250, 256 (3d
Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted), but reserving its
"federal question and diversity jurisdiction in civil actions."
Id.; see also 4 V.I.C. S 76(a).
Consequently, this action -- a local property dispute --
lacks the traditional indices of subject matter jurisdiction,

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since S 22, as noted, was amended and thus was no longer
available, and neither a federal question nor complete
diversity exists. There is no question, however, that the
District Court had jurisdiction to interpret the scope of the
_________________________________________________________________
6. The Stillmans also argued before the District Court that it lacked
jurisdiction. Because the Association argued below that the District
Court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction, it did not join its co-
appellants in arguing the court’s lack of jurisdiction.
14
easement ordered by Judge Young in his 1975 decision. It
had that jurisdiction pursuant to its inherent power to
interpret, and thereby effect, the District Court’s own
decrees. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. , 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994) (noting that federal courts have properly
exercised ancillary jurisdiction "to enable a court to
function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings,
vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.").
One of the important aspects of Judge Young’s decision
was the implementation of the beachfront easement to
ensure that each of the property owners had reasonable
and reciprocal access to the beach.7 Clearly, the District
Court had jurisdiction to interpret the meaning and scope
of the various obligations imposed by the previous 1975
District Court upon the Peter Bay properties.
The less obvious question is whether the instant District
Court had jurisdiction to decide the scope of the easement
concerning property owners who were not actual parties to
the Harthman decision. Under 28 U.S.C. S 1367,
[i]n any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are
so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.
Known as "supplemental jurisdiction," S 1367 has
permitted federal courts to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over matters they would normally be precluded
from entertaining so long as the supplemental matters are
deemed to involve or relate to the same controversy as to
matters properly before the federal court. HB General Corp.
v. Manchester Partners, 95 F.3d 1185, 1191 (3d Cir. 1996)
("28 U.S. C. S 1367 provides that, in general, if the district
court has jurisdiction over one claim, it can maintain
_________________________________________________________________
7. An additional obligation no longer at issue here concerned the 1997
action brought by the Association which sought primarily to enforce
certain monetary obligations directly imposed by the original Harthman
decision for the upkeep and care of the roadways in Peter Bay.

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15
jurisdiction over claims that lack an independent basis of
jurisdiction if those claims are so related to claims within
the court’s jurisdiction that they form part of the same case
or controversy under Article III.") (internal quotations
omitted). We have noted that supplemental jurisdiction
"applies even to claims asserted by or against additional
parties." Id. at 1197.
We are satisfied that there is sufficient overlap between
the interpretation of the 1975 Harthman decision and the
scope of the beachfront easement across non-Harthman
owned properties for supplemental jurisdiction to exist.
First, the properties at issue are identical to those that were
addressed by Judge Young in 1975. Although the owners
have changed, the parcels of land have not. The 1975
Harthman decision significantly altered the boundaries and
obligations associated with each parcel of land at issue in
this action. In order to determine what restrictions
encumber these properties today, it is logically necessary to
determine what restrictions encumbered those same
properties originally. If, for example, Judge Young did
indeed order a 50’ easement across the Peter Bay
properties, then the transferors would have been without
power to convey their property up to the vegetation berm,
since a grantor cannot sell a property interest greater than
what he owns. Accordingly, in such a circumstance, a
berm line easement would not have been possible
notwithstanding the intent of the transferring parties.
Second, most, if not all, the relevant deeds in this matter
directly reference the Harthman decision in their terms. In
this way, a proper interpretation of the Harthman opinion
provides an important starting point for determining the
boundaries of the easement.
As key threshold factual questions concerning the
easement necessarily revolve around the meaning of the
original Harthman decision, the issues are sufficiently
intertwined to be considered part of the "same case or
controversy." See HB General Corp., 95 F.3d at 1198
("Claims are part of the same case or controversy if they
share significant factual elements"); White v. County of
Newberry, 985 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The claims
need only revolve around a central fact pattern."); see also
16
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379 ("Generally speaking, we have
asserted ancillary jurisdiction . . . to permit disposition by
a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and
degrees, factually interdependent"); United States v.
Dunegan, 251 F.3d 477, 478-79 (3d Cir. 2001) ("A federal
court invokes ancillary jurisdiction as an incident to a
matter where it has acquired jurisdiction of a case in its
entirety and, as an incident to the disposition of the
primary matter properly before it. It may resolve other

