United States of America v. David J. Fitzgerald

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
Nos. 00-2393 & 00-2399
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DAVID J. FITZGERALD,
Appellant at No. 00-2393
LENWOOD MALACHI,
Appellant at No. 00-2399
_______________________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Criminal Nos. 99-cr-00450-7 & 99-cr-00450-6
(Honorable Harvey Bartle, III)
___________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 13, 2001
Before: SCIRICA and BARRY, Circuit Judges,
and MUNLEY, District Judge*
*The Honorable James M. Munley, United States District Judge for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
(Filed: January 31, 2002)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
__________________
PER CURIAM.
These drug trafficking cases require application of the rule stated in Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
At a bench trial, defendants Lenwood Malachi and David Fitzgerald were
convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana. In its verdict, the District Court found
defendants were guilty of distributing "large quantities of marijuana." The court made no
more specific findings with respect to drug quantities. Before the trial, defendants and the
government agreed that the District Court would make findings of drug quantity at
sentencing.

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Following the verdicts, but before sentencing, the United States Supreme Court
decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Court held, "’[I]t is
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that
increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is
equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’"
Id. at 490 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
As noted, the District Court made no findings at trial on specific drug quantities.
Because of Apprendi, the government asked the court to supplement its findings to
establish drug quantities, and to make, for these purposes, only such findings as could be
established beyond a reasonable doubt. At sentencing, the District Court again stated
defendants had trafficked "large quantities," but declined to make a specific finding
beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to quantity.
The relevant statute establishes different ranges of punishments depending on the
amount of drugs involved. 21 U.S.C. 841. The maximum punishment for trafficking
less than fifty kilograms of marijuana is five years, or ten years if the defendant has
previously been convicted of a felony drug offense. 841(b)(1)(D). If there is more than
one thousand kilograms of marijuana which the government alleges represents the
actual quantity distributed the maximum prescribed sentence is life imprisonment.
841(b)(1)(A).
The District Court made findings with respect to quantity only under the
preponderance of evidence standard. The District Court found Malachi conspired to
distribute 1400 kilograms of marijuana, and Fitzgerald conspired to distribute 2600
kilograms of marijuana, by a preponderance of the evidence.
As initially calculated, the guidelines for Malachi specified a range of 121-150
months; for Fitzgerald, 168-210 months. Because there was no finding of drug quantity
beyond a reasonable doubt, the District Court believed its authority after Apprendi was
constrained by the statutory maximum for trafficking less than fifty kilograms of
marijuana. For this reason, it sentenced Malachi to five years, the maximum for such a
quantity absent a prior felony drug conviction. Because Fitzgerald had a prior felony drug
conviction, it sentenced him to ten years, the maximum permitted for trafficking under
fifty kilograms of marijuana. Defendants appeal.
In United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858 (3d Cir. 2000), we held Apprendi does
not apply where a relevant factor raises the maximum statutory penalty, so long as the
sentence actually imposed remains at or below the maximum applicable when the factor
is not established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 863. Because the District Court here
imposed a sentence within the maximum statutory range for trafficking less than fifty
kilograms of marijuana, Apprendi does not apply.
Defendants seek to avoid this conclusion by arguing that the District Court’s
verdict amounted to an acquittal of any charge that they conspired to traffic more than
fifty kilograms of marijuana. It follows, they argue, that the District’s finding of
substantially greater amounts of marijuana for purposes of application of the sentencing
guidelines which raised their sentences up to the statutory maxima amounted to
double jeopardy, insofar as it negated the effect of the "acquittal." There is no basis,
however, for defendants’ claim that they were acquitted of trafficking more than fifty
kilograms of marijuana.
Furthermore, an "acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering
conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a
preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997).
Accordingly, it was appropriate to determine the applicable sentence (within the
constraints imposed by the statute) based on an amount of marijuana found by a
preponderance of the evidence, though not beyond a reasonable doubt. This is simply a
consequence of the different standards of proof employed.
Defendants contend the lack of a specific finding on quantity bars conviction under
841(b)(1)(D), which applies to trafficking less than fifty kilograms. They argue they can
be convicted only under 841(b)(4), which applies to defendants who have "distribut[ed]
a small quantity of marihuana for no remuneration," because their responsibility for more
than "a small quantity" has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. But the
District Court expressly found at trial beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants
conspired to distribute "large quantities" of marijuana a finding inconsistent with

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application of 841(b)(4). This was consistent with the evidence presented at trial.
Fitzgerald also contests the court’s application of the higher statutory maximum by
reason of a previous conviction for drug-related felonies. The basis for his argument is
that the prior conviction which Fitzgerald does not now contest was not noted in the
indictment, and was not established beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. In Apprendi,
however, the Court excepted from its rule prior convictions: "Other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490
(emphasis added). The Court declined to overrule its previous decision that prior
conviction need not be so treated. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224
(1998). Whatever misgivings the Court may have expressed about that decision in
Apprendi are, for these purposes, irrelevant. The Apprendi Court expressly declined to
overrule it, and we are therefore bound by it. 530 U.S. at 489-490.
Accordingly, the judgments of sentence will be affirmed.
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
Circuit Judge
DATED:

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