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related matters which it could not consider were they
independently presented.") (citing 13 Wright, Miller, Cooper,
Fed. Practices & Procedures: Jurisdiction 2d S 3523)
(emphasis added).
Once it is determined that a court could have exercised
supplemental jurisdiction over these matters, its decision to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction is subject to the court’s
discretion. See New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. PPG Ind.,
Inc., 197 F.3d 96, 113 (3d Cir. 1999); 28 U.S.C.S 1367(c).
The record discloses nothing to indicate that the District
Court abused its discretion in exercising its supplemental
jurisdiction here.
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court here had
subject matter jurisdiction over the issues it decided in the
August 2001 Opinion.
V.
The appellants contend that the District Court
erroneously decided in its August 2001 Opinion that the
parcels owned by the Stillmans, the Godinezes and
Burgamy were subject only to a berm line easement. To
answer this question, we must first examine the scope of
the 1975 Harthman opinion before addressing the post-
1975 transfers of property.
A.
As previously discussed, the 1975 Harthman opinion
established the original boundaries of the properties at
issue in this appeal, including the initial size of the
beachfront easements. Judge Young’s discussion in that
17
opinion can be divided into two parts: the Commissioners’
recommendations concerning the beachfront easement; and
the actual scope of the easement as ordered by Judge
Young.
As to the first part (the Commissioners’
recommendations), the Harthman court noted that
[i]n order to preserve access to the beach and beach
properties, the commissioners recommended that
perpetual easements be established for . . . a fifty foot
(50’) wide beach easement adjacent to and along the
water’s edge.
Harthman, 12 V.I. at 148 (emphasis added). Judge Young
referred to the Commissioners’ recommendation once again
later in his opinion, stating
[t]hey [the commissioners] have also indicated a
pedestrial right-of-way path from the public road to the
beach . . . and, lastly, they have indicated a strip of
beach from the water’s edge to a point 50’ inland

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(approximately to the berme [sic]) for a mutual
easement of the use and enjoyment of the beach.
Id. at 154. In light of these recommendations, the court
asked the following rhetorical question:
Should there be restrictive covenants for a sound land
development of the entire Peter Farm, now owned by
several individual owners?
Id.
The court then went on to the second part of its
discussion (its actual order of the easement). With regard to
the beachfront easement, Judge Young answered his own
rhetorical question in the following way:
Although the Commissioners have divided the beach
area into six (6) parcels, that area, in accordance with
the policies spelled out in the Virgin Islands Open
Shorelines Act, 12 V.I.C. S 401 et. seq., should remain
open to all the owners equally. No obstruction or
barrier shall be constructed across or within the
"shorelines" of said property, as that term is defined in
Section 402(b) of the Act, and each plot shall include a
18
mutual easement of the entire area encompassed by
the shoreline. Not only does the foregoing conform to the
public policy of the uninterrupted and obstructed use of
the Virgin Islands shorelines (see 12 V.I.C.S 401), it
further guarantees that the owners will maximize the
limited usable beachfront footage (about 600 feet in
length) for an area of more than 50 acres.
Id. at 156 (emphasis added). An examination of this
language confirms that Judge Young was concerned with
the public policies espoused in the Virgin Islands Open
Shorelines Act, 12 V.I.C. S 401, et. seq ., referring in
particular to the "shoreline" as defined by that Act. Section
402 states that
[f]or the purposes of this chapter "shorelines of the
United States Virgin Islands" shall mean the area along
the coastlines of the United States Virgin Islands from
the seaward line of low tide, running inland a distance
of fifty (50) feet; or to the extreme seaward boundary of
natural vegetation which spreads continuously inland;
or to a natural barrier; whichever is the shortest
distance. Whenever the shore is extended into the sea
by filling or dredging, the boundary of the shorelines
shall remain at the line of vegetation as previously
established.
12 V.I.C. S 402 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the local
laws of the Virgin Islands expressly referred to by Judge
Young clearly define the public shoreline as the shorter of
50’ inland or a boundary of natural vegetation (such as the

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berm line).
Pursuant to this reasoning, Judge Young ruled as
follows:
ADJUDGED and DECREED . . . . There should be
shown a beach easement from the water’s edge to the
berm line -- approximately 50’ inland -- on Parcels [1,
2A, 2B, 10A, 13A, and 16]. The line of Parcel[3] should
be closer to the rocky shore.
Harthman, 12 V.I. at 156-57 (emphasis added). Moreover,
the court added that
19
[a]ll owners of parcels and all future owners of plots
which may or shall be subdivided from the parcels
located in Estate Peter Farm, of Peter Bay, St. John,
shall have a perpetual easement of the use and
enjoyment of the beach area existing approximately 50’
inland from the low water mark on all water parcels
(except partially on [3]).
Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
The only reasonable interpretation of Judge Young’s
language is that he intended the easement to run only to
the vegetation berm. While the Commissioners
recommended a 50’ easement, the court explicitly ruled
that the easement should run to the "berm line," making
specific reference to that natural boundary. See , e.g., S 2.13
of the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Servitudes ("[i]n a
conveyance or contract to convey an estate or land,
description of the land conveyed by reference to a map or
boundary may imply the creation of a servitude.")
(emphasis added). Judge Young’s decision was further
supported with recitations to the Virgin Islands Open
Shoreline Act that expressly favored the shorter distance
between 50’ inland or any natural barrier. Therefore,
consistent with the language therein, we conclude that,
with the exception of Parcel 3 (now owned by Blakeney),8
the 1975 Harthman opinion established a berm line
easement across the Peter Bay beachfront properties.
B.
Because much has changed since the Harthman decision
was issued in 1975, the easement as to the parcels
belonging to non-Harthman heirs -- the Stillmans (Parcel
10A), the Godinezes (Parcel 2A) and Burgamy (Parcel 1) --
requires a further analysis. It must be determined whether
subsequent transfers subjected these parcels to easements
greater than those imposed by the Harthman decision.
_________________________________________________________________
8. As discussed, Blakeney received his property (Parcel 3) from Andrews
Trust, who received it from the Partnership, subjecting it to the
Protective Covenants of the Association. In any event, very little, if any,

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of Parcel 3 is beachfront property and as such, that property would not
be subject to an easement.
20
In the absence of contrary local law, Virgin Island courts
are directed to apply the Restatement as the controlling law
in the dispute. See 1 V.I.C. S 4 ("[t]he rules of the common
law, as expressed in the [R]estatements of the law approved
by the American Law Institute, and to the extent not so
expressed, as generally understood and applied in the
United States, shall be the rules of decision in the courts of
the Virgin Islands in cases to which they apply, in the
absence of local laws to the contrary."). Other than as
provided in the deed of transfer, under S 4.1 of the
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Servitudes, the scope of
an easement is determined by examining the intent of the
transferring parties, so long as public policy is not violated:
(1) A servitude should be interpreted to give effect to
the intention of the parties ascertained from the
language used in the instrument, or the circumstances
surrounding creation of the servitude, and to carry out
the purpose for which it was created.
(2) Unless the purpose for which the servitude is
created violates public policy, and unless contrary to
the intent of the parties, a servitude should be
interpreted to avoid violating public policy. Among
reasonable interpretations, that which is more
consonant with public policy should be preferred.
S 4.1 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Servitudes. As
such, we must look to the undisputed intent of the
conveying parties to determine whether they intended an
easement to apply on their respective properties which was
larger that the berm line easement imposed by the
Harthman court.
1. The Stillmans
The Stillmans received their Parcel 10A directly from
John and Vernon Harthman, two original Harthman heirs.
The conveyance was memorialized pursuant to a Warranty
Deed dated August 26, 1992.
Despite its reference to the two maps which show a 50’
easement across the Parcel 10A property, an examination of
this deed clearly demonstrates that the intent of the parties
21
was to subject the parcel with the same easement as
established by the Harthman decision in 1975. With regard
to easements and encumbrances burdening the property,
the deed is very particular and specific, stating:
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to Virgin Islands zoning

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regulations and to the covenants, restrictions,
easements and agreements of record, including the
terms, conditions, restrictions and obligations of the
Memorandum Opinion and Partition Decree dated
August 21, 1975 in District Court Civil No. 414-1970,
recorded with the Recorder of Deeds . . . .
It is clear that the parties intended that Parcel 10A be
subject to the same easement established by Judge Young
in the 1975 Harthman decision. Since, as previously
discussed (see Section V.A., supra), the Harthman decision
established a berm line easement, the Stillmans’ property
should similarly be burdened with only a berm line
easement.9
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s August
2001 ruling which vacated its earlier July 1999 order. That
1999 order had ruled that the Stillman’s property (Parcel
10A) was subject to a 50’ easement. The August 2001
ruling properly subjected the Stillman’s Parcel (Parcel 10A)
to a berm line easement only.
2. The Godinezes and Burgamy
Conceding that the scope of the easement was subject to
conflicting descriptions, the District Court nevertheless
ruled in its August 2001 Opinion that the intent of the
conveying parties regarding Parcels 2A (owned by the
Godinezes) and 1 (owned by Burgamy) was to establish a
berm line easement. In so ruling, the court reviewed, inter
alia, a number of deeds establishing the chain of title to
_________________________________________________________________
9. The parties point to no place in the record-- nor could any be located
-- showing that the Stillmans subjected its property to any additional
encumbrances after it purchased the property. Indeed, it is undisputed
that, unlike the parcels owned by the Godinezes (Parcel 2A) and
Burgamy (Parcel 1), the Stillmans’ property is not subject to the
restrictions set forth in the Protective Covenants.
22
those properties. While many of these deeds referenced,
directly or indirectly, a 50’ easement, the District Court
concluded that each of these references was intended to
refer to the easement established by Judge Young in the
1975 Harthman decision. Accordingly, the court attributed
all references to the 50’ easement to "simple error," and
held that the easements across each of these parcels also
ran only to the vegetation berm line.
The District Court’s analysis, however, is incomplete in
that it failed to address the effect of the Protective
Covenants as to each of the remaining parcels.10 As an
initial matter, the Protective Covenants, by their own terms,
make clear that they apply to the parcels belonging to the
Godinezes (Parcel 2A) and Burgamy (Parcel 1). See Recitals,
Protective Covenants (stating that "the rights, conditions,
covenants, reservations and restrictions" of the Protective

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Covenants apply to, inter alia, Parcels 1 and 2A).
Furthermore, those Covenants clearly and unequivocally
establish a 50’ easement across each of the parcels
affected:
[t]he term "Common Areas" shall mean those portions
of Peter Bay which, whether owned in fee simple by the
Association or subject to easements or rights of way for
the benefit of the Association and/or the Owners, are
used and reserved for the common benefit of all the
Owners. As of the date of this Declaration, the
Common Areas include . . . (ii) the 50 foot beach
easement as shown on [the 1988 map].
Definition of "Common Areas," Protective Covenants. The
question arises, therefore, whether these Protective
_________________________________________________________________
10. The Stillmans, the Godinezes and Burgamy suggest that the
Protective Covenants may not have been entered properly into evidence
before the District Court. However, their contention is belied by the
record, which demonstrates that the issue of the Protective Covenants
was raised before the District Court well before it issued its July 1999
Opinion. See Association’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment dated
February 5, 1998 at 9 (attaching a copy of the Protective Covenants and
arguing that the Protective Covenants established a 50’ easement); see
also Association’s Reply to Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, dated
March 23, 1998 at 3.
23
Covenants evidenced an intent by the Partnership to
establish a greater easement than that established by the
Harthman decision.
In making its August 2001 ruling that the parcels were
subject to a berm line easement, the District Court--
reviewing materials other than the Protective Covenants --
noted that it considered it extremely unlikely that"the
grantors would expand the easement for the collective
benefit of Peter Farm owners without either doing so
expressly in the deed or mentioning such intent to other
owners." Peter Bay Owners Assoc., No. 97 cv 0036, slip op.
at 22 (D.V.I. Aug. 22, 2001). In so stating, the District
Court expressed disbelief as to why parties would burden
their properties with greater restrictions prior to transfer.
The very purpose of the Protective Covenants, however,
addresses the District Court’s skepticism. The covenants
exist to expand and define greater restrictions than what is
otherwise permitted by law for the "collective benefit of
Peter Bay owners." The recitals of the Protective Covenants
provide:
WHEREAS, St. John Land Investment Partnership has
established a general plan for the improvement and
development of the subdivision known as Peter Bay
and now desires to establish a uniform standard of
rights, conditions, covenants, reservations and

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restrictions for all the parcels located in said subdivision
which shall run with the land. . . . Each and every one
of these rights, conditions, covenants, reservations and
restrictions are for the benefit of each Buyer and Owner
of each Lot in Peter Bay . . . and shall insure to and
pass with each and every Lot of such subdivision, and
shall bind the respective heirs, assigns and successors
in interest of the present owner thereof. . . . All deeds
to parcels within Peter Bay shall incorporate this
Declaration by reference thereto and by citation of the
recording thereof in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds
of St. Thomas and St. John.
Recitals, Protective Covenants (emphasis added). As is the
case with many developers seeking to establish communal
residences, it is evident that the Partnership desired to
24
burden its property with restrictions greater than that
which was imposed by law. Accordingly, the Partnership
expressed the very intention that the District Court found
lacking -- the intent to further restrict and bind the parcels
of land for the common benefit of Peter Bay owners.
Nor is there any evidence suggesting that the imposition
of the 50’ easement in the Protective Covenants resulted
from an erroneous interpretation of the 1975 Harthman
decision. Indeed, the Protective Covenants make no
mention of the 1975 opinion, and there is no mention of a
berm line easement throughout any of its terms.
Moreover, it is undisputed that the parcels belonging to
the Godinezes (Parcel 2A) and Burgamy (Parcel 1) are
subject to the Protective Covenants. For instance, the deeds
reflecting chain of title to the Godinezes parcel (Parcel 2A)
reference the Protective Covenants. The Warranty Deed
made between the Partnership and Danzler Lumber Co.,
dated December 14 1988, subjects Parcel 2A to the
following restrictions:
TOGETHER WITH a perpetual easement of access for
ingress and egress over road R.O.W. Parcels B and D,
and the other easements, rights and privileges
contained in the Declaration of Protective Covenants
for Peter Bay, St. John, Virgin Islands . . . recorded
November 4, 1988 in Book 33-C, Page 108, in the
Office of the Recorder of Deeds for St. Thomas and St.
John, Virgin Islands.11
On May 13, 1993, Danzler Lumber Co. conveyed Parcel 2A
to its president, Antonio Godinez, and his wife, Bonnie
Godinez. While that later deed does not expressly refer to
the Protective Covenants, it does incorporate the 1988 deed
between Danzler Lumber and the Partnership, which-- as
discussed -- does reference the Protective Covenants.
_________________________________________________________________
11. That deed also specifically references the 1975 Harthman decision.

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However, that reference does not change the conclusion that Parcel 2A
should be subject to a greater 50’ easement since: (1) the Harthman
decision imposes a number of obligations on Peter Bay owners unrelated
to easements; and (2) as previously noted, the Partnership is able to, and
did, impose restrictions greater than those otherwise imposed by law.
25
With regard to Burgamy’s parcel (Parcel 1), although the
chain of title is incomplete in this record, Burgamy cannot
-- and does not -- dispute the fact that his parcel is
subject to the Protective Covenants. As noted, Parcel 1 is
expressly covered by the terms of the Protective Covenants,
and while the deed conveying Burgamy’s property is not
before us, it is evident that such a deed would reference the
Protective Covenants. See Recitals, Protective Covenants
("All deeds to parcels within Peter Bay shall incorporate [the
Protective Covenants] by reference thereto and by citation
of the recording thereof in the Office of the Recorder of
Deeds of St. Thomas and St John."). Indeed, Burgamy
presents no evidence suggesting otherwise.12
In light of the reasons provided, we will reverse the
District Court’s August 2001 ruling that the parcels owned
by the Godinezes (Parcel 2A) and Burgamy (Parcel 1) are
subject to a berm line easement and rule instead that the
Protective Covenants impose a 50’ easement across those
properties.
VI.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the
District Court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction
to decide the issues discussed in its August 2001 Opinion.
Moreover, we will affirm the District Court’s order that the
Stillmans’ Parcel (Parcel 10A) is encumbered by a berm line
easement. However, we will reverse the District Court’s
order establishing a berm line easement across the
properties owned by the Godinezes (Parcel 2A) and
Burgamy (Parcel 1). Instead, we will order that both the
_________________________________________________________________
12. The Godinezes and Burgamy also contend that the arguments
concerning the Protective Covenants were waived below because the
appellants failed to raise this issue in opposing the Godinezes’ and
Burgamy’s motion for reconsideration. However, there is no dispute that
the appellants did, in fact, raise the Protective Covenants issue in their
respective cross-motions for summary judgment. See note 10, supra. The
Godinezes and Burgamy cite no authority -- and we are aware of none
-- supporting the proposition that a failure to raise the same issue again
in opposing a motion for reconsideration waives the ability to raise that
issue on appeal.
26
properties owned by the Godinezes (Parcel 2A) and
Burgamy (Parcel 1) are subject to a 50’ easement pursuant
to the restrictions contained in the Protective Covenants.

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A True Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
27

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